Justice Ginsburg delivered the unanimous opinion holding that an erroneous refusal to remand an improperly removed diversity case does not require setting aside the ensuing judgment when federal jurisdictional requirements are satisfied at judgment.
Supreme Court of the United States, 1996
Published opinions from 1996. The case name opens the case page.
1996 opinions
The Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist joined by Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Breyer, held that the Fourth Amendment does not require officers to advise a lawfully detained motorist that he is free to go before obtaining voluntary consent to search.
The Court held that the Ninth Circuit applied the wrong harmless-error standard when reviewing Roy's state conviction on federal habeas corpus. Because the instructional mistake was a trial error rather than a structural error, the habeas court had to apply the more deferential standard asking whether the error had a…
The Court held that a federal habeas court reviewing a nonstructural instructional error must apply the deferential harmless-error standard asking whether the error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the verdict, with grave doubt resolved for the petitioner.
The Court affirmed federal contractual liability and remanded for determination of damages. Justice Souter's plurality concluded that the thrift-acquisition agreements allocated to the Government the risk of regulatory changes affecting supervisory goodwill and capital credits, and that FIRREA's prevention of…
The Court held per curiam that the Fourth Amendment permits police to search a readily mobile automobile without a warrant when probable cause exists, without requiring additional exigent circumstances. It concluded that both vehicle searches were constitutional and reversed and remanded both judgments.
The Court, in an opinion by Justice O'Connor, held that independent government contractors receive First Amendment protection against retaliatory termination or nonrenewal of existing contracts. The Pickering balancing test applies, adjusted to consider the government's interests as contractor rather than employer.
Justice Kennedy’s opinion held that the First Amendment protections against political patronage retaliation extend to independent contractors and regular government service providers.
June 26, 1996518 U.S. 604
The Court held that applying the Federal Election Campaign Act's party-expenditure limit to an independent expenditure by a political party violated the First Amendment because independent party expenditures receive the same protection as other independent political expenditures and do not present a sufficiently…
The Court held that the Medical Device Amendments did not preempt any of the Lohrs' claims concerning Medtronic's pacemaker lead. Section 510(k) substantial-equivalence review imposed no design requirement that displaced their design claims; state damages claims paralleling federal requirements were permissible; and…
The Court, in an opinion by Justice Ginsburg joined by Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, and Breyer, held that Virginia lacked an exceedingly persuasive justification for excluding qualified women from VMI and that the separate Virginia Women's Institute for Leadership program did not remedy that violation.
The Court held that New York's CPLR § 5501(c) 'deviates materially' standard for judging the size of jury awards is both substantive and procedural, and that its substantive thrust—controlling how much a plaintiff may recover—must be given effect in federal diversity actions because ignoring it would yield…
The Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist joined by Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, held that the challenged civil in rem forfeitures were neither criminal proceedings nor punishment for double jeopardy purposes and reversed both appellate judgments.
The Court, through Justice Scalia, held that prisoners alleging denial of access to courts must demonstrate actual injury to a nonfrivolous legal claim, not merely inadequate libraries or legal assistance.
The Court, in an opinion by Justice O'Connor joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg, held that Congress had not unequivocally waived federal sovereign immunity from monetary damages for violations of § 504(a) of the Rehabilitation Act by Executive agencies…
The Court held that Gray's Brady claim was procedurally defaulted and that his claim to advance notice of sentencing evidence required a new constitutional rule unavailable on federal habeas review under Teague. The proposed notice rule did not qualify as a watershed rule of criminal procedure.
The Court held per curiam that California's appeal from an order granting habeas relief was not moot merely because the State had arranged a new trial in compliance with that order. Because the retrial had not begun, a favorable appellate decision could still relieve the State of the burden of conducting it.
The Court, in an opinion by Justice Kennedy, held that appellate courts must review departures from the Sentencing Guidelines for abuse of discretion, including correction of legal errors.
