Supreme Court of the United States

Bradshaw v. Richey

November 28, 2005546 U.S. 74

Summary

A per curiam Supreme Court vacated the Sixth Circuit's judgment granting Kenneth Richey federal habeas relief from his 1987 Ohio aggravated-felony-murder conviction and death sentence. The Court held that transferred intent was a permissible theory under the version of Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2903.01(B) at issue because the Ohio Supreme Court's interpretation of that statute, announced in its review of Richey's own case, binds a federal habeas court, and because Ohio law at the time of the 1986 offense gave fair notice that the doctrine applied; the Sixth Circuit's sufficiency ruling therefore failed. The Court also found the Sixth Circuit's Strickland adjudication erroneous for relying on evidence and procedurally defaulted subclaims not properly presented to the state courts without the required Williams v. Taylor, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2), § 2254(e)(1), and Coleman v. Thompson analyses. The case was remanded to the Sixth Circuit, which is to address in the first instance the State's argument that it was not obliged to anticipate the panel's reliance on newly presented evidence.

Holding

  • Applicability of transferred intent to aggravated felony murder under Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2903.01(B). The Sixth Circuit erred in holding that the doctrine of transferred intent was inapplicable to aggravated felony murder for the version of Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2903.01(B) (Anderson 1982) under which respondent was convicted; the doctrine applied.
  • Due process fair notice and the Bouie retroactivity objection. Assuming arguendo the fair-notice principle applied, Ohio law at the time of respondent's 1986 offense provided fully adequate notice of the applicability of transferred intent: § 2903.01(D) required specific intent to cause the death 'of another,' which respondent's intent to kill his ex-girlfriend and her boyfriend plainly satisfied, and transferred intent was firmly rooted in Ohio law; respondent could not plausibly claim unfair surprise.
  • Effect of the inference clause in Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2903.01(D). The subsequent clause of § 2903.01(D) by its terms did not apply to every aggravated felony-murder case but only to those in which intent to kill was sought to be proved from the inherent dangerousness of the relevant felony; here intent to kill was proved directly as the purpose of the arson, so the clause did not foreclose transferred intent.
  • Sufficiency of the evidence of intent. Because the Sixth Circuit disregarded the Ohio Supreme Court's authoritative interpretation of Ohio law, its ruling on sufficiency of the evidence was erroneous.
  • Sixth Circuit's reliance on evidence not presented to the state habeas courts in adjudicating the Strickland claim. The Sixth Circuit erred in adjudicating the Strickland claim by relying on evidence not properly presented to the state habeas courts without first determining (1) whether respondent was at fault for failing to develop the factual bases for his claims in state court, and (2) whether respondent satisfied the criteria established by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2).
  • Disregard of the state courts' finding that the retained forensic expert was qualified. The Sixth Circuit erred by disregarding the state habeas courts' conclusion that the forensic expert whom respondent's trial counsel hired was a 'properly qualified expert' without analyzing whether the state court's factual finding had been rebutted by clear and convincing evidence under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

Docket 05-101

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