Supreme Court of the United States, 2010

Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment and joined the Court’s opinion except for its discussion of legislative history in footnote 3. He argued that committee reports and unrelated hearing materials cannot establish what Congress intended when statutory text is unambiguous, and that relying on such materials invites…

Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment. He agrees 11 U.S.C. § 528’s advertising disclosure requirements survive First Amendment scrutiny under Zauderer, but he doubts Zauderer’s premise that disclosure requirements receive relaxed scrutiny compared to speech prohibitions.

The Supreme Court held that time granted for pretrial motion preparation is not automatically excludable from the Speedy Trial Act’s 70-day clock under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1), but requires district court findings under § 3161(h)(7). The Court reversed the Eighth Circuit and remanded.

Justice Alito, joined by Justice Breyer, dissented from the Court’s interpretation of the Speedy Trial Act. He would have held that delay resulting from a court’s granting the defense additional time to prepare pretrial motions is automatically excluded under the Act’s general exclusion for delay resulting from…

The Court held that attorneys who provide qualifying bankruptcy assistance are debt relief agencies under the BAPCPA. It narrowly construed the prohibition on advising clients to incur debt, limiting it to advice principally motivated by the prospect of filing for bankruptcy and obtaining related relief, and upheld…

The Supreme Court held that quo warranto proceedings under Kansas law are civil suits arising under federal laws when the validity of corporate consolidation depends on Acts of Congress.

Justice Alito, joined by Justice Thomas, dissented from the Court's interpretation of the Armed Career Criminal Act's phrase "physical force." He would have treated that phrase according to its traditional common-law meaning, which includes the unlawful offensive touching sufficient to constitute battery, and would…

The Court held that the Copyright Act's registration requirement is a precondition to filing an infringement claim, but it does not limit federal subject-matter jurisdiction. Because the requirement is not clearly labeled jurisdictional, appears outside the jurisdiction-granting provisions, and contains exceptions…

The Court held that Florida felony battery involving only intentional touching does not qualify as a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act because the statutory term physical force means violent force capable of causing pain or injury.

Justice Ginsburg concurred in part and in the judgment, agreeing that the copyright-registration requirement is a precondition to suit but does not limit subject-matter jurisdiction.

The Court held that Florida battery by intentionally touching another person, even slightly, does not satisfy the Armed Career Criminal Act's requirement that a predicate offense have as an element the use of physical force.

The Court held that 17 U.S.C. § 411(a)'s registration requirement is a precondition to filing a copyright infringement claim but does not limit federal courts' subject-matter jurisdiction.

Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Stevens and Breyer, concurring in part and in the judgment, agrees that 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) is a precondition to suit rather than a subject-matter jurisdictional limit.

Justice Alito dissents, arguing that the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) definition of 'violent felony' encompasses common-law battery, which includes non-violent offensive touching.

The Supreme Court held that 17 U.S.C. § 411(a)'s copyright-registration requirement is a precondition to filing an infringement claim that does not restrict federal subject-matter jurisdiction, reversing the Second Circuit's contrary ruling that had led it to reject class certification and settlement approval as to…

The Court held that it had jurisdiction to review the Florida Supreme Court's decision because that decision did not clearly rest on an adequate and independent state-law ground.

The Court held that it has jurisdiction to review the Florida Supreme Court's decision and that the Miranda warnings given to Powell—informing him of the right to talk to a lawyer before answering any question and that he may use that right at any time during the interview—satisfy Miranda's requirement of informing a…

Justice Stevens dissents, arguing this Court lacks jurisdiction to review the Florida Supreme Court's decision, which rested on an adequate and independent state ground under the Florida Constitution, and further contends that the Miranda warnings in this case failed to clearly inform Powell of his right to have…

The Court resolved a circuit split over the meaning of "principal place of business" in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1), holding that the phrase refers to a corporation's "nerve center" — the place where its high level officers direct, control, and coordinate its activities — which will typically be its headquarters.

The Supreme Court held that neither Batson v. Kentucky nor Snyder v. Louisiana clearly establishes a categorical rule requiring a judge to reject a demeanor-based explanation for a peremptory challenge unless the judge personally observed the juror's demeanor.

