Supreme Court of the United States, 2011

Justice Sotomayor concurred in the judgment, agreeing that Freeman is eligible for sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). She reasoned that a term of imprisonment under a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) agreement is based on the agreement itself, but if the agreement expressly uses a Guidelines sentencing range to…

The Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause forbids the prosecution to introduce a forensic laboratory report containing a testimonial certification through the in-court testimony of a scientist who did not sign the certification or perform or observe the reported test; the accused is…

The Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit's judgment holding Vermont's Prescription Confidentiality Law (Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 18, § 4631(d)) unconstitutional under the First Amendment.

Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy and Alito, dissents from the Court’s holding that the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA) eliminates the common‑law requirement of proximate cause.

Justice Roberts dissents, arguing that a sentence imposed under a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement is grounded solely in the agreement itself and therefore should not be considered “based on” a Sentencing Guidelines range for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).

Justice Kennedy dissents, arguing the Court wrongly extends Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts to bar a lab report when a laboratory employee who testifies to the procedures and processes, though not the certifying analyst, appears for cross-examination.

A fractured Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit and held that William Freeman, serving a 106-month sentence fixed by a Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement, is eligible to seek a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C.

The Court held that the Confrontation Clause barred admission of a testimonial forensic blood-alcohol report through an analyst who neither signed the certification nor performed or observed the reported test.

The Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause does not automatically require a state to provide appointed counsel to an indigent non‑custodial parent in a civil contempt proceeding that may lead to incarceration, so long as alternative procedural safeguards are in place.

Justice Thomas dissents, arguing the Due Process Clause does not provide a categorical right to appointed counsel for indigent defendants facing incarceration in civil contempt proceedings.

The Court held that the Clean Air Act displaces federal common-law public nuisance claims targeting CO2 emissions from power plants. It reversed the Second Circuit, ruling that Congress addressed the issue through EPA regulation authority. Justice Alito concurred in the judgment, assuming Massachusetts v.

Justice Scalia’s opinion held that the nationwide class of female Wal-Mart employees failed Rule 23(a)(2)’s commonality requirement because the plaintiffs did not establish a common discriminatory policy or common mode of exercising managerial discretion capable of producing a classwide answer.

The Court held that the Due Process Clause does not automatically require appointed counsel for indigent noncustodial parents facing incarceration in civil contempt hearings for child support nonpayment, though alternative safeguards are required.

Justice Thomas dissents, arguing that the Due Process Clause does not create a categorical right to appointed counsel for indigent defendants facing incarceration in civil contempt proceedings.

The Court reversed the judgment below, holding that the class certification of approximately 1.5 million female Wal-Mart employees was inconsistent with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) because respondents failed to demonstrate commonality and that individualized backpay claims could not be certified under Rule…

The Supreme Court held that evidence obtained through a search conducted in objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent is not subject to the exclusionary rule, because suppression would yield no appreciable deterrence of culpable police conduct while imposing heavy costs on truth and public safety.

Bond was convicted under a federal criminal statute and sought to challenge its validity on the Tenth Amendment grounds. The Court held she had standing to raise federalism-based objections to the federal statute where she suffered concrete injury.

The Court held that the federal district court exceeded its authority under the Anti-Injunction Act by enjoining a state court from considering certification of a similar class action.

The Supreme Court held that a child's age properly informs the Miranda custody analysis whenever the child's age was known to the interrogating officer at the time of questioning or would have been objectively apparent to any reasonable officer, because childhood yields objective, commonsense conclusions about how a…

Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Breyer, concurred in the Court's judgment. She emphasized that Bond, like any defendant, has a personal right not to be convicted under a constitutionally invalid law.

Justice Alito dissents from the decision to include age in the Miranda custody analysis. He argues that incorporating individualized characteristics like age erodes the objective clarity and certainty of the Miranda rule and that minors' rights are adequately protected under the existing voluntariness inquiry.

Justice Breyer dissents from the Court's decision to apply Arizona v. Gant's new Fourth Amendment rule retroactively while simultaneously creating a "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule that prevents Davis from obtaining suppression of evidence. Breyer argues this approach is incompatible with Griffith v.

Justice Sotomayor concurred in the judgment, agreeing the exclusionary rule did not apply because binding appellate precedent authorized the search, negating appreciable deterrence. She emphasized this case did not resolve whether exclusion applies when governing law is unsettled.

The Court held that Janus Capital Management LLC (JCM) could not be held liable in a private action under Rule 10b–5 for false statements in Janus Investment Fund prospectuses because JCM did not make the statements.

Justice Breyer, joined by three colleagues, dissenting, argues that the majority incorrectly interpreted Rule 10b-5's prohibition on making false statements to require 'ultimate authority' over content.

The Court affirmed the Seventh Circuit, holding that Indiana’s vehicle‑flight offense under Ind. Code § 35‑44‑3‑3(b)(1)(A) is a "violent felony" for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act.

Justice Kagan, dissenting, argues simple vehicular flight under Indiana law should not qualify as a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act because the statute distinguishes non-risky flights from aggravated ones. She emphasizes the statute's structure which separates offenses based on danger.

Justice Kagan dissents from the majority's decision that Indiana's simple vehicular flight offense qualifies as a “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). She argues the statute distinguishes simple flight from aggravated flight, the latter of which involves substantial risk to others.

Justice Scalia dissents, arguing that the Court's decision continues to produce a fourth ad hoc judgment on the Armed Career Criminal Act's residual clause. He asserts that the residual clause is a drafting failure and should be declared void for vagueness.

Justice Breyer concurred to emphasize that the clear and convincing evidence standard applies only to factual disputes in patent invalidity cases, not to legal questions regarding the application of statutory standards.

The Court reversed the Sixth Circuit, holding that incumbent local exchange carriers must lease entrance facilities to competitors at cost-based rates for interconnection under § 251(c)(2). The Court deferred to the FCC's reasonable interpretation of its regulations under Auer v. Robbins.

Justice Scalia dissents, arguing the Armed Career Criminal Act's residual clause is a drafting failure and should be declared void for vagueness. He criticizes the Court's ad hoc judgments and reliance on statistical studies introduced in briefs.

The Supreme Court held that Indiana's felony vehicle flight statute qualifies as a 'violent felony' under the Armed Career Criminal Act's residual clause. The Court reasoned that the offense categorically presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another, comparable to burglary and arson.

Justice Thomas concurs in the judgment, agreeing that the clear and convincing evidence standard applies to patent invalidity, but argues that Congress did not codify this standard in 35 U.S.C. § 282. He concludes the common-law rule persists because the statute is silent on the standard of proof.

Justice Thomas concurs in the judgment that Indiana's intentional vehicular flight statute qualifies as a violent felony under ACCA. He agrees the 'purposeful, violent, and aggressive' test from Begay should not apply here, but criticizes the majority for implying it may apply to other offenses.

Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment, stating he would reach the same result without relying on Auer deference because he finds the FCC's interpretation the fairest reading. He expressed increasing doubt regarding the validity of Auer deference, citing separation of powers concerns and the risk of encouraging…

Sykes v. United States held that a conviction for vehicular flight under Indiana law qualifies as a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act's residual clause. The Court concluded that such flight inherently presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to others, comparable to burglary and arson.

The Supreme Court held that under the Armed Career Criminal Act, the maximum term of imprisonment for a prior state drug offense is the maximum sentence applicable at the time of the defendant's state conviction.