Supreme Court of the United States, 2000

Justice Ginsburg dissents, arguing federal courts should defer to state high courts on state law interpretations under principles of federalism. She contends Article II does not authorize federal superintendence of Florida’s election law interpretation.

The Court held per curiam that Florida's court-ordered presidential recount violated equal protection because it lacked uniform ballot-evaluation standards and adequate procedural safeguards.

Justice Souter's dissent argues that the Court should not have intervened in Florida's election dispute and that the federal statutory and Article II questions were insubstantial.

Chief Justice Rehnquist concurred in the judgment, agreeing to reverse the Florida Supreme Court. He argued that Article II permits federal independent review of state law to protect legislative intent, and the Florida Court’s recount order frustrated the federal safe harbor statute.

Justice Ginsburg joins the majority on the holding that the district court’s dismissal order is a final, immediately appealable decision, but she dissents in part on the cost‑allocation issue, arguing that the burden of proving the arbitral forum’s financial inaccessibility should rest on the drafting party and that…

Justice O'Connor dissents from the denial of certiorari, arguing the Court should resolve a circuit split regarding the meaning of 'service' in the Airline Deregulation Act's preemption provision to provide certainty for airline companies.

Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion unanimously held that an order compelling arbitration and dismissing all underlying claims is an immediately appealable final decision under the Federal Arbitration Act.

Justice O'Connor, joined by Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, held that Indianapolis's suspicionless vehicle checkpoints violated the Fourth Amendment because their primary purpose was ordinary crime control through narcotics detection.

The Court, in an opinion by Justice Breyer joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg, held that public policy did not bar enforcement of an arbitration award conditionally reinstating a truck driver who twice tested positive for marijuana.

Justice Scalia concurs in the judgment because he agrees no public policy prevents reinstatement, but he critiques the Court's dictum endorsing federal courts' power to invoke public policy exceptions absent a violation of positive law.

Chief Justice Rehnquist, dissenting, argues that standardized roadblock seizures serve legitimate state interests like checking licenses and preventing drunk driving, making them constitutional under the Fourth Amendment despite the primary purpose of interdicting drugs.

The Supreme Court vacated the District Court's judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss, holding that white voters residing in majority-white districts adjacent to majority-minority districts lack standing to challenge the redistricting plan under United States v.

Justice Ginsburg delivered the unanimous opinion holding that Louisiana video poker licenses are not property in the State’s hands for purposes of the federal mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1341.

Justice Scalia delivered the unanimous opinion of the Court, holding that a state postconviction application is not improperly filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) merely because its claims are procedurally barred.

The Court held that the United States and the Quechan Tribe were not barred from seeking additional water rights for disputed Fort Yuma Reservation boundary lands. The State parties forfeited their preclusion defense by failing to raise it despite earlier opportunities, and the later consent judgment did not establish…

The Court approved and entered a proposed supplemental decree resolving water rights for the Fort Mojave and Colorado River Indian Reservations, amending previous decrees to specify annual diversion quantities, irrigable acres, and priority dates.

Justice Breyer dissents in a certiorari matter, arguing for direct appeal jurisdiction to foster legal certainty. Chief Justice Rehnquist issues a statement declining recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 455, finding no appearance of impropriety regarding his son's law firm representation.

Justice Breyer dissents, arguing the Court should note probable jurisdiction to expedite a decision on Microsoft's antitrust liability. Chief Justice Rehnquist issues a statement declining to disqualify himself under 28 U.S.C. § 455 despite his son's law firm representing Microsoft in related litigation.

The Supreme Court granted a joint motion for entry of a decree resolving a dispute between the United States and Alaska over submerged lands rights in the Beaufort Sea. The decree fixes the federal-state boundary, allocates exclusive exploration rights shoreward and seaward of that line, and specifies revenue…

Justice Ginsburg concurred to emphasize that Nebraska’s law targeted only a method of abortion rather than protecting women or fetuses, and thus chipped away at private choice without constitutionally relevant justification.

Justice O’Connor concurred in holding Nebraska’s partial-birth-abortion statute unconstitutional for two independent reasons: it lacked an exception for procedures necessary to preserve the mother’s health, and it prohibited the commonly used D&E procedure, creating an undue burden before viability.

