Supreme Court of the United States, 2011

The Supreme Court held that the Board of Immigration Appeals' (BIA) 'comparable-grounds' rule for determining eligibility for § 212(c) discretionary relief in deportation cases is arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act.

The Court held that the Illinois Appellate Court's conclusion that the State made a good-faith effort to secure a witness's presence did not represent an unreasonable application of Confrontation Clause precedents under AEDPA.

This order establishes a briefing schedule for the Court of the Court on several issues including the minimum coverage provision, Anti-Injunction Act, severability, and Medicaid. It adopts the schedule proposed in a letter from the Solicitor General without deciding any legal issues.

The Court issued a briefing schedule for multiple issues, specifying word limits and filing deadlines for parties, the Solicitor General, and amici curiae.

The Supreme Court denied the application for an injunction that would have blocked disclosure of referendum petition signers, and Justice Alito filed a dissent arguing that the district court’s narrow standard fails to protect First Amendment speakers and that a stay should be granted pending appellate review.

Justice Alito dissents, arguing that the majority’s order granting a stay was premature and that the district court’s narrow interpretation of who may challenge disclosure of referendum petition signatures under the First Amendment is erroneous.

The Supreme Court held that, under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), "clearly established Federal law" means the precedents of the Supreme Court as they existed at the time of the last state-court adjudication on the merits, not at the time the prisoner's conviction becomes final.

The Court held that the "clearly established Federal law" requirement of 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1) is measured at the time a state court adjudicates a claim on the merits, not at the point a conviction becomes final.

The Supreme Court held that under the Federal Arbitration Act, courts must compel arbitration of arbitrable claims even when a complaint also contains nonarbitrable claims. It vacated the Florida Court of Appeal’s refusal to compel arbitration and remanded for further determination of the remaining claims.

Justice Sotomayor dissents from the denial of certiorari in Buck’s death penalty case, arguing that the State of Texas misled the district court regarding procedural bars in similar cases involving racial bias testimony.

The Court reversed the Sixth Circuit, holding that the Ohio Supreme Court did not unreasonably apply clearly established federal law in admitting Dixon's second warned confession. The Court found that the initial unwarned interrogation did not violate Miranda or taint the later confession under Oregon v.

Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Kagan, dissents from the Court’s denial of certiorari, arguing that the death‑sentence case of Duane Buck raises serious constitutional concerns about racial considerations and a record tainted by the State’s misleading statements, and that the petitioner satisfied the standard for…

The Court denied the petition for a writ of certiorari reviewing the Fifth Circuit's denial of a certificate of appealability in Buck's death‑penalty case. The majority concluded that the record was compromised by misleading statements from the State and that the petitioner had satisfied the Miller‑El standard for a…

Justice Thomas dissents from the denial of certiorari, arguing that the Court should provide clarity to its fractured Establishment Clause jurisprudence. He contends the lower courts' application of the Lemon and endorsement tests is inconsistent and unpredictable.

Justice Thomas dissents from the Court's refusal to grant certiorari, arguing that the Establishment Clause jurisprudence is in shambles and requires clarification. He criticizes the reliance on the Lemon and endorsement tests as nebulous and leading to arbitrary lower court decisions.

Justice Breyer dissents from the denial of a stay of execution for Manuel Valle, arguing that executing Valle after 33 years on death row violates the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment due to the psychological toll and diminished retributive purposes.

Justice Breyer dissents from the denial of a stay of execution, arguing that executing Manuel Valle after more than 33 years on death row violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. He contends that such lengthy delays undermine the death penalty's deterrence and retributive purposes.

Justice Breyer dissented from the Court’s denial of a stay of execution for Manuel Valle, arguing that executing a prisoner after more than three decades on death row may violate the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment.

