Supreme Court of the United States, 2001

The Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, holding that qualified immunity analysis requires a sequential two-step inquiry distinct from the merits of the underlying constitutional claim. The Court ordered courts to first decide if a constitutional right was violated before determining if the right was clearly established.

Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Souter, concurs with the Court’s judgment that 28 U.S.C. §2244(d)(2) applies only to State post‑conviction applications and not to federal habeas petitions.

The Supreme Court held that the qualified immunity ruling requires analysis not susceptible of fusion with the excessive force claim, reversing the Ninth Circuit's approach of merging these inquiries.

The Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts, holding that the United States holds title, in trust for the Coeur d'Alene Tribe, to the submerged lands beneath the lower third of Lake Coeur d'Alene and part of the St. Joe River.

Justice Breyer concurred in part, agreeing with the Court's conclusion that summary judgment was improper. He emphasized that child perception of endorsement is critical under the Establishment Clause and noted the procedural posture required further factual development regarding how children perceive the Club's…

The Court, in an opinion by Justice Kennedy joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens, Scalia, and Thomas, upheld the sex-based requirements of 8 U. S. C. § 1409(a)(4) for transmitting citizenship to children born abroad and out of wedlock.

In this original action concerning Colorado's violations of the Arkansas River Compact, the Court held that the Eleventh Amendment permits Kansas to recover damages measured partly by its farmers' losses because Kansas is pursuing its own sovereign interests, not merely representing private claimants.

Justice Stevens, dissenting, would hold that a school operating a limited public forum may permit discussion of topics from a religious perspective while excluding activities principally devoted to proselytizing or worship, so long as the distinction is applied evenhandedly.

The Court, in an opinion by Justice Thomas joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy, with Justice Breyer joining in part, held that Milford's exclusion of the Good News Club from its afterschool limited public forum constituted unconstitutional religious viewpoint discrimination.

Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer, held that using technology not in general public use to obtain information about a home's interior that previously could not have been obtained without physical intrusion constitutes a Fourth Amendment search.

Justice Scalia concurs in the judgment, emphasizing that the exclusion of the Good News Club was viewpoint discrimination under the Free Speech Clause because the school had opened its forum for moral and character development.

Justice O’Connor’s dissent argues that the citizenship statute’s different requirements for unmarried citizen fathers and mothers violate equal protection because the Government failed to provide an exceedingly persuasive justification and failed to show a substantial relationship between the sex-based classification…

The Court held that 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a) does not violate equal protection under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. It applied intermediate scrutiny, concluding the requirement that unwed citizen fathers take specific steps before a child turns 18 is substantially related to important governmental objectives…

Justice Stevens dissents, arguing that using a thermal imager to measure heat from a home's exterior does not constitute a Fourth Amendment search because it reveals only public domain information.

Justice O'Connor concurred in part in the Court's disposition regarding the award and determination of damages, joining Parts I, IV, and V of the majority opinion. She dissented from the award of prejudgment interest to Kansas, arguing that under the law at the time the Compact was signed, such interest on…

Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ginsburg, dissents on the grounds that the majority misapplied Lamb’s Chapel to a case involving religious use rather than viewpoint discrimination and improperly reached the Establishment Clause issue without prior resolution in the lower courts.

The Court held that a corporate employee and the corporation he owns are distinct entities for purposes of the RICO provision requiring a person to conduct an enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity.

Justice Ginsburg, dissenting, argues that a plaintiff who secures the relief sought through a lawsuit—even without a formal judgment or settlement entered in court—should be deemed a prevailing party eligible for attorney’s fees under the Fair Housing Amendments Act and the ADA.

Justice Scalia concurred in the Court's judgment and reasoning, elaborating on the traditional meaning of "prevailing party" in federal fee-shifting statutes and rejecting the catalyst theory.

Justice Rehnquist, dissenting, argues that the Ten Commandments monument on Elkhart’s municipal lawn has a genuine secular purpose and effect, reflecting the historical and legal heritage of the community, and therefore should not be struck down under the Establishment Clause.

