National Cable & Telecommunications Association v. Brand X Internet Services

Summary

The Supreme Court held that the Federal Communications Commission's Declaratory Ruling classifying cable broadband (cable modem) service as an information service, and therefore exempt from mandatory Title II common-carrier regulation, is a lawful construction of the Communications Act under Chevron and the Administrative Procedure Act. A court's prior construction of a statute displaces a conflicting agency construction otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior decision held the statute unambiguous; because the Ninth Circuit's earlier decision had identified only the best reading of the statute without finding it unambiguous, the court below erred in refusing to apply Chevron. The statutory term offering is ambiguous, and the Commission's view that the transmission component of cable modem service is functionally integrated with the information-processing capabilities offered was a reasonable policy choice at both Chevron steps; the Commission also adequately explained its divergent treatment of DSL service. Justice Stevens concurred with a caveat that Part III-B would not necessarily apply to Supreme Court constructions that remove ambiguity; Justice Breyer concurred to defend Mead against the dissent's characterization; and Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Souter and Ginsburg as to Part I, dissented, arguing that cable operators plainly offer telecommunications and that the Court's new stare decisis rule unconstitutionally subjects judicial interpretations to executive reversal.