Supreme Court of the United States, 2010

Justice Scalia concurs in part and in the judgment, agreeing that the jury‑selection issues are properly resolved, but holding that the conviction under 18 U.S.C. §1346 must be reversed because the statute's definition of "honest services" is unconstitutionally vague under the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause.

The Court held that Washington's application of its Public Records Act to disclose the names of referendum petition signers does not impose a substantial First Amendment burden and therefore is constitutional; the judgment was affirmed.

Justice Alito concurred in the judgment, writing separately to address the Sixth Amendment jury trial right. He concluded that no constitutional violation occurs so long as no biased juror is actually seated, regardless of pretrial publicity, provided voir dire and insulating measures ensure impartiality.

The Court held that pre‑trial publicity and community prejudice in Houston did not create a presumption of juror bias and that the district court’s venue‑transfer denial and jury‑selection procedures satisfied the Sixth Amendment, so Skilling received a fair trial. It also held that 18 U.S.C.

The Supreme Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit, holding that a §2254 application challenging a new state-court judgment for the first time is not 'second or successive' under 28 U.S.C. §2244(b), so §2244(b)'s authorization and claim-dismissal restrictions do not apply to it.

Justice Alito concurred in the judgment but wrote separately to address the jury-trial argument. He argues the Sixth Amendment requires only an impartial jury at seating, not a presumption of prejudice based on pretrial publicity.

The Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit’s forfeiture ruling, holding that defendants preserved their objections to jury instructions despite opposing special verdicts. The Court vacated the convictions because the honest-services fraud instructions were incorrect under Skilling v.

Justice Stevens, dissenting, argues that when a party challenges the unconscionability of a standalone arbitration agreement, a court must resolve that challenge before compelling arbitration.

The Court held that the Carmack Amendment does not apply to shipments originating overseas under a single through bill of lading, so the forum-selection clause governing suits in Tokyo is binding.

The Supreme Court held that under the Federal Arbitration Act a party who resists arbitration must direct any validity challenge specifically at the delegation provision—the clause assigning arbitrability disputes to the arbitrator—for a court to decide the challenge; because Antonio Jackson's unconscionability…

Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Stevens and Justice Ginsburg, dissents from the Court's holding that the Carmack Amendment does not apply to inland rail leg of multimodal international shipments.

The Court held that the Carmack Amendment does not apply to a shipment originating overseas under a single through bill of lading. Therefore, the Tokyo forum-selection clause in the bill of lading is binding. Justice Sotomayor, dissenting, would have applied Carmack to the inland rail segment.

Justice Breyer dissents, agreeing the material support statute is not vague but disagreeing that the Constitution permits prosecuting plaintiffs for coordinated teaching and advocacy supporting the lawful political objectives of foreign terrorist organizations.

Justice Scalia concurs in the judgment, agreeing that the City’s audit of employee pager messages was reasonable and that the Fourth Amendment question is unnecessary. He criticizes the plurality’s “operational realities” test from O’Connor v.

The Court held that a government employer's search of an employee’s text messages on a city-issued pager was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Even assuming the employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy, the search was justified by legitimate work-related purposes and was not excessively intrusive.

Justice Stevens dissents, arguing that United States v. Booker’s remedial holding rendering the Sentencing Guidelines advisory should apply to sentence modification proceedings under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).

The Court affirmed the Florida Supreme Court's decision, holding that no taking occurred because the beach restoration project fit within Florida's avulsion doctrine, leaving littoral owners without a vested right to future accretions.

Justice Stevens joined the Court's opinion but wrote separately to highlight that the Court sensibly declined to resolve which standard from O'Connor v. Ortega governs employee privacy expectations. He concluded Quon had a limited expectation of privacy regardless of the standard applied.

Justice Kennedy concurs in part and in the judgment, agreeing with the majority’s resolution of the land‑ownership dispute. He uses the opportunity to caution against extending the Takings Clause to judicial decisions that alter established property rights, arguing that such questions are better addressed under the…

The Supreme Court held that United States v. Booker does not apply to sentence-modification proceedings under 18 U.S.C. §3582(c)(2), so USSG §1B1.10(b) binds district courts to confine any reduction to the amended Guidelines range unless the original sentence was below the then-applicable range.

