Supreme Court of the United States, 2015

The Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit, holding that a Kansas drug‑paraphernalia misdemeanor does not make an alien removable under 8 U.S.C. §1227(a)(2)(B)(i) because the state statute is not limited to substances defined in 21 U.S.C. §802.

The Supreme Court held that 18 U.S.C. §875(c), which punishes transmitting in interstate commerce a communication containing a threat to injure another person, cannot support a conviction premised solely on how a reasonable person would view the posts, because that standard amounts to negligence and criminal statutes…

The Supreme Court held that a Chapter 7 debtor may not void a junior mortgage lien under §506(d) when the senior mortgage exceeds the property's value, reversing the Eleventh Circuit and remanding for further proceedings.

The Court held that under Title VII, an applicant need only show that need for an accommodation was a motivating factor in the employer's decision, not that the employer had actual knowledge of the need. Thomas dissenting in part, argued that applying a neutral policy does not constitute intentional discrimination.

Justice Alito argues that the Court should require at least recklessness as the mens rea for convictions under 18 U.S.C. §875(c) and that the jury instructions in Elonis were defective for requiring only negligence.

The Supreme Court held that Article III permits bankruptcy judges to adjudicate "Stern claims" — statutorily core claims that constitutionally require Article III adjudication — with the parties' knowing and voluntary consent, and that such consent need not be express but may be implied under Roell v.

Justice Thomas dissents, arguing that whether parties may consent to non-Article III bankruptcy courts adjudicating Stern claims is a difficult constitutional question the majority resolves too easily.

Justice Alito concurs in part and in the judgment, joining the Court's holding that a bankruptcy judge’s resolution of a Stern claim with consent does not violate Article III. He would not decide whether consent may be implied and notes the respondent forfeited any Stern objection by failing to raise it properly…

The Supreme Court held that, under the Prison Litigation Reform Act's 'three strikes' provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), a prior dismissal on a statutorily enumerated ground counts as a strike even if the dismissal is pending on appeal when the prisoner files a new action.

The Supreme Court held that the six‑year limitations period under ERISA §1113 may be triggered by a breach of a fiduciary’s continuing duty to monitor and remove imprudent investments, vacating the Ninth Circuit’s judgment that the claim was untimely and remanding for further consideration.

The Court held that when a debtor converts a Chapter 13 case to Chapter 7, any post‑petition wages held by the Chapter 13 trustee must be returned to the debtor, not distributed to creditors, absent a bad‑faith conversion.

The Court held that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) does not prohibit a court from ordering a convicted felon to transfer firearms to a third party if the felon cannot retain control over them.

The Supreme Court dismissed as improvidently granted its first question--whether Title II of the ADA requires law enforcement officers to provide accommodations to an armed, violent, and mentally ill suspect in the course of bringing the suspect into custody--because San Francisco abandoned the argument it had pressed…

The Court held that judicial review of the EEOC's conciliation efforts is permitted under Title VII, but its scope is narrow. The EEOC must inform the employer of the allegation and attempt discussion, yet courts cannot impose detailed procedural requirements. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Court held that Florida's canon prohibiting judicial candidates from personally soliciting campaign funds does not violate the First Amendment. The restriction survives strict scrutiny because it serves the compelling interest in preserving public confidence in judicial integrity and is narrowly tailored to that…

The Court held that the Federal Tort Claims Act’s two‑year agency filing deadline and six‑month suit‑filing deadline are not jurisdictional limits and therefore may be equitably tolled.

The Court held that the Federal Tort Claims Act's statute of limitations is not jurisdictional and is subject to equitable tolling. We reverse the district courts' dismissals and remand to determine tolling equities.

The Court held that the Natural Gas Act does not preempt state antitrust suits brought by direct purchasers of natural gas against interstate pipelines for alleged price manipulation.

