Supreme Court of the United States, 2000

Justice Souter dissents from the Court’s holding that § 5 of the Voting Rights Act is indifferent to a racially discriminatory purpose so long as a change in voting law is not meant to diminish minority voting strength below its existing level.

Justice Stevens dissents, arguing that the jury instructions on the death penalty were ambiguously worded, creating a reasonable likelihood of juror confusion about whether a life sentence was permissible even when an aggravating circumstance was found.

Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment, agreeing that the defendant received his full complement of peremptory challenges. He declined to join the Court's opinion because it addressed whether the defendant could have complained had he not used a peremptory challenge, an issue he viewed as not properly before the…

Souter, joined by Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, dissents in Robbins's habeas petition, arguing California's Wende procedure for indigent appellants lacks required adversarial character.

Justice Stevens dissents, arguing the Court's approval of California's Wende procedure effectively overrules Anders, Penson, and McCoy by adopting a standard that merely requires an appeal be resolved in a way related to its merit.

The Court held that a trial judge did not violate the Constitution by answering a capital jury's question about its sentencing discretion through a reference to the precise paragraph of a constitutionally adequate instruction that answered the question.

Justice Souter delivered the unanimous opinion of the Court holding that Guam’s Organic Act requires a gubernatorial runoff only when no slate receives a majority of the votes cast for Governor and Lieutenant Governor, not a majority of all ballots cast in the simultaneous general election.

Justice Thomas, writing for the Court, held that Anders establishes a prophylactic procedure rather than the exclusive constitutionally permissible method for handling apparently frivolous indigent criminal appeals. California's Wende procedure adequately protects the right to appellate counsel.

Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment, expressing confidence in the constitutional validity of Faretta v. California regarding the right to self-representation at trial, but distinguishing appellate proceedings where no constitutional right to appeal exists.

Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, held that Wardlow's unprovoked flight upon noticing police in an area known for heavy narcotics trafficking supplied reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop.

Justice Ginsburg's opinion for the Court held that the environmental organizations had Article III standing because their members' reasonable concerns about Laidlaw's ongoing illegal discharges impaired their recreational, aesthetic, and economic interests, and civil penalties could redress those injuries by deterring…

The Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit’s judgment dismissing Adarand’s equal protection challenge to federal subcontracting preferences as moot. The Court held that voluntary cessation of challenged conduct does not moot a case unless it is absolutely clear the wrongful behavior cannot reasonably be expected to…

The Court, in an opinion by Justice Stevens joined by eight Justices, held that the Federal Constitution does not guarantee self-representation on direct appeal from a criminal conviction and affirmed the California Supreme Court's judgment.

Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the unanimous opinion holding that the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act validly regulates interstate commerce and does not violate the Tenth Amendment’s anti-commandeering principles.

Justice Stevens concurred in Part III, where the Court found the ADEA incorporated Fair Labor Standards Act remedies, but dissented from the remainder of the opinion. He argued Congress has broad power to authorize federal remedies against state agencies without Eleventh Amendment limits and that sovereign immunity…

Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Kennedy, concurs in part and dissents in part, arguing that Congress did not make an unmistakably clear statement to abrogate State Eleventh Amendment immunity in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and therefore rejects the majority's view that the ADEA permits private…

Justice Scalia delivered the unanimous opinion holding that defense counsel’s agreement to a specified trial date beyond the Interstate Agreement on Detainers’ time limit waived the defendant’s right to dismissal based on that delay.

Justice O'Connor's opinion held that Congress unmistakably intended the ADEA to abrogate state sovereign immunity, but lacked constitutional authority to effect that abrogation. Article I does not authorize private suits against nonconsenting States, and the ADEA's broad protections are not congruent and proportional…

Justice O'Connor's majority opinion affirmed the dismissal of petitioners' state-law age-discrimination claims on statutory grounds rather than deciding the constitutional question resolved below.

Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, dissents from the denial of certiorari, arguing that the South Carolina Supreme Court's affirmance of an injunction based on civil conspiracy for lawful protests threatens protected First Amendment activity.

Justice Thomas dissents, arguing the Clean Water Act is not a public welfare offense because it covers ordinary industrial activities and imposes severe penalties. He contends criminal liability for ordinary negligence violates due process and would grant certiorari to delineate the public welfare doctrine's limits.

The Court held that California Government Code § 6254(f)(3) was not subject to a facial First Amendment challenge because the respondent did not attempt to qualify under the statute and there was no threat of prosecution or other harm that would justify a facial challenge under the First Amendment.

Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices O'Connor, Souter, and Breyer, concurs that California Government Code §6254(f)(3) is a restriction on access to government information, not on protected speech, and therefore the Ninth Circuit’s judgment is reversed.

Justice Stevens dissents, arguing the majority mischaracterized the case as an improper facial challenge and that the state's discrimination in providing arrestee information based on the respondent's commercial speech purpose violates the First Amendment.

Justice Ginsburg delivered the unanimous opinion holding that Drye’s disclaimer of his inheritance under Arkansas law did not defeat federal tax liens. State law defines the taxpayer’s underlying rights, but federal law determines whether those rights constitute property or rights to property under 26 U.S.C. § 6321.

Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment, agreeing with the Court that the statute restricting access to government information does not chill speech for facial challenge purposes. He emphasized the distinction between access restrictions and speech restrictions while leaving as-applied challenges open.

The Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, held that United Reporting could not prevail on its facial challenge to California's restrictions on access to arrestees' addresses.

The Supreme Court granted certiorari and certified a question to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court asking whether the interpretation of the hazardous‑waste permit statute in Commonwealth v. Scarpone represents the correct meaning of the statute at the time William Fiore’s conviction became final.