Supreme Court of the United States

Anthony Douglas Elonis, Petitioner v. United States.

June 1, 2015575 U.S. 723

Summary

The Supreme Court held that 18 U.S.C. §875(c), which punishes transmitting in interstate commerce a communication containing a threat to injure another person, cannot support a conviction premised solely on how a reasonable person would view the posts, because that standard amounts to negligence and criminal statutes silent on mens rea must be read to require the mental state necessary to separate wrongful from otherwise innocent conduct. Applying the presumption in favor of scienter element by element, the Court concluded that the mens rea must attach to the threatening nature of the communication—the crucial element separating legal innocence from wrongful conduct—and that §875(c) is satisfied by transmission for the purpose of issuing a threat or with knowledge that the communication will be viewed as a threat, while expressly reserving whether recklessness would suffice and not reaching the First Amendment questions. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion, joined by six Justices, and the Third Circuit's judgment was reversed and the case remanded. Justice Alito concurred in part and dissented in part, contending the Court should have held recklessness sufficient and remanded for the Third Circuit to apply that standard, and Justice Thomas dissented, arguing the traditional general-intent standard governed and the conviction should be affirmed.

Holding

  • Whether §875(c) requires a mental state notwithstanding its textual silence on mens rea. Yes. Neither the word 'threat' nor the contrast with the express 'intent to extort' requirements in §§875(b) and (d) identifies any mental state in §875(c)'s text, but 'mere omission from a criminal enactment of any mention of criminal intent' does not dispense with the requirement: federal criminal statutes silent on mental state are read to include 'only that mens rea which is necessary to separate' wrongful from otherwise innocent conduct, and a defendant must know the facts that make his conduct fit the offense definition even if not that those facts give rise to a crime.
  • Whether the reasonable-person jury instruction sufficed and what mental state §875(c) demands. No. Because the threatening nature of the communication is 'the crucial element separating legal innocence from wrongful conduct,' the mental state requirement must apply to the fact that the communication contains a threat; a conviction premised solely on how a reasonable person would view the posts reduces culpability to negligence, inconsistent with the criminal-law requirement of 'awareness of some wrongdoing.' Section 875(c) is satisfied if the defendant transmits a communication for the purpose of issuing a threat or with knowledge that the communication will be viewed as a threat; the instruction given was error and Elonis's conviction cannot stand.
  • Whether recklessness suffices for liability under §875(c). Reserved. The Court declined to address whether recklessness would also suffice because neither party briefed or argued the point, noting that no Court of Appeals has even addressed that question and that following its usual practice of awaiting a decision below and hearing from the parties would help ensure the question is decided correctly.

Docket 13-983

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