Supreme Court of the United States, 1998

Justice Breyer delivered the unanimous opinion of the Court, holding that the Sherman Act's per se group-boycott rule does not apply to a single buyer's vertical agreement to favor one supplier over another, even when the purchasing decision lacks a legitimate business justification and forms part of a regulatory…

Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for a unanimous Court, held that issuing a speeding citation rather than making a custodial arrest does not authorize a full automobile search incident to the citation.

Chief Justice Rehnquist, sitting as Circuit Justice, denied the State of South Carolina's application to vacate a stay of criminal proceedings against respondent Livingston. The District Court had entered a temporary restraining order on October 20, 1998, enjoining the State from proceeding further with the…

Justice Stevens delivered the unanimous opinion holding that the on-sale bar under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) can apply before an invention has been reduced to practice. Before the critical date, the invention must have been the subject of a commercial offer for sale and ready for patenting.

The Court, in an opinion by Justice Souter, held that an employer is vicariously liable under Title VII for an actionable hostile work environment created by a supervisor with authority over the victim.

The Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar retrial of a prior-conviction allegation in a noncapital sentencing proceeding, even after the prosecution's evidence was found insufficient.

The Court affirmed the judgment reversing summary judgment against Ellerth. Justice Kennedy's majority opinion held that an employer is vicariously liable for an actionable hostile work environment created by a supervisor with immediate or successively higher authority over the employee.

The Court held that the attorney-client privilege survives the client's death and protects Hamilton's notes of his consultation with Vincent Foster from disclosure in the criminal investigation.

The Court affirmed the District Court, holding that the plaintiffs could invoke expedited review, had Article III standing, and successfully challenged the Line Item Veto Act's cancellation procedures under the Presentment Clause.

The Court, in an opinion by Justice Kennedy joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, held that Abbott's asymptomatic HIV infection was a disability under the ADA because it was a physical impairment substantially limiting reproduction, a major life activity.

The Court reversed and remanded, holding the Coal Act unconstitutional as applied to Eastern Enterprises, but no rationale commanded five votes. Justice O'Connor's plurality, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas, concluded that imposing substantial retiree-health liabilities based on…

The Court held that the statutory requirement that the National Endowment for the Arts consider general standards of decency and respect for Americans' diverse beliefs and values is facially constitutional under the First and Fifth Amendments.

The Court held that the attorney-client privilege survives a client's death and protects confidential communications from compelled disclosure in a criminal investigation absent an applicable exception.

The Court, in an opinion by Justice Thomas joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy, held that the federal exclusionary rule does not apply in parole revocation hearings, even when searching officers know the subject is a parolee.

Justice O'Connor's majority opinion held that, absent an official discriminatory policy, a school district is liable in damages under Title IX for a teacher's sexual harassment only when an official authorized to institute corrective measures has actual knowledge of the discrimination and responds with deliberate…

The Court, in an opinion by Justice Thomas joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, held that forfeiture of Bajakajian’s entire $357,144 for willfully failing to report its transportation abroad would violate the Excessive Fines Clause. Criminal forfeiture under 18 U.S.C.

Justice Breyer, writing for a unanimous Court, held that an Eleventh Amendment bar to some claims does not prevent removal of an otherwise removable federal-question case or defeat federal jurisdiction over its remaining claims.

Justice Scalia, writing for a unanimous Court, held that Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act unambiguously covers state prison inmates. State prisons are public entities, and their services, programs, and activities fall within the statute without regard to whether participation is voluntary.

The Court held that the filed‑rate doctrine of the Communications Act pre‑empted the respondent’s state‑law breach‑of‑contract and tortious‑interference claims because they sought privileges not contained in AT&T’s filed tariff, and therefore reversed the Ninth Circuit’s judgment.

The Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist joined by Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, held that interest generated by client funds in IOLTA accounts is the client's private property for purposes of the Takings Clause.

Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, held that 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) authorizes Supreme Court review of denials of certificates of appealability by circuit judges or courts of appeals.

The Court, in an opinion by Justice Scalia, held that the Communications Act's filed rate doctrine bars COT's state-law claims seeking services and privileges inconsistent with AT&T's filed tariff.

Justice Souter delivered the unanimous opinion holding that a parent's control over its subsidiary does not, without grounds for piercing the corporate veil, establish derivative CERCLA liability.

The Court, in an opinion by Justice Breyer joined by Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas, held that carrying a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) includes knowingly possessing and conveying a firearm in a vehicle the defendant accompanies, including in a locked glove compartment or trunk.

Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for a unanimous Court, held that California death-row inmates' suit seeking an advance determination of California's eligibility for Chapter 154's expedited habeas procedures did not present an Article III case or controversy.

The Supreme Court held that Indian tribes enjoy sovereign immunity from suits on contracts, whether governmental or commercial and whether made on or off a reservation, unless Congress has abrogated the immunity or the tribe waived it.

The Court, in an opinion by Justice Souter joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Breyer, held that a high-speed police pursuit causing an unintended death violates substantive due process only if the officer acts with a purpose to cause harm unrelated to legitimate law…

The Court held that a class action seeking a declaration about whether California could invoke Chapter 154 was not an Article III case or controversy because it sought an advance ruling on a defense that might be raised in future habeas proceedings.

Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion held that Bousley could invoke Bailey's interpretation of the federal firearm statute to challenge the intelligence of his guilty plea on collateral review.

The Court held that public broadcasters generally need not provide third parties access to their programming, but candidate debates are subject to First Amendment forum principles.

Justice Breyer delivered the unanimous opinion holding that the Sierra Club’s challenge to the Wayne National Forest plan’s logging and clearcutting provisions was not ripe. The plan did not itself authorize logging, delayed review would impose no significant hardship, immediate review could interfere with further…

Justice Stevens, writing for a five-Justice majority, held that plaintiffs asserting constitutional claims requiring proof of improper motive cannot be required to establish that motive by clear and convincing evidence.

The Court held that the Ninth Circuit's sua sponte recall of its mandate did not violate AEDPA's successive-application provisions because it rested exclusively on Thompson's first federal habeas petition.

In a unanimous opinion by Justice Souter, the Court held that the Truth in Lending Act’s three-year period under § 1635(f) extinguishes the federal right of rescission itself, preventing borrowers from asserting rescission defensively in a foreclosure action after that period expires.

The Court, per curiam, denied Breard’s and Paraguay’s petitions, original-action requests, and stay applications. It concluded that Breard procedurally defaulted his Vienna Convention claim, that AEDPA restricted his ability to develop evidence on federal habeas review, and that his asserted prejudice was speculative.

The Supreme Court denied the petition for an original writ of habeas corpus, the motion to file a bill of complaint, the petitions for certiorari, and the stay applications filed by Angel Francisco Breard and the Republic of Paraguay.

The Court held that § 504(c) of the Copyright Act does not itself grant a right to a jury trial on statutory damages, but the Seventh Amendment guarantees a jury determination of all issues pertinent to such an award, including its amount.

The Court held that the Seventh Amendment guarantees a right to a jury trial when a copyright owner elects statutory damages under 17 U.S.C. §504, including a jury determination of the amount of those damages. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and remanded for a jury trial on statutory damages.

The Court held that Military Rule of Evidence 707's categorical exclusion of polygraph evidence does not unconstitutionally abridge an accused's right to present a defense. Justice Thomas's majority opinion concluded that uncertainty about polygraph reliability justifies the exclusion and that barring expert testimony…