Supreme Court of the United States, 2000

Justice Stevens dissents, arguing that although the Government breached the exploration lease by exceeding the 30-day approval deadline, restitution of the full investment is an excessive remedy.

The Court, in an opinion by Justice Scalia joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Breyer, held that California's partisan blanket primary violated political parties' First Amendment associational rights.

Justice Breyer's opinion for eight Justices held that the United States repudiated offshore oil leases by imposing approval delays and environmental-review requirements under the subsequently enacted Outer Banks Protection Act that materially departed from the procedures incorporated into the leases.

Justice Scalia, dissenting, argues that the Court’s decision to retain Miranda while disregarding 18 U.S.C. §3501 is logically inconsistent because subsequent precedents treat Miranda as a prophylactic rule rather than a constitutional mandate.

Justice Kennedy concurred in the Court's judgment because California's blanket primary impermissibly forces political parties to accept candidates who may alter their doctrinal positions, burdening their freedom of association under the First Amendment.

Justice Scalia dissents from the denial of certiorari, arguing the Fifth Circuit improperly applied the Lemon test to a school board disclaimer. He maintains that the disclaimer advances freedom of thought rather than religion, distinguishing the case from invalidated creationism statutes.

Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices O’Connor and Thomas, dissents in part, arguing the United States' and Quechan Tribe's water rights claim is barred by res judicata. He contends the Special Master erred in finding an exception to preclusion and that the Court should not have refused to decide whether the…

Justice Scalia concurs in the judgment but criticizes the majority's extensive use of legislative history, arguing that the statute's meaning is clear from its text alone and that reliance on legislative history wastes resources and misleads future litigants.

Chief Justice Rehnquist dissents, arguing the majority distorts precedent by invalidating the school district’s student-message program on its face under the Establishment Clause before implementation.

Justice Souter's opinion for the Court held that the federal Burma sanctions statute preempted Massachusetts's restrictions on state purchases from companies doing business with Burma.

Justice O'Connor's opinion held that the PLRA's automatic stay provision unambiguously bars courts from exercising equitable discretion to suspend the stay and does not violate separation of powers.

The Court, in an opinion by Justice Ginsburg joined by Justices Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and Breyer, rejected both asserted grounds for precluding the Quechan Tribe’s additional water-rights claims and remanded those claims to the Special Master for determination on the merits.

Justice Souter concurs with the majority on the first two parts of the opinion, agreeing that the PLRA’s automatic‑stay provision is clear and that it may raise due‑process concerns.

Justice Scalia dissents from denial of certiorari, arguing the Fifth Circuit erred in applying the Lemon test to strike down the school board disclaimer. He states the disclaimer advances freedom of thought rather than religion and contains no realistic danger of endorsing any particular faith.

Justice Breyer, dissenting, would construe 18 U.S.C. § 3626(e)(2) to allow courts to modify or suspend the PLRA's automatic stay using traditional equitable powers. He argues this interpretation avoids constitutional issues and aligns with legislative purpose, whereas the majority's rigid reading might leave…

The Court reversed the judgment overturning a jury verdict for an employee who claimed age discrimination. It held that a prima facie case plus evidence permitting rejection of the employer's stated reason may allow a reasonable jury to infer intentional discrimination, although that combination is not invariably…

The Court affirmed the denial of federal habeas relief. Justice Kennedy's plurality, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas, concluded that Virginia's refusal to give a parole-ineligibility instruction was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of Simmons because Ramdass was not…

Justice Souter delivered the unanimous opinion holding that mixed eligibility and treatment decisions made by HMO physicians are not fiduciary decisions under ERISA. Herdrich therefore failed to state an ERISA fiduciary-breach claim based on financial incentives rewarding physician owners for limiting care.

The Court affirmed the denial of federal habeas relief, holding that the capital sentencing jury was not constitutionally entitled to a parole-ineligibility instruction because petitioner was not conclusively parole ineligible under Virginia law when the jury deliberated.

