Supreme Court of the United States, 2015

The Supreme Court held that the California Court of Appeal's interpretation of the contractual phrase 'law of your state' to include state law invalidated by federal preemption was preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act. Accordingly, the arbitration agreement must be enforced.

The Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit, holding that the appellate court failed to give the required deference under AEDPA to the Kentucky Supreme Court’s decision that the trial judge properly excused a juror whose answers were ambiguous about the death penalty.

Justice Thomas (joined by Justice Ginsburg and Justice Sotomayor) dissents, arguing that the Federal Arbitration Act does not apply to state‑court proceedings and that the ambiguous "law of your state" clause in DIRECTV’s contract should be construed against the drafter under traditional state‑contract principles.

The Court held that Carol Sachs's suit is not “based upon” a commercial activity carried out in the United States, so the commercial activity exception of 28 U.S.C. §1605(a)(2) does not apply and OBB Personenverkehr AG is immune from suit. The judgment of the Ninth Circuit was reversed.

The Court reversed the Fifth Circuit's denial of qualified immunity to Trooper Mullenix, holding that existing precedent did not clearly establish that his conduct violated the Fourth Amendment under the specific circumstances he confronted.

The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the Maryland Court of Appeals' decision vacating James Kulbicki's murder conviction on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel.

The Supreme Court affirmed the Tenth Circuit's judgment denying a preliminary injunction against Oklahoma's three-drug lethal injection protocol, which uses a 500-milligram dose of midazolam as the first drug.

This dissent from the denial of certiorari argues the Court should review two Fourth Circuit cases where state court rulings on juror misconduct were deemed unreasonable. Justice Thomas asserts the Court of Appeals improperly relied on its own precedents to define the matter pending before the jury under Remmer v.

EPA reversed the D.C. Circuit, holding that the agency unreasonably ignored costs when deciding if regulating power plants was 'appropriate and necessary' under the Clean Air Act.

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court, holding that the Arizona Legislature has standing to challenge Proposition 106 and that both the Elections Clause and 2 U.S.C. §2a(c) permit Arizona to use an independent redistricting commission for congressional districts.

The Court held that the Armed Career Criminal Act’s residual clause is unconstitutionally vague because it requires courts to assess the risk posed by an imagined ordinary version of an offense without providing a reliable method for determining either the relevant conduct or the required degree of risk.

The Supreme Court held that Section 36B of the Internal Revenue Code makes Affordable Care Act premium tax credits available to individuals enrolled through Exchanges established by the Federal Government as well as those established by States.

The Court held that disparate-impact claims are cognizable under the Fair Housing Act (FHA), relying on the statute's results-oriented language, analogous statutes (Title VII, ADEA), and congressional ratification in 1988.

The Court held that a pretrial detainee bringing an excessive-force claim under the Fourteenth Amendment must prove that the force was purposely or knowingly used and was objectively unreasonable, not that the officer subjectively knew the force was excessive.

The Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of certiorari filed by Roy Carlton. Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Breyer, explained that while the Fifth Circuit’s rule that factual errors cannot be reviewed under plain error is misguided, the Court declined to intervene.

The Court held that the Takings Clause applies to personal property and that the Reserve requirement was a physical appropriation requiring just compensation regardless of any retained interest in proceeds.

The Court held that the Takings Clause applies to personal property and requires just compensation when the government physically appropriates it. The reserve requirement for raisins was a physical taking that could not be avoided by retaining net proceeds or as a condition of access to interstate commerce.

Justice Sotomayor dissents from the majority's holding that the Raisin Marketing Order effects a per se taking under Loretto. She argues the Order does not destroy all of the Hornes' property rights because they retain the right to proceeds from reserve raisin sales.

The Supreme Court reversed the Supreme Court of Ohio, holding that a 3-year-old abuse victim's statements to his preschool teachers identifying Darius Clark as his abuser were not 'testimonial' under the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause and were therefore admissible at trial even though the child never…

The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's grant of federal habeas relief to Hector Ayala, a California prisoner sentenced to death for a 1985 San Diego triple murder, whose counsel had been excluded from the ex parte portions of the Batson hearings at which the prosecution justified peremptory strikes against all…

The Supreme Court held that the Town of Gilbert, Arizona's Sign Code provisions governing 'Temporary Directional Signs Relating to a Qualifying Event' are content-based regulations of speech because the Code defines sign categories by the messages they convey — ideological, political, or directional to a nonprofit…

The Court held that the state court unreasonably determined the facts when it denied Brumfield an evidentiary hearing on his claim that intellectual disability barred his execution.

