Supreme Court of the United States, 2005

Justice Scalia concurs in the judgment, agreeing that subsequent legislation authorized the collection of student-loan debt by administrative offset despite the Social Security Act's express-reference requirement.

The Court held that the United States may offset Social Security benefits to collect student loan debts outstanding for over 10 years. The Higher Education Technical Amendments removed the 10-year time limit on student loans, and the Debt Collection Improvement Act explicitly authorized offsets of Social Security…

The Court held that, absent unusual circumstances, attorney's fees should not be awarded under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) when the removing party had an objectively reasonable basis for removal, and conversely that fees may be awarded only where the removing party lacked such a basis.

The Court held that the Government may offset Social Security benefits to collect a student loan debt that has been outstanding for over 10 years, because the Higher Education Technical Amendments eliminated the applicable time limit.

Justice Ginsburg, dissenting with Justice Kennedy, would affirm the Tenth Circuit’s judgment that Kansas’s fuel tax was preempted under the Indian preemption framework. She argues that despite the tax’s legal incidence falling on a non-Indian distributor, a particularized interest-balancing inquiry under White…

The Court held that Kansas may impose its motor-fuel tax because the tax falls on non-Indian distributors when they receive fuel off the reservation, and the Bracker interest-balancing test therefore does not apply.

The Court reversed the Tenth Circuit, holding that the White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker interest-balancing test applies only when a State asserts authority over non-Indians engaging in on-reservation activity.

The Court affirmed the judgment upholding New York's tax on shares of national banks without permitting shareholders to deduct personal debts. It held that the federal limitation requires a practical comparison of the actual tax burden on national-bank shares with that imposed on competing forms of moneyed capital…

The Supreme Court held that defendants may remove a state-court action on diversity grounds whenever there is complete diversity between all named plaintiffs and all named defendants and no properly joined and served defendant is a citizen of the forum State; a removing defendant need not negate the existence of an…

A per curiam Supreme Court vacated the Sixth Circuit's judgment granting Kenneth Richey federal habeas relief from his 1987 Ohio aggravated-felony-murder conviction and death sentence. The Court held that transferred intent was a permissible theory under the version of Ohio Rev. Code Ann.

Justice Breyer, dissenting, argues that the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act leaves the burden of persuasion at due process hearings to state determination rather than imposing a uniform federal rule.

Justice Ginsburg dissents, arguing that policy considerations, convenience, and fairness dictate the school district rather than the parents should bear the burden of proof in IDEA due process hearings.

The Supreme Court held that at an IDEA 'impartial due process hearing' challenging an individualized education program (IEP), the burden of persuasion rests on the party seeking relief — here the disabled child's parents — because the Act is silent on allocation and the ordinary default rule assigns that burden to the…

The Supreme Court held that the Federal Tort Claims Act waives sovereign immunity only when local law would make a private person liable, not merely when a state or municipal entity would be liable for a unique governmental function.

The Supreme Court, acting as Circuit Justice, denied the emergency application to vacate the Second Circuit’s stay of a district‑court preliminary injunction against the nondisclosure provision of 18 U.S.C. §2709(c), finding no extraordinary circumstances warranting intervention.

Justice Breyer joins the Court’s opinion, agreeing the Federal Communications Commission’s decision falls within its delegated authority, but writes separately to correct Justice Scalia’s characterization of United States v. Mead Corp.

Justice Scalia dissents, arguing that the FCC’s interpretation of “offer” and the classification of cable‑modem service misreads the Telecommunications Act and exceeds congressional authority. He also contends that the Court’s recent approach to Chevron deference, particularly in United States v.

Justice Souter delivered the unanimous opinion holding that a distributor who promotes a device's use for copyright infringement through clear expression or other affirmative steps is liable for resulting third-party infringements.

