Supreme Court of the United States

Monge v. California

June 26, 1998524 U.S. 721

Summary

The Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar retrial of a prior-conviction allegation in a noncapital sentencing proceeding, even after the prosecution's evidence was found insufficient. Justice O'Connor's opinion, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Breyer, confined Bullington's exception to capital sentencing and treated the recidivism finding as a sentencing factor rather than an offense element. Justice Stevens dissented alone, arguing that evidentiary insufficiency bars another opportunity to prove the allegation. Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Souter and Ginsburg, agreed that double jeopardy generally does not apply to noncapital sentencing but argued that facts increasing the statutory maximum constitute offense elements, making retrial here unconstitutional.

Holding

  • Application of double jeopardy to retrial of a noncapital sentence-enhancement allegation.. The Double Jeopardy Clause does not preclude retrial of a prior-conviction allegation in a noncapital sentencing proceeding, notwithstanding insufficient evidence in the first proceeding.
  • Characterization of the recidivism finding as an offense element.. The prior-conviction determination at issue was a sentencing determination and did not place petitioner in jeopardy for an offense.

Docket 97-6146

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