The Supreme Court held that a police stop exceeding the time needed to handle the matter for which the stop was made violates the Fourth Amendment's shield against unreasonable seizures: authority for a traffic stop ends when tasks tied to the infraction are—or reasonably should have been—completed, and a dog sniff…

In a five-to-four judgment authored by Justice Scalia (except as to Part IV), the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and held that Medicaid providers cannot maintain an officer-enjoining equitable suit to compel Idaho to raise habilitation-service reimbursement rates under § 30(A) of the Medicaid Act.

The Court held that the Sixth Circuit erred in granting habeas relief because the Michigan Court of Appeals' decision was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law; Cronic does not apply to counsel’s brief absence during testimony about co‑defendants, so the petition for relief…

The Court held that North Carolina’s satellite‑based monitoring program, which requires a sex offender to wear an ankle‑bracelet that continuously tracks his movements, constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment, and vacated the state courts’ judgments, remanding for further proceedings on the reasonableness of…

In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the Sixth Circuit's affirmance of federal habeas relief for Cory Donald, whose trial attorney was briefly absent during testimony concerning a telephone-call chart among his codefendants.

The Supreme Court held that the second clause of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act neither grants pregnant workers a 'most-favored-nation' entitlement to every accommodation given any subset of workers, nor merely defines sex discrimination to include pregnancy; instead, a pregnant worker may prove disparate treatment…

The Supreme Court vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded, holding that the lower court erred by analyzing the racial gerrymandering claim against the State as a whole, by improperly finding the Alabama Democratic Conference lacked standing, by miscalculating predominance by treating equal‑population goals…

The Supreme Court held that a pregnant worker may prove disparate treatment under the second clause of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act through the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework: she makes a prima facie case by showing she sought and was denied an accommodation the employer granted to others 'similar in…

The Court held that a decision of the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board may have issue-preclusive effect in later trademark infringement litigation when the ordinary elements of issue preclusion are satisfied.

The Supreme Court held that a sincere statement of pure opinion in a securities registration statement is not an 'untrue statement of material fact' under Section 11 of the Securities Act, even if the opinion later proves wrong.

The Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of certiorari. Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor, dissented, arguing that Texas’s special‑issues sentencing scheme violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments as held in Penry and that Bower is entitled to a new sentencing proceeding.

The Supreme Court held that the D.C. Circuit's Paralyzed Veterans doctrine—which required notice-and-comment procedures whenever an agency issued a new interpretation of a regulation deviating significantly from a prior definitive interpretation—is inconsistent with the APA, because 5 U.S.C.

The Supreme Court held that it retains jurisdiction to issue further proceedings, orders, and writs necessary to give force and effect to the decree in the Kansas‑Nebraska water dispute.

The Supreme Court, exercising original jurisdiction, issued a decree resolving a water‑compact dispute between Kansas, Nebraska, and Colorado. It reformed the RRCA accounting procedures, held Nebraska not liable for certain evaporative losses, classified evaporation from non‑federal reservoirs as a Beneficial…

The Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit and held that the term “tangible object” in 18 U.S.C. §1519 is limited to objects used to record or preserve information, not any physical object such as fish.

The Court held Nebraska knowingly breached the Republican River Compact, ordering partial disgorgement of gains but no injunction, and authorized reform of accounting procedures to exclude imported water. The Special Master's recommendations were adopted after independent review of the record.

Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas concurred in part and dissented in part from the Court's resolution of a water compact dispute. They agreed Nebraska breached the Compact but opposed awarding disgorgement for non-deliberate breach or reforming the Settlement absent mutual mistake.

The Court affirmed the Special Master’s findings that Nebraska knowingly breached the Republican River Compact and ordered partial disgorgement of Nebraska’s gains but denied Kansas’s request for an injunction; it also adopted the Master’s amendment to the Accounting Procedures to exclude imported water.

The Supreme Court held that the Sixth Circuit’s reliance on the Yard‑Man decision to infer vested retiree health‑care benefits conflicts with ordinary contract law and therefore must be rejected.

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The Court held that trademark tacking availability is a question for the jury, not the judge, when a jury trial is requested. It reasoned that the inquiry involves consumer commercial impression, which falls within a jury's factual assessment capabilities.