Supreme Court of the United States, 2000

Justice Breyer, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy, held that the plaintiffs' claim that their 1987 Honda Accord should have contained an airbag was preempted because it conflicted with the deliberate federal policy of gradually introducing a mix of passive restraint systems.

Justice Ginsburg, writing for a unanimous Court, held that 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) does not cover arson of an owner-occupied residence used solely for noncommercial purposes. The statute requires active employment of the property in commerce or commerce-affecting activity; an interstate mortgage, insurance policy, or…

Justice Breyer, joined by three other Justices, dissented from the Court’s decision to invalidate the First Amendment under the First Amendment. He argued the statute was tailored to serve a compelling interest in protecting children from adult programming broadcast without parental consent.

Justice Scalia, dissenting, would uphold § 505 on the ground that it regulates the commercial pandering of sexually explicit material rather than protected speech, even assuming the programming itself is merely indecent.

Justice Thomas, concurring, explains that although obscenity regulations might have authorized a total ban on some programming in this case, the litigation proceeded on the assumption the speech was indecent but protected.

Justice Stevens dissents, arguing that the 1986 amendments to the False Claims Act clearly make a “person” include States, and that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar qui tam actions against States. He would affirm the Court of Appeals’ judgment permitting the suit.

Justice Ginsburg concurred in the judgment, agreeing with the Court that a qui tam relator is an assignee of the Government’s claim and possesses Article III standing. She agreed the False Claims Act does not authorize qui tam suits against States and concurred in resolving this statutory question without reaching the…

Justice Thomas dissents from the denial of certiorari, arguing the California Supreme Court's affirmance of an injunction against workplace harassment speech violated the First Amendment.

Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg, dissents from the Court's holding that federal preemption bars state common-law tort claims against automobile manufacturers for failure to install airbags.

Justice Thomas dissents from the Court’s denial of certiorari regarding an injunction in a workplace harassment case. He argues the injunction functions as an invalid prior restraint on speech because it is not narrowly tailored and suppresses fully protected expression.

The Supreme Court affirmed Fischer's conviction, holding that federal payments to a health care provider under the Medicare program constitute 'benefits' under 18 U.S.C. § 666(b).

Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, held that Congress lacked authority under either the Commerce Clause or § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enact the Violence Against Women Act's federal civil remedy for gender-motivated violence, and affirmed the Fourth Circuit.

The Court held that the federal bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 666, covers fraud perpetrated on organizations participating in the Medicare program because such organizations receive “benefits” under the statute.

The Court affirmed Johnson’s sentence, holding that postrevocation penalties relate to the original conviction, that § 3583(h) applies only when the original offense occurred after September 13, 1994, and that the earlier version of § 3583(e)(3) independently authorized supervised release following revocation and…

Justice Breyer delivered the unanimous Court's opinion upholding three grazing regulations against challenges that they exceeded the Secretary of the Interior's authority under the Taylor Grazing Act.

Justice Souter, dissenting, argues the Civil Rights Remedy of the Violence Against Women Act lies within Congress's Commerce Clause power given the extensive legislative record showing a substantial aggregate effect on interstate commerce.

Justice Breyer dissents, arguing that gender-motivated violence substantially affects interstate commerce through aggregation and documented legislative findings, and that judicial limits on the Commerce Clause are unworkable; he concludes that Congress also had power under §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to remedy…

Justice Kennedy, concurring in part, agrees that 18 U.S.C. §3583(e)(3) permits a trial court to impose additional incarceration and a subsequent period of supervised release after revoking a prior term, but cautions against extending a term under §3583(e)(2) and critiques the majority’s dicta on §3583(a).

Justice Scalia dissents from the Court's interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3), arguing that 'revoke' means to annul a term of supervised release, not to call it back while preserving it for later reimposition.

Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, dissented from the Court's interpretation of the Medicare-related jurisdictional requirement in 18 U.S.C. § 666(b). The dissent would construe "benefits" to mean useful aid or financial assistance to the recipient organization, not reimbursement paid to a medical provider in…

The Court affirmed the Secretary of the Interior's 1995 grazing regulations under the Taylor Grazing Act. It held the changes to "grazing preference" definitions, eligibility criteria, and title rules for improvements did not exceed statutory authority.

