Supreme Court of the United States, 2005

The Court affirmed the Michigan Court of Appeals' judgment, holding that 49 U.S.C. § 14504(b) does not preempt Michigan's $100 annual truck fee because the term 'State registration requirement' in the federal statute is limited to matters related to the Single State Registration System (SSRS), which the Michigan fee…

Justice Stevens dissents, arguing that the 1-year limitations period for habeas petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, ¶ 6(3) should begin when a new right is both recognized by the Supreme Court and held retroactive.

The Court held that Michigan's flat $100 annual fee on trucks engaged in intrastate commercial hauling does not violate the dormant Commerce Clause because it applies only to local activity, does not facially discriminate against interstate commerce, and lacks evidence of practical burden.

The Supreme Court held that, in a capital case reviewed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), counsel rendered ineffective assistance under Strickland by failing to examine the readily available court file on Rompilla's prior rape conviction after the prosecution gave notice it would prove the violent-history aggravator by…

The Supreme Court held that the False Claims Act's 6-year statute of limitations does not apply to retaliation actions under § 3730(h). Because no federal limitations period expressly covers retaliation claims, the Court concluded that the most closely analogous state limitations period must apply.

The Supreme Court held that the one-year limitations period in 28 U.S.C. § 2255 ¶ 6(3) begins on "the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court," not on the later date when the right is made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; the retroactivity clause merely…

The Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit, holding that federal courts must apply 28 U.S.C. §1738 and give full faith and credit to state court judgments, so they cannot create an exception for takings claims even when the claim is not ripe under Williamson County.

The Court held that Michigan's flat $100 fee on trucks engaging in intrastate commercial hauling does not violate the dormant Commerce Clause because it applies evenhandedly to local activities and lacks evidence of burdening interstate trade.

Justice Breyer dissents, arguing that the six‑year limitations period in 31 U.S.C. § 3731(b)(1) plainly applies to retaliation actions under § 3730(h) and should run from the date of the alleged false‑claims violation.

The Court held that the False Claims Act's 6-year statute of limitations in § 3731(b)(1) does not apply to retaliation actions under § 3730(h), so the most closely analogous state limitations period governs.

Justice Kennedy, joined by the Chief Justice, Justice Scalia, and Justice Thomas, dissents in Rompilla v. Beard, arguing that the majority’s decision imposes an unprecedented rigid requirement that counsel review all prior conviction files in capital cases.

Justice O’Connor concurred to clarify that the Court's decision did not impose a categorical requirement that defense counsel review every document in every prior-conviction file.

Justice Ginsburg dissents, arguing that 28 U.S.C. § 2255(6)(3)'s limitation period should start when a new right is made retroactively applicable, not merely when recognized, to avoid barring claims before they can be brought.

The Supreme Court held that Batson's first step does not permit a State to require a criminal defendant to show that it is more likely than not that the prosecutor's peremptory strikes, if unexplained, were based on impermissible group bias; the prima facie showing requires only evidence sufficient to permit the trial…

The Supreme Court held that Ohio inmates have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in avoiding assignment to the Ohio State Penitentiary, a Supermax facility, because the extreme isolation, indefinite duration, and disqualification from parole eligibility that placement entails impose an atypical and…

The Supreme Court held that prosecutors in Miller-El's Texas capital trial peremptorily struck qualified black venire members because of race, rendering the state courts' contrary factual finding unreasonable under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) and rebutted by clear and convincing evidence under § 2254(e)(1).

The Supreme Court unanimously held that the absence of a federal cause of action does not preclude removal and federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 over a state-law quiet title action between nondiverse parties, so long as the claim necessarily raises a stated federal issue that is actually disputed…

The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the Sixth Circuit's grant of habeas relief on the ground that Stumpf's guilty plea to aggravated murder was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, holding that a plea may validly rest on competent defense counsel's on-record representation that the elements were explained, and…

In an opinion by Justice Scalia, the Court held that 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) protects uses of patented inventions in preclinical research reasonably related to developing information for FDA submission, even when the tested drug or experimental results are not ultimately submitted.

Justice Souter concurred, explaining that the Court is remanding to consider whether due process is violated when the State maintains inconsistent positions about who was the triggerman in two separate death penalty cases involving co-defendants.

Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, concurs with the Court’s opinion, emphasizing that the State has not shown that Teague v. Lane bars Stumpf’s due‑process claim regarding the prosecution’s inconsistent theories and that Stumpf has not procedurally defaulted that claim.

Justice Breyer concurs in the judgment but expresses doubt about the effectiveness of the Batson rule against racial discrimination in jury selection, suggesting a need to reconsider peremptory challenges broadly.

Justice Thomas dissents, arguing that the majority improperly relies on evidence Miller-El presented to federal habeas courts rather than the state-court record under AEDPA, and finds the evidence insufficient to prove purposeful race discrimination in jury selection by clear and convincing evidence.

Justice Thomas's concurrence acknowledges Court precedents permitting federal-question jurisdiction over state law claims requiring federal law determinations, and expresses willingness to reconsider this approach in favor of a rule limiting jurisdiction to cases where federal law creates the cause of action.

Justice Thomas concurred in part and dissented in part, agreeing that the clear-statement rule requires Congress to expressly indicate if statutes apply laws to foreign-flag ships' internal affairs.

Justice Scalia concurred in part and dissented in part, disagreeing with the majority's conclusion that the United States expressly retained title to submerged lands within Glacier Bay National Monument upon Alaska's statehood.

The Court overruled Alaska’s exceptions to the Special Master’s recommendations, concluding it does not possess title to submerged lands within the Alexander Archipelago or Glacier Bay National Monument.

Justice Scalia dissented from the Court's conclusion that Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act applies to foreign-flag cruise ships. He would have applied the clear-statement rule because Title III's structural-accessibility requirements affect a ship's internal order and may conflict with foreign law or…

The Court held that Title III of the ADA applies to foreign-flag cruise ships in United States waters, rejecting a blanket presumption against application. The Court clarified that the clear statement rule for foreign-flag ships’ internal affairs applies only when statutory duties interfere with internal order, not…

The Court reversed the Fifth Circuit, holding that Title III of the ADA applies to foreign-flag cruise ships in U.S. waters unless a clear statement of congressional intent is required to avoid interference with internal affairs.

The Court held that Alaska did not acquire title to the submerged lands underlying the Alexander Archipelago because the waters are neither historic inland waters nor juridical bays.

Justice Thomas, dissenting, argues that Congress lacks the power under the Commerce Clause and Necessary and Proper Clause to regulate respondents’ noncommercial, intrastate cultivation and consumption of marijuana.

Justice O'Connor dissents, arguing the majority's application of the Commerce Clause to intrastate medical marijuana cultivation exceeds Congress's authority under Lopez and Morrison. She contends the regulation lacks a substantial effect on interstate commerce and undermines state sovereignty.

Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment, agreeing that the Controlled Substances Act applies to respondents’ cultivation of marijuana for personal use, but reasoned that Congress’s power derives from the Necessary and Proper Clause combined with the Commerce Clause to regulate intrastate activities necessary to make…

Justice Ginsburg concurred in part and in the judgment, agreeing that Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act covers cruise ships and allows resistance to modifications conflicting with international legal obligations.

The Supreme Court held that the Controlled Substances Act is a valid exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause authority, carried into execution through the Necessary and Proper Clause, even as applied to the intrastate, noncommercial cultivation and possession of marijuana for personal medical use authorized by…

Justice O'Connor dissents from the Court's dismissal of the writ as improvidently granted. She would vacate the denial of a certificate of appealability to address whether the International Court of Justice's Avena judgment is binding on U.S.

The Court held that due process bars routine use of visible shackles during the penalty phase of a capital case unless a case-specific state interest justifies them. Because the trial judge relied on Deck’s prior conviction without making an individualized security determination, and because Deck need not prove actual…

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for a writ of certiorari as improvidently granted, finding that pending state‑court proceedings and numerous threshold issues made it premature to resolve the substantive questions.

The Supreme Court held that Oklahoma’s semiclosed primary system does not violate the First Amendment freedom of association because the burden it imposes is minor and justified by important state interests. The Court reversed the Tenth Circuit and remanded for further proceedings.