Supreme Court of the United States, 2001

Justice Scalia, joined in full by Justices Stevens and Thomas and in part by Justice Breyer, dissented from the approval of Rogers's murder conviction. He would have held that due process prohibits a court from retroactively eliminating an established element of a crime and applying that change to earlier conduct…

The Court, in an opinion by Justice Thomas joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy, held that medical necessity is not a defense to manufacturing and distributing marijuana under the Controlled Substances Act.

The Court held that appellate courts must review de novo a district court's determination whether punitive damages are constitutionally excessive, while reviewing underlying factual findings for clear error.

Justice Ginsburg dissents, arguing appellate review of a trial court’s determination that punitive damages are not grossly excessive should be for abuse of discretion, not de novo. She relies on Gasperini and the Seventh Amendment, contending district courts are better positioned to assess jury factfindings.

Justice Stevens dissents from the Supreme Court's summary reversal of the Ninth Circuit's decision, arguing that existing case law does not provide clear standards for reviewing an arbitrator's behavior sufficiently to warrant such an extraordinary remedy without briefing or argument.

The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, holding that courts may not resolve the merits of a labor arbitration dispute based on their own factual findings. When an arbitrator's award must be vacated, the appropriate remedy is to remand for further arbitration proceedings rather than entering judgment.

Justice Ginsburg delivered the unanimous opinion holding that the Tribe clearly waived its sovereign immunity from a state-court action to enforce an arbitration award. The contract required binding arbitration, authorized judicial enforcement of awards, incorporated arbitration rules contemplating enforcement in…

Justice Thomas dissents, arguing the majority departed from the clearly erroneous standard of review by engaging in extensive fact-finding regarding the District Court’s determination that race predominated in North Carolina’s District 12.

The Supreme Court reversed the three‑judge district court’s finding that race was the predominant factor in drawing North Carolina’s 1997 12th Congressional District, holding that the evidence did not meet the demanding burden required to prove an unconstitutional racial gerrymander.

The Supreme Court held that a state prisoner generally may not use a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition to collaterally attack an expired prior conviction that was used to enhance a current sentence, extending its earlier § 2255 ruling in Daniels v.

The Supreme Court held that, as a general rule, a federal prisoner may not use a § 2255 motion to collaterally attack the validity of prior convictions used to enhance his sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act once those convictions are no longer open to direct or collateral attack in their own right; the…

Justice Souter dissents, arguing the plurality's rule against attacking predicate convictions is flawed where state process proved imaginary. He contends the majority prematurely concludes Coss cannot show adverse effect on his sentence without adequate appellate consideration.

Justice Scalia concurs in part, agreeing that 28 U.S.C. § 2255 does not permit inquiry into whether a conviction used to enhance a federal sentence was unconstitutionally obtained, save for Gideon violations. He rejects the Court's speculation that rare exceptions might exist based on unavailability of review.

Justice Souter dissents, arguing that 28 U.S.C. § 2255 permits federal prisoners to challenge the constitutionality of prior state convictions used for ACCA sentence enhancements.

The Court held that private individuals may not sue to enforce disparate-impact regulations promulgated under § 602 of Title VI, as neither § 601 nor § 602 manifests congressional intent to create a private right of action for regulations extending beyond intentional discrimination.

The Court held that prisoners have no freestanding First Amendment right to provide legal assistance to other inmates that receives greater protection than other prisoner communications.

The Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment does not forbid warrantless custodial arrests for minor criminal offenses: when an officer has probable cause to believe an individual committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, the arrest is reasonable without any additional balancing of interests.

Justice Stevens dissenting, argues a private right of action exists to enforce disparate-impact regulations under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act. He contends that precedents including Lau v. Nichols and Cannon v.

A per curiam Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and upheld summary judgment for the Clark County School District on a Title VII retaliation claim. Assuming arguendo that Section 2000e-3(a) protects opposition based on a reasonable, good-faith belief that a practice is unlawful, the Court held no one could…

A unanimous Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Thomas, held that prisoners do not possess a First Amendment right to provide legal assistance to fellow inmates that enhances the protections otherwise available under Turner v.

Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the unanimous opinion holding that California's withholding of disputed payments under public works contracts did not deny the subcontractor procedural due process because ordinary judicial proceedings provided an adequate opportunity to resolve its contractual claim.

The Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is offense specific and does not extend to uncharged crimes merely because they are factually related to charged crimes. It encompasses uncharged crimes that constitute the same offense under Blockburger.

Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, concurring, agrees that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals erred by not applying the offense‑specific Sixth Amendment right to counsel and therefore joins the majority in reversing that decision. He argues that the Court need not reaffirm Michigan v.

Justice Breyer dissents, arguing the majority's narrow Blockburger-based definition of "offense" undermines the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel by permitting police to question represented defendants about uncharged but factually related crimes without counsel.

Justice Kennedy's majority opinion held that employment contracts are not categorically outside the Federal Arbitration Act's coverage and that § 1 exempts only employment contracts of transportation workers. The Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's judgment and remanded.

Justice Kennedy concurs in the judgment, agreeing the search policy cannot be sustained under the Fourth Amendment but disagreeing with the majority's special needs analysis. He argues the policy lacks exemption because law enforcement was integral to its implementation, including threats of arrest.

Justice Scalia, dissenting, would have held that the collection, testing, and reporting of the urine samples did not violate the Fourth Amendment because the samples were voluntarily provided and the reporting of information entrusted to medical personnel was not itself a search.

Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer (and Justice Souter as to Parts II and III), dissents from the majority's interpretation of the Federal Arbitration Act. Stevens argues that legislative history and original congressional intent exclude all employment contracts from the Act’s enforcement, not…

Justice Souter, dissenting, argues that Section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act, which exempts workers engaged in commerce, should be read evolutionarily like Section 2 to exclude all employment contracts from arbitration rather than only transportation workers, consistent with legislative history indicating…

Justice Breyer dissents, arguing the Washington statute does not conflict with ERISA because it serves as a gap-filler for silent plan documents and aligns with employee intent. He asserts the majority ignores the presumption against preemption in traditional state fields like family property law.

Justice Stevens, joined by Justices O'Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, held that the special-needs exception did not justify a state hospital's nonconsensual drug-testing program designed to obtain evidence for law enforcement and use threatened prosecution to compel pregnant patients into treatment.

The Court, in an opinion by Justice Thomas joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg, held that ERISA expressly preempts Washington's automatic revocation of a former spouse's beneficiary designation insofar as the statute applies to ERISA plans.

Justice Breyer delivered the unanimous opinion holding that appellate courts should deferentially review a district court’s determination whether prior convictions were functionally consolidated for sentencing under the Sentencing Guidelines.

Justice Kennedy delivered the unanimous opinion holding that MDI could not obtain trade dress protection for its functional dual-spring sign-stand design. An expired utility patent is strong evidence that the features it claims are functional, imposing a heavy burden on a party seeking trade dress protection for those…

The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Ohio Supreme Court, holding that a witness who denies all culpability may still invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination if there is reasonable cause to apprehend danger.

Justice Souter, writing for a unanimous Court, held that communications between Indian Tribes and the Department of the Interior concerning competing claims to scarce water did not qualify as inter-agency or intra-agency communications under FOIA Exemption 5.

In dissenting from the Court's decision, Justice Scalia concluded that 504(a)(16) of the Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996 is constitutional under the First Amendment.

The Court held that a statutory restriction prohibiting Legal Services Corporation (LSC) funded attorneys from challenging existing welfare laws violates the First Amendment. The Court reasoned that the program facilitates private speech rather than government speech, and the restriction distorts the legal system by…

The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, holding that Missouri's Article VIII, which mandates pejorative ballot labels for candidates who do not pledge to support congressional term limits, violates the Constitution.

The Court held that the condition barring federally funded legal-services attorneys from challenging existing welfare laws violates the First Amendment because it suppresses private advocacy and distorts the functioning of the legal system rather than conveying a governmental message.