Peggy Young, Petitioner v. United Parcel Service, Inc.

Summary

The Supreme Court held that a pregnant worker may prove disparate treatment under the second clause of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act through the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework: she makes a prima facie case by showing she sought and was denied an accommodation the employer granted to others 'similar in their ability or inability to work'; the employer may then offer legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons (which normally cannot rest on cost or convenience alone); and the plaintiff may reach a jury by showing the employer's policies impose a significant burden on pregnant workers that the proffered reasons do not sufficiently justify, yielding an inference of intentional discrimination. The Court rejected petitioner Young's 'most-favored-nation' reading, UPS's reading that the second clause merely defines sex discrimination to include pregnancy, and special reliance on the EEOC's 2014 guidance under Skidmore. Because Young created a genuine dispute as to whether UPS favored at least some employees whose situations could not reasonably be distinguished from hers, the Court vacated the Fourth Circuit's affirmance of summary judgment and remanded for a determination on pretext. Justice Alito concurred in the judgment on narrower grounds, while Justices Scalia and Kennedy dissented, arguing the Court's significant-burden/sufficiently-strong-justification test lacks textual foundation and conflates disparate treatment with disparate impact.