The Supreme Court denied Ricky Gray’s application for a stay of the Eastern District of Virginia’s scheduling order that extended his deadline to file a federal habeas petition. The Court held that the standard for staying a judgment does not apply because Gray was not seeking a stay of a judgment, and the higher…

The South Carolina Supreme Court held that a service‑of‑suit clause in an insurance policy does not waive the statutory requirement to serve the insurer by delivering two copies of the summons and complaint to the Director of the Department of Insurance.

Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, dissents from the Court’s denial of a stay of execution for Humberto Leal Garcia, arguing that the United States’ treaty obligations under the Vienna Convention, serious foreign‑policy interests, and the prospect of pending legislation justify granting…

An opinion by Justice Kennedy, joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Scalia and Thomas, announced the judgment reversing the New Jersey Supreme Court's assertion of personal jurisdiction over a British manufacturer of scrap-metal machines.

The Court concluded it had no authority to review the Ninth Circuit's judgment because the case was moot, as the respondent was no longer subject to the registration conditions due to the expiration of his juvenile supervision.

The Supreme Court reversed the New Jersey Supreme Court, holding that New Jersey could not exercise personal jurisdiction over the British manufacturer J. McIntyre Machinery Ltd.

The Court held that Arizona's public financing matching funds provision substantially burdens the speech of privately financed candidates and independent expenditure groups by providing funds to opponents in direct response to that speech.

The Supreme Court reversed the North Carolina Court of Appeals, holding that the state's exercise of general personal jurisdiction over Goodyear's foreign subsidiaries violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause because the subsidiaries lacked the continuous and systematic contacts required for general…

The Supreme Court held that the Ninth Circuit lacked jurisdiction because the case was moot after the juvenile‑supervision order expired. Accordingly, the Court vacated the appellate judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss the appeal.

Justice Kagan dissents from the majority's holding that Arizona's public financing system violates the First Amendment. She argues that the matching funds provision subsidizes rather than restricts speech, promoting robust political debate and serving the compelling interest of preventing corruption.

Justice Kagan dissents, arguing Arizona's public financing matching funds provision does not violate the First Amendment because it subsidizes rather than restricts speech, and serves the compelling interest of preventing corruption.

The Court held that Arizona's public financing matching funds provision violates the First Amendment because it substantially burdens the speech of privately financed candidates and independent expenditure groups without serving a compelling state interest.

The Supreme Court held that although 28 U.S.C. §157(b)(2)(C) gave the Bankruptcy Court statutory authority to enter final judgment on Vickie Marshall's compulsory counterclaim for tortious interference with an expected gift, Article III forbade a non-Article III bankruptcy judge from entering that final judgment on a…

Vermont's Prescription Confidentiality Law restricting sale and use of prescriber-identifying data for marketing violated the First Amendment. The Court held the law imposed content- and speaker-based restrictions subject to heightened scrutiny, which it failed. Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and Kagan dissented.

Justice Breyer, dissenting, argues that Vermont's statute regulating the use of prescriber-identifiable information should be reviewed under rational basis standards applicable to economic regulation rather than heightened First Amendment scrutiny.

Justice Breyer, dissenting, argues that the Vermont statute regulating the sale and use of prescriber-identifiable information does not violate the First Amendment. He contends the law should be reviewed under rational basis or intermediate scrutiny for commercial speech, not heightened scrutiny, as it is part of a…

Chief Justice Roberts, dissenting, argues that under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), a worker must still prove that an employer's negligence was the proximate cause of injury.

Justice Sotomayor concurred in the judgment, agreeing that Freeman is eligible for sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). She reasoned that a term of imprisonment under a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) agreement is based on the agreement itself, but if the agreement expressly uses a Guidelines sentencing range to…

Justice Sotomayor concurs in part, agreeing that the certified blood‑alcohol concentration report was testimonial and therefore its admission violated the Confrontation Clause. She emphasizes that the report’s primary purpose was to serve as evidence and notes the limited scope of the Court’s opinion.

Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, Alito, and Sotomayor, held that Vermont’s restrictions on the sale, disclosure, and marketing use of prescriber-identifying information violate the First Amendment.