Supreme Court of the United States
Greene, Aka Trice v. Fisher
November 8, 2011132 S. Ct. 38
Summary
The Supreme Court held that, under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), "clearly established Federal law" means the precedents of the Supreme Court as they existed at the time of the last state-court adjudication on the merits, not at the time the prisoner's conviction becomes final. Because the Pennsylvania Superior Court sustained Greene's conviction nearly three months before Gray v. Maryland was decided, Gray could not supply the governing rule, and § 2254(d)(1) barred relief even though the Pennsylvania Supreme Court later dismissed Greene's allowance-of-appeal as improvidently granted. Rejecting the analogy to Teague's finality cutoff and following Cullen v. Pinholster's backward-looking approach, the Court affirmed the Third Circuit's denial of Greene's Bruton-based habeas petition.
Holding
- What temporal point fixes "clearly established Federal law" under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)—the last state-court adjudication on the merits or the date the conviction becomes final?. "Clearly established Federal law" under § 2254(d)(1) consists of the Supreme Court's precedents as of the time the state court renders its decision on the merits; decisions announced after that adjudication, even if before the conviction becomes final, cannot supply the governing law.
- Which state-court "decision" must satisfy the § 2254(d)(1) standard when a higher state court later disposes of the appeal without adjudicating the claim on the merits?. The relevant decision is the one produced by the merits adjudication itself; a later affirmance on alternative procedural grounds, or a state supreme court's decision not to hear the appeal (here, dismissal as improvidently granted), is not a decision resulting from the merits adjudication.
Docket 10-637