Supreme Court of the United States, 2010

Justice Scalia dissents from the Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari in Lawhorn. He contends that the Eleventh Circuit erred in finding prejudice under Strickland and that the Court should have granted certiorari to reverse that judgment.

The Court held that the policy or custom requirement from Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs. applies to claims for prospective relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 just as it applies to claims for monetary damages.

The Court held that a defendant convicted under § 924(c) must receive the statute's mandatory consecutive sentence even when another conviction carries a higher mandatory minimum.

Justice Sotomayor dissented from the Supreme Court's denial of a petition for writ of certiorari in Pitre v. Cain, arguing that the Fifth Circuit erred in applying a heightened pleading standard and that the plaintiff's complaint sufficiently states an Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference arising from…

Justice Sotomayor dissents, arguing that the plaintiff’s complaint adequately states an Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference and that the lower courts erred by requiring proof of evidence before pleading. She would grant certiorari and reverse the judgment below.

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for a writ of error because the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus had been revoked, rendering the issue moot, and held that habeas corpus proceedings are civil and may be reviewed only by appeal, not by writ of error.

The Court held that the 1908 Maryland statute's grandfather clause standard for voter registration violated the Fifteenth Amendment but the remaining property and naturalized citizen standards were valid.

Justice Scalia, dissenting, disagrees with the Court's decision to remand for the state court to find whether a different mitigation theory would have persuaded the jury. He argues the state habeas court correctly applied Strickland and that Sears has not shown a reasonable probability that the sentence would have…

The Supreme Court granted certiorari, held that the Georgia state court applied an incorrect prejudice analysis under Strickland for Sears' ineffective‑assistance claim, vacated the judgment and remanded for a proper inquiry.

Justice Alito dissents, arguing Hastings denied CLS registration under its Nondiscrimination Policy due to viewpoint discrimination against religious and sexual morality viewpoints rather than an “accept-all-comers” policy. He contends the Court disregards Healy v.

Justice Stevens concurred, joining the Court's opinion upholding the 'all-comers' policy for student organizations. He responded to the dissent's challenge of the school's Nondiscrimination Policy, arguing it is content and viewpoint neutral despite any disparate impact on religious groups.

The Supreme Court held that the machine-or-transformation test is not the exclusive test for determining patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, concluding that petitioners' patent application claims an unpatentable abstract idea regarding risk hedging.

The Supreme Court upheld Hastings College of the Law's "all‑comers" policy, finding it viewpoint neutral and a permissible condition for recognizing student organizations, and affirmed the denial of registration to the Christian Legal Society.

The Court held that dual for-cause removal protections for Public Company Accounting Oversight Board members violate the Constitution's separation of powers, but severed the removal provisions to allow the Board to continue operating with members removable at will by the SEC.

Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment, arguing that business methods are not patentable processes under 35 U.S.C. § 101 based on historical practice and the constitutional purpose of patents. He disagreed with the Court’s approach to defining a process but agreed petitioners’ claims were unpatentable.

The Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause incorporates the Second Amendment right, recognized in District of Columbia v. Heller, to keep and bear arms for self-defense, making that right fully applicable to the States and dooming Chicago's and Oak Park's effective handgun bans insofar…

The Court held that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act's dual for-cause removal protections for PCAOB members violate Article II's vesting of executive power in the President. The Court found the restrictions severable, allowing the Board to continue operating with members removable at will by the SEC.

The Supreme Court affirmed the Federal Circuit's rejection of Bilski and Warsaw's patent application for a method of hedging risk in commodity and energy markets. It held that the machine-or-transformation test, though a useful and important clue, is not the sole test of whether an invention is a patent-eligible…

The Court affirmed the Federal Circuit’s decision that the petitioners’ method of managing commodity risk is not patent‑eligible because a business‑method claim is not a “process” under 35 U.S.C. §101; the machine‑or‑transformation test is a useful clue but not the exclusive test.

