Dodd v. United States

Summary

The Supreme Court held that the one-year limitations period in 28 U.S.C. § 2255 ¶ 6(3) begins on "the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court," not on the later date when the right is made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; the retroactivity clause merely conditions whether the subsection applies at all. Because Richardson v. United States was decided June 1, 1999 and Dodd did not file his § 2255 motion until April 4, 2001, the motion was untimely, and the Court affirmed the Eleventh Circuit's dismissal. The Court acknowledged that the interplay of ¶¶ 6(3) and 8(2) produces harsh results for second or successive motions but declined to rewrite the statute. Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer as to Part II, dissented on the ground that the period should run only when both recognition and retroactivity have been established; Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Breyer, dissented separately, stressing that the Court's reading bars most new-rule petitioners.