The Supreme Court held that a sentencing court retains the power to order restitution after missing the 90-day statutory deadline under 18 U.S.C. § 3664(d)(5), because the deadline is not jurisdictional but a time-related directive aimed at helping victims, not limiting judicial power.

Chief Justice Roberts dissents, arguing that the District Court lacked authority to impose restitution more than 90 days after sentencing under 18 U.S.C. § 3664(d)(5). He concludes sentences are final, the statutory deadline is self-executing, and the Government's failure to appeal the initial sentencing error…

The Court held that a sentencing court that misses the 90‑day deadline for determining a victim's losses under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act still retains authority to order restitution if it had previously indicated it would do so, leaving only the amount undetermined.

The Court held that the AEDPA limitations period is subject to equitable tolling and rejected a categorical rule that attorney misconduct cannot be extraordinary absent specified forms of bad faith or impairment.

The Court held that missing the 90-day statutory deadline for determining victim losses under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act does not deprive a sentencing court of the power to order restitution. The deadline is not jurisdictional, and the statute does not specify a sanction for noncompliance.

Chief Justice Roberts, dissenting, argues that the 90-day deadline under 18 U.S.C. § 3664(d)(5) for ordering restitution is a self-executing statutory limit on a court's authority once the sentence is imposed.

The Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit, holding that a second or subsequent simple drug possession conviction that is not based on a prior conviction does not constitute an aggravated felony under the INA, so the petitioner remains eligible for cancellation of removal.

Justice Thomas, writing for a unanimous Court, held that attorney’s fees awarded under 28 U. S. C. §2412(d) belong to the prevailing litigant, not the attorney, and therefore are subject to administrative offset for the litigant’s pre-existing federal debts.

The Court held that AEDPA's one-year limitations period for federal habeas petitions, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), is subject to equitable tolling in appropriate cases, and that the Eleventh Circuit's per se rule—under which attorney negligence, even gross negligence, could never constitute an 'extraordinary circumstance'…

The Court denied the petition for a writ of certiorari. The petition raised a Confrontation Clause issue concerning the use of two‑way video testimony, but the Court declined to address the merits because the case was in an interlocutory posture and it was unclear whether the lower court decision was a final judgment.

The Court held that a bankruptcy court calculating a debtor’s projected disposable income may account for changes in income or expenses that are known or virtually certain at confirmation. This forward-looking approach rejects a purely mechanical formula under §1325(b)(1).

The Supreme Court examined whether the respondent’s case was moot, given that he remained on the Montana sex‑offender registry potentially because of a federal juvenile‑supervision order.

The Supreme Court held that bankruptcy courts calculating a Chapter 13 debtor’s “projected disposable income” under 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)(B) may account for changes in the debtor’s income or expenses that are known or virtually certain at the time of confirmation.

Justice Scalia dissents, arguing the majority's allowance of adjustments to projected disposable income contradicts the Bankruptcy Code's text. He contends the statute requires a mechanical calculation based on historical income data without consideration of future changes unless the law explicitly provides otherwise.

Justice Thomas, concurring, argues the suit should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction under the Tax Injunction Act (TIA) rather than on comity grounds. He contends that the TIA bars federal courts from suspending state tax collection, a bar that applies because respondents compete with exempt entities and thus…

Justice Scalia concurs in the judgment, agreeing with the Court's result that foreign officials are not covered by the foreign‑state immunity provision, but he criticizes the majority's reliance on legislative history, arguing that the statutory text alone resolves the issue.

The Court held that the Southeast Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Compact does not authorize the Commission to impose monetary sanctions on member states. It further ruled that North Carolina did not breach the Compact by ceasing licensing efforts after the Commission ceased financial support, and…

Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Sotomayor, concurs in part and in the judgment. He accepts that compacts are federal statutes but emphasizes their status as agreements interpretable under contract principles.