The Court held that the state court's rejection of Brumfield's Atkins claim was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Brumfield was entitled to an evidentiary hearing because the record supported a finding of intellectual disability. Vacated and remanded.

Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan, dissents from the Court’s decision that Hector Ayala is not entitled to habeas relief, arguing that the exclusion of his counsel from Batson hearings raises grave doubt about harmlessness of the error.

The Court held that Texas specialty license plate designs are government speech, so the Board’s refusal to approve the Sons of Confederate Veterans’ Confederate‑flag plate did not violate the First Amendment. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit’s judgment was reversed.

Justice Kennedy concurs with the Court’s judgment that Hector Ayala is not entitled to habeas relief, but writes separately to highlight the severe conditions of long‑term solitary confinement that Ayala has endured, noting its historical and psychological harms.

The Supreme Court held that 11 U.S.C. §330(a)(1) does not permit bankruptcy courts to award attorney's fees for defending fee applications, affirming the Fifth Circuit's judgment. The decision rests on the American Rule and the textual meaning of "services rendered," which excludes fee‑defense litigation.

The Court vacated and remanded the judgment requiring further review of the denial of an immigrant visa to Fauzia Din's husband. Justice Scalia's plurality concluded that the denial did not deprive Din of a constitutionally protected liberty interest, while Justice Kennedy, whose concurrence supplied the controlling…

Justice Thomas dissents, arguing that the Court of Appeals improperly recharacterized Mata's motion to reopen removal proceedings and misapplied jurisdictional burden rules; he would vacate the judgment and remand for proper consideration.

The Court held that 11 U.S.C. §330(a)(1) does not permit a bankruptcy court to award attorney’s fees for work defending a fee application, affirming the Fifth Circuit’s reversal.

The Supreme Court held that federal courts of appeals have jurisdiction to review BIA denials of motions to reopen, even when denied as untimely. The Court reversed the Fifth Circuit, which had dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction by treating the motion as a request for unreviewable sua sponte reopening.

Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Kagan, dissents from the Court’s opinion, arguing that bankruptcy courts may consider the costs incurred in defending fee applications as relevant factors in determining reasonable compensation under 11 U.S.C.

The Supreme Court held that a federal court of appeals has jurisdiction to review a Board of Immigration Appeals denial of a motion to reopen removal proceedings, even when the motion is dismissed as untimely.

The Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of certiorari. Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Kagan, concurred, emphasizing that the Eleventh Circuit erred in abandoning the Ylst "look‑through" presumption and that the district court had properly applied it.

Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, dissented from the Supreme Court’s denial of a petition for a writ of certiorari, arguing that the Ninth Circuit’s upholding of San Francisco’s handgun‑storage ordinance improperly burdened the core Second Amendment right of self‑defense and that the Court should have granted…

Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, dissented from the Supreme Court’s denial of a petition for certiorari challenging San Francisco’s handgun‑storage ordinance. The dissent argues that the Ninth Circuit erred by applying only intermediate scrutiny to a law that burdens the core Second Amendment right of…

The Court held that Congress may not enact a law that forces the President to contradict his own recognition determination; therefore §214(d) of the 2003 Foreign Relations Authorization Act, which required passports of Jerusalem‑born citizens to list Israel as the place of birth, is unconstitutional.

The Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit, holding that a Kansas drug‑paraphernalia misdemeanor does not make an alien removable under 8 U.S.C. §1227(a)(2)(B)(i) because the state statute is not limited to substances defined in 21 U.S.C. §802.

The Supreme Court held that 18 U.S.C. §875(c), which punishes transmitting in interstate commerce a communication containing a threat to injure another person, cannot support a conviction premised solely on how a reasonable person would view the posts, because that standard amounts to negligence and criminal statutes…