Justice Scalia's dissent argues that the Court's invalidation of Nebraska's partial-birth abortion statute is a logical consequence of Planned Parenthood v. Casey, not a misapplication. He contends the undue burden test is value-laden and asserts Casey must be overruled.

Justice Stevens dissents, arguing that New Jersey’s antidiscrimination law does not violate the Boy Scouts’ First Amendment rights because admission of homosexuals does not impose a serious burden on their expressive goals and the organization has never adopted a clear, unequivocal stance on homosexuality that could…

Justice Kennedy, joined by the Chief Justice, dissented from the judgment invalidating Nebraska's prohibition on partial-birth abortion. He would have concluded that the statute advanced legitimate state interests, imposed no undue burden, did not require a physician-controlled health exception, and applied only to…

The Court reversed the Fifth Circuit’s judgment invalidating Chapter 2 educational aid to religious schools in Jefferson Parish. Justice Thomas’s plurality, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Kennedy, reasoned that neutral allocation, private choices, and secular aid content prevented…

The Court held that Chapter 2 of the Education Consolidation and Improvement Act of 1981 does not violate the Establishment Clause when applied to religious schools because the aid is neutral, secular, and allocated based on neutral criteria. To the extent Meek and Wolman conflict, they are overruled.

Justice Kennedy dissents, arguing the Colorado statute restricting approaches to health care facilities violates the First Amendment. He contends the law is content-based and viewpoint-based because it targets protest, education, or counseling, effectively suppressing anti-abortion speech.

Justice O’Connor, joined by Justice Breyer, concurred in the judgment because she concluded that the Title II, or Chapter 2, school-aid program was constitutional under the framework previously used for neutral government aid.

Justice Souter, joined by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg, dissents, arguing the Establishment Clause prohibits public aid to religious missions. He contends neutrality and evenhandedness alone are insufficient to justify aid that diverts to religious purposes.

Justice Thomas, dissenting, argues the Nebraska partial-birth abortion statute does not ban standard dilation and evacuation procedures and does not impose an undue burden under Casey. He contends the majority misinterprets the statute and expands health exception requirements without doctrinal basis.

The Court upheld Colorado’s prohibition on knowingly approaching within eight feet of another person without consent for specified expressive activities within 100 feet of a health care facility entrance.

Justice Souter dissents from the Court's ruling that New Jersey's antidiscrimination law violates the Boy Scouts' right of expressive association. He argues the Boy Scouts failed to prove they maintain a clear, unequivocal policy against homosexuality that is integral to their expressive activities.

Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, and Ginsburg, held Nebraska's partial-birth abortion ban unconstitutional on two independent grounds: it lacked a necessary exception protecting women's health, and its language reached the commonly used D&E procedure, imposing an undue burden on…

The Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist joined by Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, held that requiring the Boy Scouts to readmit Dale as an assistant scoutmaster under New Jersey's public accommodations law violated its First Amendment freedom of expressive association.

Justice Scalia dissenting with Justice Thomas, argues that the Court misapplied First Amendment standards by treating a Colorado statute regulating approach distances near medical facilities as a content-neutral time, place, and manner restriction.

Justice Souter, joined by Justices O'Connor, Ginsburg, and Breyer, concurred in the Court's judgment and explained why the Colorado eight-foot approach restriction should be treated as a content-neutral time, place, and manner regulation.

Oil companies sought restitution of $156 million bonus payments after Government denied permit approvals under new statute (OBPA) conflicting with OCSLA incorporated in leases. Court held Government breached and repudiated contracts by suspending approvals beyond OCSLA's 30-day limit, entitling companies to…

The Court held that, other than a prior conviction, any fact increasing punishment beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

Justice Stevens dissents, arguing that although the Government breached the exploration lease by exceeding the 30-day approval deadline, restitution of the full investment is an excessive remedy.

Justice Kennedy concurred in the Court's judgment because California's blanket primary impermissibly forces political parties to accept candidates who may alter their doctrinal positions, burdening their freedom of association under the First Amendment.