Justice Stevens dissents, arguing the plurality wrongly distinguishes Simmons v. South Carolina based on the timing of judgment entry rather than the verdict itself. He contends that due process requires informing juries of parole ineligibility when future dangerousness is argued, regardless of technical state-law…

Justice Ginsburg dissents, arguing that bank larceny is a lesser‑included offense of bank robbery and that the defendant should be permitted a jury instruction on bank larceny. She contends the majority’s reliance on the elements‑test of Schmuck misreads the common‑law relationship and the statutory history of 18…

The Court unanimously held, in an opinion by Justice Thomas, that ERISA § 502(a)(3) authorizes appropriate equitable relief against a nonfiduciary party in interest participating in a transaction prohibited by § 406(a), even though that substantive provision imposes duties only on fiduciaries.

The Court held that a Social Security claimant who exhausts administrative remedies need not also exhaust issues in the request for review by the Appeals Council; the issue‑exhaustion requirement is inappropriate.

The Court affirmed the judgment invalidating Washington's nonparental-visitation statute as applied to Granville and her family. The statute unconstitutionally permitted any person to seek visitation at any time based solely on a judge's best-interests determination, without requiring deference to the decision of a…

Justice O'Connor respects the denial of certiorari, noting the petitioner waived the challenge to the fee award in the settlement. She argues the underlying issue—whether fee awards must have a rational connection to actual class recovery—warrants attention but this case is unsuitable for review.

The Court held that the Fifth Amendment privilege protects a witness from being compelled to disclose the existence of incriminating documents when the Government cannot describe them with reasonable particularity. It further held that immunity under 18 U.S.C.

The Court held that the Fifth Amendment protects a witness from being compelled to disclose the existence of incriminating documents the Government is unable to describe with reasonable particularity. Additionally, statutory immunity under 18 U.S.C.

Justice Thomas concurs in the judgment but writes separately to question the Court's act-of-production doctrine, arguing that the original meaning of 'witness' in the Fifth Amendment may protect against compelled production of any incriminating evidence, not just testimonial communications, and he remains open to…

The Court held that under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1), statutory references to specific firearm types like a 'machinegun' define a separate offense rather than a sentencing factor. Consequently, these elements must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.

Justice O'Connor concurred in the judgment, writing separately to emphasize that the Social Security Administration's failure to notify claimants of issue exhaustion requirements makes such a requirement inappropriate here.

In this dissent, Justice Breyer argues that administrative law principles require exhaustion of arguments before the Social Security Appeals Council to preserve them for judicial review.

Justice O’Connor concurred in the denial of certiorari, stating that while the issue of fee awards disconnected from actual class distributions warrants attention, the petitioners waived their right to challenge reasonableness in this specific case due to their settlement stipulations.

The Supreme Court held that 11 U.S.C. § 506(c), which permits recovery from collateral of the reasonable, necessary costs of preserving or disposing of encumbered property, may be invoked only by the trustee (and a debtor-in-possession exercising the trustee's powers under § 1107), and therefore does not give an…

Justice Souter delivered the opinion of the Court, holding that bankruptcy does not alter the burden of proof imposed by the substantive state tax law; the burden remains on the responsible officer (the taxpayer) even in bankruptcy. The Court affirmed the judgment of the Seventh Circuit.

Justice Thomas dissents from the denial of certiorari, arguing the California Supreme Court's affirmance of an injunction against workplace harassment speech violated the First Amendment.

Justice Thomas dissents from the Court’s denial of certiorari regarding an injunction in a workplace harassment case. He argues the injunction functions as an invalid prior restraint on speech because it is not narrowly tailored and suppresses fully protected expression.

Justice Souter, joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg and Breyer, dissents from the majority’s rule that a testifying defendant waives the right to appeal an adverse in‑limine ruling admitting prior convictions.

Justice Ginsburg concurred in the judgment, agreeing with the Court that a qui tam relator is an assignee of the Government’s claim and possesses Article III standing. She agreed the False Claims Act does not authorize qui tam suits against States and concurred in resolving this statutory question without reaching the…