Justice O'Connor concurred in the Court's opinion, emphasizing that petitioners' facial challenge under the Taylor Grazing Act failed because they did not show how the regulations themselves violated the Act given Secretary assurances.

Justice Stevens dissents, arguing that under FLSA §207(o), a public employer cannot require employees to use accrued compensatory time absent a prior agreement permitting such use.

Justice Scalia concurs in part and in the judgment, joining the Court’s decision but rejecting Part III’s refusal to apply Chevron deference to the Department of Labor’s opinion letter.

Justice Ginsburg, dissenting, argues that Article 38.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure is an evidentiary witness competency rule rather than a sufficiency of evidence rule.

The Supreme Court held that Texas' 1993 amendment to Article 38.07 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which permitted conviction of certain sexual offenses on the uncorroborated testimony of victims under 18, could not be applied retroactively to offenses committed before September 1, 1993 without violating the Ex…

The Court, in an opinion by Justice Thomas, held that the FLSA and its implementing regulations do not prohibit a public employer from requiring employees to use accrued compensatory time without a prior agreement authorizing compelled use.

Justice Breyer, dissenting, argues that the Department of Labor's interpretation of the Fair Labor Standards Act concerning compensatory time should receive Skidmore deference given its expertise and reasonableness. He contends that Skidmore deference remains vital when Chevron deference might not apply.

The Court held that a civil RICO conspiracy claim cannot rest on injury caused by an overt act that is neither racketeering activity nor otherwise unlawful under RICO. Drawing on common-law civil conspiracy principles, Justice Thomas explained that the injurious act must be independently wrongful under RICO; Beck’s…

The Court held that AEDPA's certificate-of-appealability requirements govern habeas appeals initiated after its effective date, even when the district-court proceeding began earlier.

Justice Ginsburg delivered the unanimous opinion holding that due process required an opportunity for Nelson to contest his personal liability after being added as a party and before judgment was entered against him.

Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Stevens, concurs in the judgment, agreeing that the Court of Appeals correctly decided the procedural‑default issue. He argues that the majority’s rule adds unnecessary complexity to habeas law and that the determination of “cause” should remain a matter for the federal habeas judge.

Justice Scalia, writing for seven Justices, held that an ineffective-assistance claim offered as cause to excuse the procedural default of another habeas claim may itself be procedurally defaulted. A petitioner must establish cause and prejudice excusing that default before relying on the ineffective-assistance claim.

Justice Kennedy delivered the unanimous opinion holding that 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) restricts federal evidentiary hearings only when the prisoner or counsel lacked diligence, or bore greater fault, in developing the claim’s factual basis in state court.

The Court held that the Virginia Supreme Court's rejection of Williams's ineffective-assistance claim was contrary to, and involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law.

Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Stevens, dissents from the Court’s holding that federal funding of railroad crossing improvements preempts state tort law. She argues that funding alone does not preempt state safety regulations, leaving no federal standard to replace state negligence law.

Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Scalia, dissenting, argues that border patrol agents' physical manipulation of a passenger's soft-sided overhead bag did not violate the Fourth Amendment. He contends such touching is reasonably expected by travelers in light of how others commonly handle luggage.

This case involved a wrongful death action against a railroad for inadequate warning devices at a grade crossing. The Court held that the Federal Railroad Safety Act and FHWA regulations preempt state tort claims where federal funds participated in installing the devices.

Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for seven Justices, held that an officer's exploratory physical manipulation of a bus passenger's carry-on bag violated the Fourth Amendment. Although passengers expect others to move or handle luggage stored overhead, they do not ordinarily expect probing tactile examination.

The Court held that the Federal Railroad Safety Act preempts a state tort claim alleging that federally funded grade-crossing warning devices were inadequate. Because federal funds participated in installing the signs and the applicable regulations governed the devices' adequacy, federal law displaced Tennessee law on…