Supreme Court of the United States

Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc.

May 22, 2000529 U.S. 861

Summary

Justice Breyer, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy, held that the plaintiffs' claim that their 1987 Honda Accord should have contained an airbag was preempted because it conflicted with the deliberate federal policy of gradually introducing a mix of passive restraint systems. Although the Safety Act's express preemption provision did not encompass common-law tort actions, its saving clause did not prevent ordinary conflict preemption or impose a special burden against it. A formal agency statement of preemptive intent was unnecessary to establish an actual conflict. Justice Stevens dissented, joined by Justices Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg, arguing that Honda had not overcome the presumption against preemption, that the claim would not frustrate the regulation's safety objectives, and that regulatory history and litigation positions were inadequate grounds for displacing state tort remedies.

Holding

  • Whether the Safety Act expressly preempts common-law tort actions.. The Act's express preemption provision does not preempt this common-law tort action.
  • Whether the statutory saving clause forecloses or specially disfavors conflict preemption.. Ordinary conflict preemption principles apply notwithstanding the express preemption provision and saving clause, without an additional special burden against preemption.
  • Whether the plaintiffs' no-airbag claim conflicts with FMVSS 208.. The claim is preempted because the state-law duty it seeks to impose would obstruct FMVSS 208's objectives.
  • Whether conflict preemption requires a formal agency statement of preemptive intent.. A specific, formal agency statement of preemptive intent is not required when an actual conflict exists.

Docket 98-1811

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