Justice Ginsburg concurred in the Court's decision to vacate the Ninth Circuit's judgment. She wrote separately to explain that the Court of Appeals misapplied Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios regarding contributory liability, finding insufficient evidence that the defendants' software had substantial…

The Supreme Court held that the Federal Communications Commission's Declaratory Ruling classifying cable broadband (cable modem) service as an information service, and therefore exempt from mandatory Title II common-carrier regulation, is a lawful construction of the Communications Act under Chevron and the…

The Supreme Court held that Jessica Gonzales lacked a constitutionally protected property interest in police enforcement of her domestic restraining order: although Colorado's statute directed officers to 'use every reasonable means to enforce' the order and to arrest or seek a warrant upon probable cause, the Court…

Justice Scalia dissents, arguing that the Court’s claim that government cannot favor religion is historically false, that the majority’s extension of that claim exceeds prior precedent, and that even under that premise the judgment against McCreary and Pulaski Counties’ Ten Commandments displays is wrong.

Justice Breyer concurs in the judgment, agreeing that distributors of dual-use technology may be liable if they seek to advance infringement, but he defends the Sony safe harbor standard. He reasons that Grokster's product passes Sony's test because it is capable of substantial noninfringing uses.

The Court held that the Sixth Circuit abused whatever discretion it may have had to withhold its mandate for more than five months after the denial of certiorari and rehearing, particularly because it issued no formal order or notice while reconsidering the case.

Justice Breyer dissents from the Supreme Court's decision to reverse the Court of Appeals' ruling that vacated a denial of habeas relief and remanded a capital case before the mandate issued.

The Court held that the Court of Appeals abused any discretion it may have had to withhold its mandate after the denial of certiorari and rehearing, particularly because it delayed for more than five months without a formal order or notice.

Souter agrees that no Fourteenth Amendment violation occurred because Colorado statutes did not create an enforceable property interest due to traditional police discretion. Stevens dissents, arguing Colorado law mandated enforcement creating an entitlement, and the Court should defer to state courts or certify the…

Justice O'Connor concurs in the Court’s opinion and that the Counties’ display of the Ten Commandments violated the Establishment Clause. She explains that the Religion Clauses protect religious liberty and prohibit government endorsement of religion, arguing the display sent an unmistakable message of endorsement to…

Stevens dissents, arguing Colorado’s mandatory arrest statute created a protected property interest in police enforcement of restraining orders, contrary to the majority’s conclusion.

The Supreme Court affirmed the Sixth Circuit's affirmance of a preliminary injunction requiring McCreary and Pulaski Counties to remove courthouse displays centered on the Ten Commandments, holding that the displays' predominantly religious purpose violated the Establishment Clause.

Justice Thomas dissents, arguing that the Court errs in extending the right to appointed appellate counsel to defendants convicted by plea who seek discretionary leave to appeal. He contends this exceeds precedents like Douglas and Ross, and notes that such rights are waivable and were waived here.

The Court held that indigent defendants convicted by guilty or nolo contendere pleas must receive appointed counsel when seeking first-tier review in the Michigan Court of Appeals.

The Supreme Court held that 28 U.S.C. § 1367 authorizes supplemental jurisdiction in diversity cases over the claims of additional plaintiffs—including permissively joined parties and absent class members—that do not independently satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement, so long as at least one named plaintiff…

The Supreme Court held that New London's condemnation of non-blighted homes under a carefully formulated, integrated economic development plan serves a valid 'public use' under the Fifth Amendment, affirming the judgment of the Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Breyer, dissented from the Court's interpretation of the supplemental-jurisdiction statute, concluding that the statute did not eliminate the longstanding requirement that each plaintiff in a diversity action independently satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement.

Kennedy joins the Court's opinion affirming the taking under the Public Use Clause. He clarifies that rational-basis review applies but forbids takings primarily benefiting private parties with pretextual public benefits.

The Supreme Court held that an amended federal habeas petition filed after AEDPA's one-year limitations period does not relate back to the original timely filed petition under Fed. Rule Civ. Proc.

Justice O'Connor, joined by three other Justices, dissents from the Court's decision holding that economic development takings satisfy the Fifth Amendment's public use requirement.

The Supreme Court held that a Rule 60(b)(6) motion in a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 case is not treated as a second or successive habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) when, like petitioner's challenge to the District Court's AEDPA statute-of-limitations ruling, it attacks a defect in the integrity of the federal habeas…

Justice Thomas dissents, arguing the Public Use Clause originally required the government or public to actually use the property, not simply serve a 'public purpose' like economic development.