Supreme Court of the United States
Thomas E. Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Association Jerome Nickols, Et…
March 9, 2015575 U.S. 92
Summary
The Supreme Court held that the D.C. Circuit's Paralyzed Veterans doctrine—which required notice-and-comment procedures whenever an agency issued a new interpretation of a regulation deviating significantly from a prior definitive interpretation—is inconsistent with the APA, because 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) categorically exempts interpretive rules from those procedures. Because an agency need not use notice-and-comment to issue an initial interpretive rule, it need not do so when amending or repealing one, and courts may not impose procedural requirements beyond the APA's specified maximum. The Court reversed the judgment below that had vacated the Department of Labor's 2010 Administrator's Interpretation classifying mortgage-loan officers as non-exempt under the FLSA, and declined to reach MBA's waived argument that the interpretation was a legislative rule. Justices Alito, Scalia, and Thomas concurred in the judgment; Scalia and Thomas wrote separately to argue that Auer/Seminole Rock deference to agency interpretations of regulations is constitutionally suspect and should be reconsidered or abandoned.
Holding
- Whether the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine is consistent with the APA.. It is not. Section 553(b)(A)'s exemption of interpretive rules from notice-and-comment requirements is categorical: because an agency is not required to use those procedures to issue an initial interpretive rule, it is also not required to use them when it amends or repeals that interpretive rule.
- Whether courts may impose procedural requirements on agencies beyond those specified in the APA.. No. The APA sets forth the full extent of judicial authority to review executive agency action for procedural correctness, and § 553 states the maximum procedural requirements courts may impose; the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine creates a judge-made procedural right—a right to notice and comment when an agency changes its interpretation of a regulation—that reviewing courts lack authority to impose.
- Whether MBA's defenses preserve the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine.. No. An agency can 'interpret' a regulation without 'effectively amend[ing]' it, and the assertion is irreconcilable with the longstanding recognition that interpretive rules lack the force and effect of law; Christensen addressed substantive invalidity from conflict with a regulation's text, not procedural validity; Guernsey confirms interpretive rules do not require notice and comment, and its contrary passage is dictum taken out of context; and policy concerns are answered by arbitrary-and-capricious review and statutory safe harbors rather than a judge-made notice-and-comment trigger.
- Whether the Court should address MBA's contention that the 2010 Administrator's Interpretation is a legislative rule.. No—the argument is waived. The parties litigated on the understanding that the interpretation was an interpretive rule, neither lower court considered the legislative-rule claim, and MBA's brief in opposition to certiorari did not dispute petitioners' assertions that it is an interpretive rule.
Docket 13-1041
Cited authorities
- Rule 15.2
- 5 U.S.C. § 553
- 5 U.S.C. § 553
- 5 U.S.C. § 553
- 52 Admin. L. Rev. 547
- 72 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 893
- 52 Stat. 1060
- 29 U.S.C. § 201
Cited by
- The State ex rel. McCann v. Delaware County Board of Elections.
- The Nipmuc Nation v. Jewell
- Centro Presente v. Biden
- Candra v. Cronen
- Donahue Francis v. Kings Park Manor, Inc., Corrine Downing, Raymond Endres
- La Union Del Pueblo Entero v. Federal Emergency Management Agency (fema)
- Bnsf Railway Company v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
- Bodie S. Knapp, Doing Business as the Wild Side v. United States Department of Agriculture