Supreme Court of the United States, 2010

Justice Thomas, concurring, argues the suit should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction under the Tax Injunction Act (TIA) rather than on comity grounds. He contends that the TIA bars federal courts from suspending state tax collection, a bar that applies because respondents compete with exempt entities and thus…

Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Sotomayor, concurs in part and in the judgment. He accepts that compacts are federal statutes but emphasizes their status as agreements interpretable under contract principles.

Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Thomas, concurs in part and dissents in part, arguing that allowing the Southeast Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Commission—a non‑sovereign entity—to sue North Carolina violates the Eleventh Amendment's bar on suits against states.

Justice Breyer argues that North Carolina breached the Southeast Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Compact by suspending waste disposal construction efforts without taking other steps toward the obligation, despite the Commission stopping funding advances.

The Supreme Court held that ERISA § 1132(g)(1) does not require a fee claimant to be a 'prevailing party' to recover attorney’s fees. Instead, a court may award fees to any party achieving 'some degree of success on the merits.' The Court reversed the Fourth Circuit's vacatur of the fee award to Hardt, who achieved…

The Court held that a fact that a firearm is a machinegun under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(B)(ii) is an element of the offense that must be proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt, rather than a sentencing factor to be determined by the judge. This conclusion relied on the Court's prior decision in Castillo v.

Justice Stevens, J., concurring, argues that facts triggering mandatory minimum sentences function as elements of a criminal offense and require proof beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury. He criticizes McMillan v.

Justice Thomas concurs in the judgment, arguing that sentencing facts that increase mandatory minimum sentences are elements under the Sixth Amendment and must be submitted to a jury. He asserts this requirement follows from Apprendi v. New Jersey and applies regardless of whether the fact alters the statutory maximum.

The Court vacated the Court of Appeals’ judgment because it treated one statutory exception to the presumption of correctness as controlling without considering Jefferson’s arguments that other exceptions applied to the state court’s factfinding process.

The Court held that the machinegun provision in §924(c)(1)(B)(ii) is an element of the offense, not a sentencing factor, because it substantially increases the mandatory minimum sentence and the 1998 statutory amendments did not clearly indicate a change in congressional policy.

The Supreme Court held that a fee claimant need not be a 'prevailing party' to recover attorney's fees under ERISA §1132(g)(1). Instead, fees may be awarded where the claimant achieves some degree of success on the merits.

Justice Stevens dissented from the Court's remand and would have affirmed the judgment ordering a retrial. He reasoned that the failure to instruct the jury that pre-enactment conduct was not criminal created a substantial risk that the jury relied on noncriminal conduct and distorted its assessment of the charged…

Justice Stevens delivered the Court's unanimous opinion holding that the NFL teams' collective licensing of their separately owned intellectual property through NFL Properties constitutes concerted action subject to § 1 of the Sherman Act.

Justice Stevens concurred to argue that facts triggering mandatory minimum sentences should be treated as elements of the offense, requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt. He contends that McMillan and Harris were wrongly decided because they allowed judicial factfinding to increase penalties by a preponderance of…

The Supreme Court held that the Second Circuit's plain-error standard for claims not raised at trial—requiring reversal whenever there is 'any possibility, no matter how unlikely,' that the jury convicted exclusively on conduct predating the Trafficking Victims Protection Act's October 28, 2000 enactment—is…

The Supreme Court vacated the Eleventh Circuit’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings, holding that the appellate court erred by considering only §2254(d)(8) and failing to evaluate the other seven statutory exceptions to the presumption of correctness.

Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, dissents from the Court's summary vacation of the Eleventh Circuit's judgment. He argues the Court decided an issue neither raised nor passed upon below—specifically, the application of exceptions to 28 U.S.C.

Justice Thomas dissents, arguing the majority's categorical ban on life-without-parole for juvenile nonhomicide offenders conflicts with the original meaning of the Eighth Amendment and overlooks legislative consensus.

The Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits sentencing a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide to life imprisonment without parole. Because juveniles have diminished culpability, life without parole is exceptionally severe for them, and the recognized penological goals do not justify irrevocably denying…

The Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, forbids sentencing a juvenile offender to life imprisonment without parole for a nonhomicide crime.

The Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits sentencing juvenile offenders to life without parole for nonhomicide crimes because juveniles have diminished culpability and life without parole is the second most severe penalty.

Justice Roberts concurred in the judgment because Graham’s life-without-parole sentence was grossly disproportionate under existing narrow proportionality precedent, considering his youth, diminished culpability, the nature of his offenses, and the severity of the punishment.

Justice Stevens dissents from the majority’s denial of habeas relief to Lett, arguing the trial judge declared a mistrial after only four hours of deliberation without adequately confirming deadlock, violating double jeopardy protections.

The Court reversed the grant of federal habeas relief because the state supreme court’s conclusion that the trial judge acted within her discretion in declaring a mistrial for jury deadlock was not an objectively unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.

The Court held that the statute makes the Federal Tort Claims Act remedy against the United States exclusive for personal injuries caused by Public Health Service personnel performing medical or related functions within the scope of their employment.

The Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit's affirmance of a federal habeas writ granted to Reginald Lett, holding that the Michigan Supreme Court's determination that the trial judge exercised sound discretion in declaring a mistrial after a deadlocked jury was not an objectively unreasonable application of clearly…

The Supreme Court held that the limitations period under 28 U.S.C. §1658(b)(1) for private securities fraud actions begins to run only when the plaintiff discovers, or a reasonably diligent plaintiff would have discovered, the facts constituting the violation, including scienter.

Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment, agreeing that a lodestar fee award under § 1988 may be enhanced for attorney performance only in rare and exceptional circumstances. He noted that the lodestar calculation typically reflects performance, and enhancements should be infrequent.

The Court held that attorney fee enhancements under § 1988 are permitted only in extraordinary circumstances where specific evidence proves the lodestar is insufficient to attract competent counsel.

The Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit's affirmance of a District Court's 75% enhancement to a lodestar attorney's fee award under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The Court held that while enhancements are permitted in rare and exceptional circumstances, factors subsumed in the lodestar calculation, such as quality of performance…

Breyer, joined by Stevens, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor, concurs in part and dissents in part. He agrees that attorney fee enhancements are permitted in extraordinary circumstances but would affirm the District Court’s enhancement. Thomas and Kennedy concurred with the Court’s opinion, noting that enhancements must be rare.

The Court held that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 governs class certification in diversity cases and preempts New York Civ. Prac. Law Ann. §901(b), allowing Shady Grove’s class action to proceed.

The Court held that the Sixth Amendment requires criminal defense counsel to advise a noncitizen client whether a guilty plea carries a risk of deportation. Because Padilla alleged that counsel gave incorrect advice about the virtually mandatory immigration consequence of his drug conviction, he adequately alleged…

The Court held that liability under §36(b) requires proof that an investment adviser charged a fee so disproportionately large that it bore no reasonable relationship to the services provided and could not have resulted from arm’s-length bargaining.

The Court held that liability under § 36(b) requires proof that an investment adviser charged a fee so disproportionately large that it bears no reasonable relationship to the services provided and could not have resulted from arm's-length bargaining.

Justice Thomas concurs in the judgment affirming the approach to § 36(b) cases but writes separately to clarify that the Court does not endorse the 'Gartenberg standard.' He argues that Gartenberg's emphasis on fee fairness could be read as judicial rate regulation, and notes that most courts have instead deferred to…

Justice Ginsburg concurred in the Court's opinion, understanding that nothing bars the Eighth Circuit from considering the Government's remand argument about the indictment's effectiveness. She notes the Government suggested alternative exclusion calculations for speedy trial timing.

The Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit, holding that time granted to prepare pretrial motions is not automatically excludable under the Speedy Trial Act's §3161(h)(1). Such time may only be excluded when a district court grants a continuance based on appropriate findings under §3161(h)(7).

The Supreme Court held that attorneys are debt relief agencies under the BAPCPA, and construed § 526(a)(4) narrowly to prohibit only advice to incur debt when the impelling reason is the expectation of filing for bankruptcy. It upheld § 528's disclosure requirements as constitutional under Zauderer.