Supreme Court of the United States, 2000

Justice Stevens dissents from the Court’s decision to allow the "secondary effects" doctrine to justify a total ban on nude dancing, which he views as protected First Amendment expression.

The Court reversed and remanded the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's judgment invalidating Erie's public nudity ordinance. Justice O'Connor's opinion commanded five votes on the conclusion that the case remained live despite the closure of Pap's nude dancing business.

Justice Scalia concludes the case is moot due to the respondent's voluntary cessation of operations and would dismiss it for want of jurisdiction, though he agrees with the majority that the ordinance should be reversed.

Justice Souter joined the Court's analytical framework and agreed that the regulation should be evaluated under the O'Brien standards because Erie asserted an interest in combating secondary effects unrelated to suppressing expression.

Justice Souter dissents from the Court's reversal of the Eleventh Circuit's grant of summary judgment for the respondent, arguing the parole policy change violates the Ex Post Facto Clause by creating a substantial risk of increased punishment without mitigating evidence.

Justice Scalia, concurring in part, agrees that the Georgia Board’s discretionary change in the frequency of parole‑eligibility hearings does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause and would reverse the Eleventh Circuit’s decision without remand.

The Court held that Georgia's retroactive extension of parole-reconsideration intervals from three years to as much as eight years did not inherently violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.

Justice Scalia dissents from the denial of certiorari, arguing the Court of Appeal erred in rejecting a takings claim under Nollan and Dolan because the record suggests the permit denial was influenced by the petitioners' refusal to pay a demanded replacement fee.

The Court held that a public university may require students to pay a mandatory activity fee that funds extracurricular student speech, provided the funding program operates on a viewpoint-neutral basis.

Justice Scalia delivered the unanimous opinion of the Court holding that product design cannot be inherently distinctive and is protectible as unregistered trade dress under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act only upon a showing of secondary meaning.

Justice Souter concurs in the judgment, agreeing that the student activity fee scheme is permissible but disagreeing with the majority's imposition of a strict viewpoint neutrality requirement.

The Court held that the First Amendment permits a public university to charge students an activity fee used to fund a program facilitating extracurricular student speech if the program is viewpoint neutral.

Justice Souter, writing for a unanimous Court, held that the Federal Arbitration Act’s venue provisions for confirming, vacating, or modifying arbitration awards are permissive rather than exclusive.

The Court, in an opinion by Justice O'Connor joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, held that Congress had precluded FDA regulation of tobacco products as customarily marketed and affirmed the Fourth Circuit.

Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Souter, dissents from the Court’s decision that a prosecutor may, in summation, comment that a defendant’s presence at trial permits him to tailor his testimony, arguing that such commentary improperly burdens the Sixth Amendment right to be present and undermines the truth‑seeking…

Justice Kennedy delivered the unanimous opinion holding that excess time served in prison does not automatically reduce a subsequent term of supervised release. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e), supervised release begins upon actual release from imprisonment, not when the prisoner should have been released.

Justice Thomas, dissenting, would have held that the Medicare Act's incorporation of the Social Security Act's jurisdictional restriction does not bar a provider's preenforcement challenge to the Secretary's regulations and manuals under general federal-question jurisdiction.

The Court, in an opinion by Justice Breyer joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Souter, and Ginsburg, held that § 405(h), incorporated into Medicare by § 1395ii, bars federal-question jurisdiction over the Council's challenge to nursing-home enforcement regulations.

Justice Stevens dissents and joins Justice Thomas. He argues the Social Security Act and Medicare Act distinction in § 405(h) means providers challenging reimbursement regulations are not barred by the statute's 'to recover' language. He would allow providers to sue under general federal-question jurisdiction.

Justice O'Connor's opinion applies Strickland's performance and prejudice requirements to counsel's failure to file a notice of appeal. Rejecting automatic deficiency whenever the defendant has not consented to foregoing an appeal, the Court held that counsel must consult when a rational defendant would want to appeal…

The Court held that a plaintiff may state an Equal Protection Clause claim as a class of one by alleging intentional differential treatment from similarly situated persons without a rational basis.