The Court unanimously upheld the NLRB's rule placing the burden of proving supervisory status on the party asserting it, including an employer challenging a bargaining unit through an unfair-labor-practice proceeding.

The Supreme Court reversed the Arkansas Supreme Court, holding that subjective police motivation is irrelevant under the Fourth Amendment where probable cause exists (Whren) and state courts cannot expand federal constitutional rights beyond Supreme Court precedent (Hass).

Stevens concurred in part and dissented in part. He agreed the Court of Appeals wrongly allocated the burden of proof but argued the NLRB's interpretation of 'independent judgment' deserved deference. He would reverse the Court of Appeals decision rather than affirm it on that basis.

The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, ruling that the party claiming supervisory status under the NLRA bears the burden of proof, and rejecting the Board's categorical exclusion of professional judgment from the statutory term 'independent judgment.' Justice Stevens, concurring in part and dissenting in part, would…

Justice Ginsburg delivered the Court’s opinion granting Maine’s motion to dismiss this original boundary action. Judicial estoppel barred New Hampshire from claiming that the Piscataqua River boundary followed the Maine shore after New Hampshire had successfully supported a contrary interpretation in the earlier…

Justice Souter delivered the unanimous opinion holding that the Prison Litigation Reform Act requires a prisoner seeking only money damages to exhaust an available administrative grievance process that can provide some relief, even when it cannot award money.

Justice Scalia dissents, arguing that the majority’s reading of Title III of the ADA wrongly treats professional golfers as customers of a public accommodation and extends the statute beyond its textual scope.

The Court held that the catalyst theory does not permit attorney's fees under the Fair Housing Amendments Act or the Americans with Disabilities Act. A defendant's voluntary change in conduct, even if prompted by the lawsuit and providing the requested relief, does not establish prevailing-party status without a…

Justice Breyer, writing for a unanimous Court, held that selling an option to purchase stock while secretly intending never to honor the option violates § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5.

Justice Scalia concurs with the majority that the Social Security tax extension to Article III judges violates the Compensation Clause, but dissents from the majority’s reasoning on the Medicare tax, arguing that eliminating a tax exemption that formed part of judges' compensation is unconstitutional.

The Court held that the Compensation Clause does not prohibit nondiscriminatory taxes like Medicare on federal judges, overruling Evans v. Gore on that point. However, the specific Social Security tax scheme singled out judges for unfavorable treatment, violating the Clause.

Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, dissenting, argues that statutes prohibiting disclosure of illegally intercepted communications are content-neutral and subject to intermediate scrutiny. He contends they protect privacy and deter interception without unlawfully chilling speech.

Justice Breyer concurred in the judgment, agreeing that the statutes as applied violated the Constitution but emphasizing the narrow holding limited to lawful broadcasters and matters of unusual public concern involving threats. He argued the Court's decision does not imply broader immunity for the media.

The Court held that the First Amendment protects the disclosure of an illegally intercepted cellular conversation when the disclosers did not participate in the interception, obtained the information lawfully, knew or had reason to know of the unlawful interception, and the conversation concerned a matter of public…

The Court held that the Compensation Clause permits generally applicable, nondiscriminatory taxation of sitting federal judges, partially overruling Evans v. Gore and reversing the ruling against the Medicare tax.

Justice Thomas dissents from denial of certiorari, arguing the Court should grant review to resolve a circuit conflict regarding the proper population measure for one-person, one-vote districting (total vs. citizen voting age population).

Justice Thomas dissents, arguing that the Supreme Court should resolve the unsettled question of which population measure—total population or citizen voting‑age population—governs the one‑person‑one‑vote requirement in local districting, and he would grant certiorari to address this issue.

The Supreme Court affirmed the Supreme Court of Tennessee's judicial abolition of the common law 'year and a day rule' and its retroactive application to uphold Rogers's second-degree murder conviction, finding no violation of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.