Justice Scalia delivered the unanimous opinion of the Court, holding that probable cause to believe a traffic violation occurred rendered the traffic stop reasonable under the Fourth Amendment regardless of the officers’ actual motivations.
The Supreme Court held that a federal district court may not invoke the fugitive disentitlement doctrine to strike a claimant's filings and enter summary judgment against him in a civil forfeiture action merely because he remains abroad and unavailable for a related criminal prosecution.
Justice Stevens delivered the unanimous opinion holding that due process prohibited Alabama from binding petitioners to an earlier judgment upholding a county occupation tax because they received neither notice nor constitutionally adequate representation in that litigation.
June 10, 1996517 U.S. 882
The Court held that an ERISA § 406(a) violation requires a transaction caused by a fiduciary; that employers act as settlors, not fiduciaries, when amending pension plans; and that paying benefits under an otherwise lawful plan conditioned on employees’ release of employment claims is not a prohibited transaction.
The Court held that Congress constitutionally authorized the President to prescribe aggravating factors governing when a court-martial may impose the death penalty for murder. Articles 18, 36, and 56 of the UCMJ together supplied the delegation, and the President's authority was guided sufficiently by statutory…
Justice Scalia delivered the unanimous opinion affirming the Supreme Court of California. The Court held that the Comptroller of the Currency reasonably interpreted “interest” under §85 of the National Bank Act to include late-payment fees, permitting national banks to charge fees authorized by their home States to…
The Court, in an opinion by Justice Kennedy, affirmed Loving's death sentence, holding that Congress could and did authorize the President to prescribe aggravating factors for military capital sentencing. Assuming civilian capital-punishment precedents applied, Article 118 required additional narrowing factors.
June 3, 1996517 U.S. 706
The Court held that appellate courts generally must review de novo the ultimate determinations of reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop and probable cause for a warrantless search.
The Court, in an opinion by Justice Ginsburg joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and Breyer, held that the Federal Arbitration Act preempts Montana's requirement that notice of arbitration appear in underlined capital letters on the first page of a contract.
Justice Kennedy's opinion, joined by Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, held that Colorado's Amendment 2 violates equal protection and affirmed the Colorado Supreme Court on a different rationale.
The Court, in an opinion by Justice Ginsburg joined by Justices Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and Breyer, held that Rule 4's extendable 120-day service period superseded the Suits in Admiralty Act's requirement of service “forthwith.” The statutory service requirement was a nonjurisdictional procedural direction…
Justice Stevens's majority opinion held that Alabama's $2 million punitive damages award against BMW for failing to disclose presale repainting was grossly excessive under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court held that Rhode Island's prohibition on truthful, nonmisleading liquor-price advertising violated the First Amendment and that the Twenty-first Amendment did not shield it from constitutional scrutiny. It reversed the Court of Appeals and disavowed California v.
The Court, through Chief Justice Rehnquist, held that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a)(1)(C) does not authorize discovery for selective-prosecution claims and that defendants seeking such discovery must make a credible showing that similarly situated persons of other races were treated differently.
May 13, 1996517 U.S. 544
The Court unanimously held, in an opinion by Justice Souter, that the WARN Act authorizes a union to sue for damages on behalf of its employee-members and that Congress constitutionally displaced the third prong of the associational-standing test for those suits.
The Court, in an opinion by Justice Scalia, held that the District Court lacked authority to grant a postverdict motion for judgment of acquittal filed one day after Rule 29(c)'s deadline and affirmed the Sixth Circuit.
April 23, 1996517 U.S. 370
Justice Souter delivered the unanimous opinion holding that patent construction, including the interpretation of technical terms within patent claims, belongs exclusively to the court and is not subject to the Seventh Amendment's jury guarantee.
Justice Stevens delivered the unanimous opinion holding that Oklahoma violated due process by requiring a criminal defendant to prove incompetence to stand trial by clear and convincing evidence.
Justice Scalia delivered the unanimous opinion holding that an ADEA plaintiff need not show replacement by someone outside the protected age group to establish a prima facie case under the McDonnell Douglas framework.