The Court held that Hastings College of the Law’s all-comers policy, which requires registered student organizations to accept all students regardless of status or beliefs, does not violate the First Amendment. The policy was deemed a reasonable and viewpoint-neutral condition on access to a limited public forum.

The Supreme Court affirmed the Federal Circuit's judgment that the petitioners' method of managing commodity risk is not patent‑eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. §101 because it is a general business method and an abstract idea.

The Court held that the machine-or-transformation test is not the sole test for determining patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. §101, and that §101 does not categorically exclude business methods.

Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor, dissents from the Court's holding that the Sarbanes‑Oxley statute’s ‘for‑cause’ removal provision for PCAOB members is unconstitutional.

Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor, dissents from the Court's holding that the Sarbanes‑Oxley statute limiting removal of PCAOB members to cause is unconstitutional.

Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Scalia as to Part II, concurs in the judgment affirming the Federal Circuit's decision that Bilski's method of hedging risk is not a patentable process under 35 U.S.C. § 101.

Justice Thomas dissents, arguing Washington’s public records disclosure of referendum petitions burdens First Amendment associational rights. He would hold the PRA facially unconstitutional as strict scrutiny requires narrow tailoring and the state has less restrictive means, such as an electronic database, to verify…

Justice Sotomayor joins the majority in holding that Granite Rock's tortious interference claim is not cognizable under the Labor Management Relations Act. She dissents from the majority's conclusion that the collective-bargaining agreement's arbitration clause does not cover the dispute over the union's alleged…

Justice Kennedy, joined by the Chief Justice, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Alito, dissents, arguing the Court misinterprets AEDPA's "second or successive" bar. He contends the correct claim-based approach from Panetti should bar Magwood's second petition since the claim was available earlier.

Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Stevens and Breyer, concurred in the Court's resolution of the honest-services fraud question but dissented from its conclusion that Skilling received a fair trial before an impartial jury.

The Court held that pre‑trial publicity and community prejudice in Houston did not create a presumption of juror bias and that the district court’s venue‑transfer denial and jury‑selection procedures satisfied the Sixth Amendment, so Skilling received a fair trial. It also held that 18 U.S.C.

The Court held that extensive pretrial publicity and community hostility did not deprive Skilling of a fair trial because neither presumptive nor actual juror prejudice was established.

Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment, doubting that signing a referendum petition falls within the First Amendment's freedom of speech. He argued that even if it does, historical tradition of public legislating and voting refutes any right to anonymity. He criticized McIntyre v.

Sotomayor concurs in the Court's resolution of the honest-services fraud question but dissents from the conclusion that Skilling received a fair trial before an impartial jury, arguing the District Court's voir dire was insufficient to screen pervasive community bias.

The Supreme Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit, holding that a §2254 application challenging a new state-court judgment for the first time is not 'second or successive' under 28 U.S.C. §2244(b), so §2244(b)'s authorization and claim-dismissal restrictions do not apply to it.

The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of Australian purchasers' Securities Exchange Act claims arising from massive write-downs of a Florida mortgage-servicing subsidiary whose inflated valuation had supported the price of shares traded only on foreign exchanges.

The Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit’s forfeiture ruling, holding that defendants preserved their objections to jury instructions despite opposing special verdicts. The Court vacated the convictions because the honest-services fraud instructions were incorrect under Skilling v.

Justice Sotomayor concurs to emphasize that initiatives and referenda are not compelled by the Constitution, so states have considerable leeway to regulate ballot access. Public disclosure of petition signatures advances state interests in electoral integrity and transparency while burdening First Amendment rights…

The Court held that Skilling received a fair trial despite pretrial publicity and that the honest-services fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1346, covers only bribery and kickback schemes.

Justice Scalia concurs in part and in the judgment, agreeing that the jury‑selection issues are properly resolved, but holding that the conviction under 18 U.S.C. §1346 must be reversed because the statute's definition of "honest services" is unconstitutionally vague under the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause.

The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' ruling that defendants forfeited their objection to honest-services jury instructions by opposing special verdict proposals. The Court held that defendants need not acquiesce in government requests for special findings to preserve objections to instructions under the…