United States v. Glenn Marcus (SCOTUS 2010)

Summary

The Supreme Court held that the Second Circuit's plain-error standard for claims not raised at trial—requiring reversal whenever there is 'any possibility, no matter how unlikely,' that the jury convicted exclusively on conduct predating the Trafficking Victims Protection Act's October 28, 2000 enactment—is irreconcilable with the Court's four-part Rule 52(b) test, particularly the prejudice (substantial rights) and fairness/integrity/public-reputation criteria. The Court further determined that the error (the absence of any instruction ensuring the jury could not convict solely on preenactment conduct) is not a 'structural error,' and that it was mislabeled an Ex Post Facto Clause violation when the operative claim would properly sound in due process. It therefore reversed the Second Circuit's judgment and remanded for application of the correct plain-error standard. Justice Stevens dissented, contending the error plainly prejudiced Marcus and that the Court of Appeals properly exercised its discretion to order a retrial, while criticizing the Court's multi-part plain-error test as an analytic maze that obscures Rule 52(b)'s straightforward text.

Holding

Whether the Second Circuit's 'any possibility, no matter how unlikely' standard for recognizing plain error in claims not raised at trial is consistent with the Court's interpretation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b).. No. The Second Circuit's standard is irreconcilable with the Court's plain-error precedent—specifically its third and fourth criteria—and the Court rejects the rule; the judgment resting on it is reversed.

Whether the error at issue—the absence of an instruction ensuring the jury could not convict exclusively on conduct predating the statute's enactment—is a 'structural error' that automatically affects substantial rights without a showing of individual prejudice.. No. The error is not within the very limited class of structural errors; like other instructional errors, it requires a demonstration of individual prejudice under the third plain-error criterion.

Whether the error should be classified as a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause.. No. The Government never claimed the statute retroactively criminalized preenactment conduct; the Ex Post Facto Clause limits the powers of the Legislature and does not of its own force apply to the Judicial Branch. If the uninstructed jury convicted exclusively on noncriminal preenactment conduct, the claim would properly sound in the Due Process Clause—though the label does not alter the plain-error analysis.

Summary

Holding

Cited authorities