Carmell v. Texas (SCOTUS 2000), 529 U.S. 513

Summary

The Supreme Court held that Texas' 1993 amendment to Article 38.07 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which permitted conviction of certain sexual offenses on the uncorroborated testimony of victims under 18, could not be applied retroactively to offenses committed before September 1, 1993 without violating the Ex Post Facto Clause. The Court characterized Article 38.07 as a sufficiency-of-the-evidence rule that reduced the quantum of proof needed to convict, placing it squarely within the fourth Calder category of ex post facto laws, and distinguished the witness-competency line of cases (Hopt, Thompson v. Missouri) on which Texas relied. Petitioner's convictions on counts 7 through 10, which rested solely on the stepdaughter's uncorroborated testimony, could not stand, while his other eleven convictions were unaffected. Justice Ginsburg, dissenting, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, would have characterized the statute as a witness-competency rule whose retroactive application is constitutionally permissible.

Holding

Whether Article 38.07, as amended in 1993, falls within the fourth Calder category of ex post facto laws when applied to offenses predating its effective date.. Yes. Article 38.07 is a sufficiency-of-the-evidence rule that alters the legal rules of evidence by receiving less testimony than the law required at the time of the offense, and its retrospective application violates the Ex Post Facto Clause.

Whether petitioner's convictions on counts 7 through 10, which rested solely on the victim's uncorroborated testimony, can stand.. No. The convictions on counts 7 through 10, insofar as they are not corroborated by other evidence, cannot be sustained under the Ex Post Facto Clause.

Carmell v. Texas

Summary

Holding

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