Supreme Court of the United States
Town of Castle Rock, Colorado v. Gonzales
June 27, 2005545 U.S. 748
Summary
The Supreme Court held that Jessica Gonzales lacked a constitutionally protected property interest in police enforcement of her domestic restraining order: although Colorado's statute directed officers to 'use every reasonable means to enforce' the order and to arrest or seek a warrant upon probable cause, the Court concluded that a deep-rooted tradition of police discretion coexists with apparently mandatory arrest statutes, that the asserted entitlement was indeterminate, and that Colorado therefore created no 'legitimate claim of entitlement' — leaving no property interest for the Due Process Clause to protect and making it unnecessary to assess the town's custom or the adequacy of process. As an alternative ground the Court expressed substantial doubt that an entitlement to have another person arrested could ever constitute traditional 'property,' because it lacks ascertainable monetary value and arises only incidentally from the government's law-enforcement function. The judgment of the Court of Appeals was reversed. Justice Souter, joined by Justice Breyer, concurred on the added ground that state-mandated process itself cannot be 'property'; Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg, dissented, contending that Colorado's mandatory-arrest statute eliminated police discretion and created an enforceable entitlement and that the Court should have deferred to the Tenth Circuit or certified the state-law question to the Colorado Supreme Court.
Holding
- Whether Colorado law gave the recipient of a domestic restraining order a personal entitlement to police enforcement of the order when officers have probable cause to believe it has been violated.. No. The statute's commands that officers 'use every reasonable means to enforce' the order and 'arrest, or, if an arrest would be impractical under the circumstances, seek a warrant' did not make enforcement truly mandatory: a well-established tradition of police discretion coexists with apparently mandatory arrest statutes, the asserted entitlement was indeterminate as to its precise means, and the statute nowhere gave the protected person a power to demand arrest (contrasting her express power to initiate civil contempt and mere ability to request criminal contempt).
- Whether respondent had a constitutionally protected property interest, for purposes of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, in having police enforce her restraining order.. No. Because Colorado law created no entitlement to enforcement, respondent had at most a unilateral expectation rather than a legitimate claim of entitlement, and therefore no property interest was deprived without due process; the Court accordingly did not address whether the town's custom or policy denied due process or what process would have sufficed.
Docket 04-278
Cited authorities
- Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 18-6-803.5
- CA10
- CA10
- CA10
- CA10
- CA10
- 42 U.S.C. § 1983
- Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)
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