Supreme Court of the United States, 2001

The Supreme Court granted certiorari and certified a question to the Arizona Supreme Court regarding whether Arizona Rule 32.2(a)(3) requires consideration of the merits of an ineffective‑assistance claim to determine if the claim is of sufficient constitutional magnitude.

Justice Thomas, writing for six Justices, held that newly developed plant breeds qualify for utility patent protection under 35 U.S.C. § 101 and that neither the Plant Patent Act nor the Plant Variety Protection Act makes its protections exclusive or removes plants from § 101.

Scalia joins the Court, reasoning that Chakrabarty settled the ambiguity regarding composition of matter and plants, so the Plant Patent Act acts as an amendment governed by the canon against implied repeal. Justice Breyer, dissenting, would have held that specific plant statutes exclude utility patents.

Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Stevens, dissents from the Court's holding that utility patents are available for plants. He reasons that the Plant Patent Act of 1930 and the Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970 specifically exclude plant subject matter from the general utility patent statute.

The Court held that newly developed plant breeds, including sexually reproduced plants, fall within the broad subject-matter language of 35 U.S.C. § 101 and may receive utility patents.

The Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist joined by Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, declined to extend Bivens to permit damages actions against a private corporation operating a halfway house under contract with the Bureau of Prisons.

The Court, in an opinion by Justice Breyer, held that the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act does not exempt tribal gaming operations from the wagering excise and occupational taxes imposed by chapter 35 of the Internal Revenue Code.

The Court, in a per curiam opinion, dismissed the petition for a writ of certiorari as improvidently granted because the case posture and standing issues were not presented for review, thereby refusing to address the merits of the challenged DBE program. No separate concurring or dissenting opinions were filed.

The Court approved the parties' Final Settlement Stipulation, entered a Modified North Platte Decree that replaces the 1945 decree, dismissed all claims, counterclaims and cross‑claims with prejudice, and imposed detailed water‑use injunctions and apportionments among Nebraska, Wyoming, and Colorado.

Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, concurs in the judgment, agreeing that the Ninth Circuit erred in applying an injury‑discovery rule to the statute of limitations. He reiterates the traditional rule that a limitations period begins when the cause of action is complete and argues that any departure from that…

The Court held that the Fair Credit Reporting Act's then-applicable two-year statute of limitations did not incorporate a general discovery rule. Congress's express discovery exception for specified willful misrepresentations implicitly excluded a broader discovery rule, which would also render the express exception…

The Court held that the Merit Systems Protection Board may independently review prior disciplinary actions when assessing a termination even though those actions remain subject to negotiated grievance proceedings.

Justice Ginsburg concurred in the judgment but declined to rely on the Board’s independent review of prior discipline because the relationship between that review and the statutory preponderance-of-the-evidence requirement remained unsettled.

Justice Thomas concurs in vacating the Federal Circuit's judgment and remanding, but would reach the adequacy of the Board's framework for considering prior discipline subject to pending grievance proceedings.

The Court vacated the Federal Circuit’s judgment because the Merit Systems Protection Board may independently review prior disciplinary actions that remain subject to collective-bargaining grievance proceedings, and the Federal Circuit could not categorically prohibit the Board from considering them.

Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Stevens, O’Connor, and Souter, would grant certiorari and summarily reverse the judgment because the arrest warrant was issued on a form complaint that failed to satisfy Fourth Amendment probable cause requirements.

Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, dissents from the Court of Appeals order extending the stay of execution for John Byrd. The dissent argues that the stay lacks any constitutional justification and was granted only to allow additional time for consideration of a rehearing petition.

Chief Justice Rehnquist, dissenting, argued that the Court of Appeals lacked justification to stay Byrd's execution. He concluded that a stay granted solely to afford a panel member additional time to consider a case, without substantial constitutional grounds, is egregious.

Circuit Justice Rehnquist denied an application for injunctive relief pending writ of certiorari, refusing to stay implementation of Virginia's minute of silence statute. He found the applicants' legal rights not indisputably clear under the All Writs Act standard, distinguishing the case from Wallace v.

Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, and Ginsburg, held that federal habeas jurisdiction remains available to challenge post-removal-period detention and construed 8 U.S.C.

Justice Ginsburg, dissenting, argues that Palazzolo’s takings claim is not ripe because he never sought permission to develop the uplands, and she criticizes the Court for allowing new Penn Central arguments not raised below and using the State’s defense against the Lucas claim as a weapon for those new claims.

Justice Stevens joins the Court’s discussion of standing for a post‑enactment landowner but dissents from the judgment, holding that the takings claim is not ripe and that a purchaser cannot recover compensation for a taking that occurred before he owned the property.

Justice Scalia concurs in the judgment but disagrees with Justice O'Connor's reasoning regarding windfalls to subsequent purchasers. He argues that the existence of a regulation at the time of title transfer should not bar a takings claim, as investment-backed expectations do not include the assumed validity of…

Justice Kennedy's majority opinion held that Palazzolo's regulatory takings claims were ripe because the agency's decisions established the extent of permitted development, and that acquiring title after enactment of the challenged regulations did not categorically bar those claims.

Justice O'Connor concurred, joining the Court's opinion but clarifying that the timing of regulation relative to title acquisition is a factor in Penn Central analysis but not dispositive. She emphasized balancing investment-backed expectations with regulatory backdrop to avoid per se rules.

Justice Thomas, dissenting, argues that the Party Expenditure Provision violates the First Amendment because it restricts core political speech without concrete evidence of corruption.

Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, held that § 1252(a)(2)(C) deprived the Court of Appeals of jurisdiction over these aggravated felons’ petitions for direct review, but that district courts retained jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

Stevens, J., concurs in the judgment but disagrees with the majority’s conclusion that tribal courts may not exercise jurisdiction over § 1983 claims. He argues tribal courts generally have general jurisdiction unless federal law dictates otherwise, and he considers the majority’s § 1983 discussion unnecessary given…

The Supreme Court held that the appellate‑court jurisdiction‑stripping provision of 8 U.S.C. §1252(a)(2)(C) bars courts of appeals from reviewing direct‑review petitions by aliens removable because of aggravated felonies, and that such aliens must seek relief in district courts under 28 U.S.C. §2241.

Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, held that AEDPA and IIRIRA did not repeal district courts’ jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to decide St. Cyr’s legal eligibility for discretionary relief from deportation.

Justice O'Connor concurs in the judgment, agreeing that Montana governs tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers regardless of land ownership. She contends the majority failed to adequately consider land status and created an unjustified per se rule barring tribal jurisdiction over state officials on tribal land.

The Court held that the Tribes lacked regulatory authority over state officers investigating off-reservation violations of state law and therefore lacked adjudicative jurisdiction over tribal-law claims arising from those duties, notwithstanding tribal ownership of the land searched.

Justice Soutek agrees that the tribal court lacked jurisdiction over the state officers and joins the Court's disposition, but would reach that result by applying a general presumption against tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers, subject to two exceptions.

The Supreme Court held that the qualified immunity ruling requires analysis not susceptible of fusion with the excessive force claim, reversing the Ninth Circuit's approach of merging these inquiries.

Justice Scalia dissenting argues that the Court's decision replaces the established Chevron deference doctrine with a new, uncertain standard requiring affirmative congressional intent to delegate rulemaking authority via formal procedures.

The Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts, holding that the United States holds title, in trust for the Coeur d'Alene Tribe, to the submerged lands beneath the lower third of Lake Coeur d'Alene and part of the St. Joe River.

The Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, holding that qualified immunity analysis requires a sequential two-step inquiry distinct from the merits of the underlying constitutional claim. The Court ordered courts to first decide if a constitutional right was violated before determining if the right was clearly established.

The Court held that the United States, as trustee for the Coeur d’Alene Tribe, retains title to submerged lands under Lake Coeur d’Alene and the St. Joe River within the Tribe’s reservation.

Justice Souter's opinion, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer, held that Chevron deference requires congressional delegation of authority to act with the force of law and an interpretation issued in exercise of that authority.