Supreme Court of the United States
Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole v. Scott
June 22, 1998524 U.S. 357
Summary
The Court, in an opinion by Justice Thomas joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy, held that the federal exclusionary rule does not apply in parole revocation hearings, even when searching officers know the subject is a parolee. The marginal deterrence would not outweigh the loss of reliable evidence and disruption of informal parole proceedings. The Court reversed and remanded without deciding whether the search was constitutional. Justice Stevens dissented separately, agreeing with Justice Souter's deterrence analysis and emphasizing that exclusion is a constitutionally required remedy. Justice Souter, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, dissented because revocation frequently substitutes for criminal prosecution, making exclusion at revocation hearings an essential deterrent; he would affirm.
Holding
- Application of the federal exclusionary rule in parole revocation proceedings.. Federal law does not require parole boards to exclude evidence obtained in violation of a parolee's Fourth Amendment rights, including when the searching officer knows the subject's parole status.
Docket 97-581
Cited authorities
- 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1365
Cited by
- Alasaad v. Duke
- State of Idaho, Plaintiff-Appellant v. Troy Edwin Liechty, Defendant-Respondent
- The State of Texas, Petitioner v. One (1) 2004 Lincoln Navigator, Vin # 5lmfu27rx4lj28242, Respondent
- People v. Ramirez
- McBride v. Lumpkin
- State of Vermont v. Steven R. Lussier, Jr.; State of Vermont v. Robert R. Lussier
- People v. Ramirez
- Robert A. Vigeant, Plaintiff, Appellant v. United States, Defendant, Appellee