Justice Breyer dissents, arguing Hemi’s failure to report customer data under the Jenkins Act proximately caused New York City’s loss of tax revenue under RICO. He contends the harm was foreseeable, intended, and within the scope of the Jenkins Act’s protections, unlike precedents like Holmes and Anza.

Justice Ginsburg concurred in the judgment, agreeing that New York City cannot use RICO to recover lost tax revenue that it lacked authority to collect directly under the Commerce Clause.

The Supreme Court held that New York City cannot state a civil RICO claim against online cigarette seller Hemi Group because it cannot show its lost tax revenue came about 'by reason of' the alleged predicate mail and wire fraud, namely Hemi's failure to file Jenkins Act customer reports with New York State.

Justice Kennedy's opinion held that the First Amendment prohibits restrictions on corporate independent political expenditures, overruling Austin and the portion of McConnell sustaining BCRA § 203.

Justice Alito concurs in the judgment, agreeing the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to review the denial of the motion to reopen. He would decide on narrower grounds, arguing the regulation conferring discretion to the Attorney General derives from Subchapter I of Title 8, not Subchapter II, and thus does not…

The Supreme Court affirmed the Eleventh Circuit's reinstatement of the denial of federal habeas relief, holding that even assuming, as petitioner urged, that the state court's factual findings are reviewed solely under 28 U.S.C.

The Supreme Court held that 8 U.S.C. §1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)—which strips courts of jurisdiction over Attorney General actions 'the authority for which is specified under this subchapter to be in the discretion of the Attorney General'—reaches only determinations Congress itself made discretionary by statute, not…

Justice Stevens dissents, arguing counsel's failure to investigate mitigating evidence of Wood's mental deficits was the result of inattention and neglect rather than strategic decision. He concludes the state court's factual determination was unreasonable under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).

Chief Justice Roberts (joined by Thomas, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor) writes separately to disagree with the majority’s grant of intervention to non-sovereign entities (Duke Energy, CRWSP) in an original-action equitable apportionment dispute. He argues the Court’s test in New Jersey v.

Justice Scalia, dissenting, argues the Court's grant, vacate, and remand order is improper because the Eleventh Circuit's decision rested on independent merits grounds unaffected by the procedural error addressed in Cone v. Bell.

In a per curiam summary disposition, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the Supreme Court of Georgia's affirmance of Eric Presley's cocaine trafficking conviction, holding that the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial extends to the voir dire of prospective jurors and that a trial court must consider…

Justice Thomas dissents from the Court's summary disposition, arguing that whether the Sixth Amendment public trial right extends to jury voir dire remains open and that the precedents relied on do not explicitly require courts to consider alternatives to closure sua sponte.

Justice Alito's dissent argues that the Court improperly vacated and remanded the judgment because the lower court's decision rested on an independent merits ground unaffected by the procedural-default error identified by the Court.

The Court vacated and remanded the Eleventh Circuit’s judgment denying discovery and an evidentiary hearing in a capital habeas case, finding a reasonable probability the lower court relied on a procedural error corrected in Cone v. Bell.

The Court vacated the Eleventh Circuit's judgment and remanded for reconsideration because that court applied an erroneous procedural-bar analysis and its discussion did not make clear whether the same error affected its denial of discovery and an evidentiary hearing.

Justice Stevens concurred in part and in the judgment, agreeing that the penalty-phase instructions impermissibly required unanimity to reject death before considering life sentences and that defense counsel's closing argument was constitutionally deficient.

The Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit, holding that the state court's rejection of Spisak's claims regarding jury instructions and ineffective assistance of counsel was not contrary to clearly established federal law under AEDPA. The jury instructions did not violate Mills v.

The Supreme Court, per curiam, reversed the Ninth Circuit's affirmance of a federal habeas grant to Troy Brown, holding that a Jackson v. Virginia sufficiency-of-the-evidence review must consider all of the evidence admitted at trial and may not exclude DNA testimony based on a post-trial expert report, and that the…