Justice Souter concurred in part and dissented in part, arguing that counsel generally has a constitutional duty to consult with defendants about appeal rights after conviction, rather than only when specifically requested.

The Supreme Court held that Hawaii's restriction barring citizens from voting in Office of Hawaiian Affairs trustee elections unless they are of Hawaiian ancestry violates the Fifteenth Amendment, which prohibits race-based voting qualifications.

Justice Breyer concurred in the result, rejecting the majority's reliance on the concept of 'quasi sovereign' and finding the State's analogy between OHA and a tribal trust fails.

In this dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens argues that Hawaii's Office of Hawaiian Affairs (OHA) trustee election scheme, which limits voting to descendants of aboriginal Hawaiians, does not violate the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments.

The Court held that Hawaii's ancestry-based restriction on voting for Office of Hawaiian Affairs trustees violates the Fifteenth Amendment. Ancestry operated as a proxy for race, and neither federal Indian-law principles, special-purpose district precedents, nor the asserted alignment of trustees and trust…

Justice Souter delivered the unanimous opinion of the Court, holding that discovery of a pattern of racketeering activity does not postpone the commencement of civil RICO’s four-year limitations period.

Justice Ginsburg delivered the unanimous opinion of the Court, holding that a court of appeals may direct judgment as a matter of law when exclusion of erroneously admitted expert testimony leaves insufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict.

The Supreme Court held that California’s interest‑deduction limitation, which reduces the deduction by the amount of a corporation’s nonunitary dividend and interest income, violates the Due Process and Commerce Clauses.

Justice Thomas delivered the unanimous opinion holding that withholding and estimated income tax remittances are deemed paid on the statutory return due date, without regard to an extension, for purposes of the refund and credit limitations in § 6511.

Justice Stevens dissents from the Court’s holding that § 5 of the Voting Rights Act is indifferent to discriminatory purpose if the change is not retrogressive. He argues the plain language of the statute and Department of Justice interpretations support a separate purpose inquiry, and that the Beer retrogression…

The Court held that § 5 of the Voting Rights Act prohibits preclearance only when a redistricting plan has a retrogressive purpose or effect. It affirmed the District Court's grant of preclearance for the Bossier Parish School Board's plan, concluding that a discriminatory but nonretrogressive purpose does not violate…

The Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit and held that Buckley v. Valeo is authority for state limits on contributions to candidates for state office: such limits are constitutional if closely drawn to a sufficiently important interest, and preventing corruption and its appearance is such an interest.

The Court affirmed preclearance of the school board's redistricting plan, holding that § 5 of the Voting Rights Act does not prohibit preclearance of a plan adopted with a discriminatory but nonretrogressive vote-dilutive purpose.

Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, dissented from the Court's approval of Missouri's limits on campaign contributions. He argued that contributions are a constitutionally protected means of political expression, that the rationale distinguishing contributions from expenditures is unsound, and that contribution…

Justice Kennedy's dissent concludes that the Court's decision to uphold Missouri's contribution limits perpetuates distortions of political speech created by Buckley v. Valeo. He argues Buckley forced speech underground via soft money, and thus the contribution limits fail any serious First Amendment review.

Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Ginsburg, concurs in the judgment, explaining that strict scrutiny's mechanical tests are unsuited for campaign finance contribution limits that balance competing First Amendment interests.

Justice Stevens, concurring, emphasizes that money is property not speech and that campaign finance regulations rest on property and liberty concerns rather than the First Amendment.

Justice Breyer dissents, agreeing with Justice Souter on one qualification: he would not reconsider Beer v. United States, but argues § 5 prohibits preclearance of voting changes with the purpose of unconstitutionally depriving minorities of the right to vote.