Supreme Court of the United States, 2012

The Court held that SORNA's registration requirements do not apply to pre-Act offenders until the Attorney General specifies applicability. This conclusion rests on a natural reading of the statute's text and avoids constitutional questions. Justice Scalia, dissenting, argued the requirements apply automatically.

The Supreme Court held that the Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA) expressly preempts California Penal Code § 599f, which regulated how slaughterhouses must handle nonambulatory animals.

The Supreme Court granted certiorari, reversed the Ninth Circuit, and held that the officers’ warrantless entry into the Huff home was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and that the officers are entitled to qualified immunity. The case was remanded for entry of judgment in favor of the petitioners.

The Supreme Court held that the Government's installation of a GPS tracking device on Antoine Jones's vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle's movements for 28 days, constituted a Fourth Amendment "search," because the Government physically occupied private property for the purpose of obtaining…

Justice Sotomayor concurs, agreeing that physical trespass constitutes a Fourth Amendment search. She separately warns that long-term GPS monitoring without trespass may still violate reasonable expectations of privacy under Katz, and she urges reconsidering the third-party doctrine in the digital age.

Justice Alito concurring in the judgment joins by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan, agrees with the disposition that the Court of Appeals decision should be affirmed but disputes the majority's reasoning.

Justice Scalia, dissenting, argues that the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act applies to pre-Act offenders without Attorney General action. He interprets the provision granting the Attorney General authority to 'specify the applicability' as allowing exceptions rather than discretion to waive coverage…

The Court vacated the district court's interim redistricting orders and remanded for further proceedings, holding that a district court drawing interim maps must be guided by the state’s enacted plan unless there is a reasonable probability that aspects of that plan will fail preclearance under §5 of the Voting Rights…

The Court vacated the District Court's interim redistricting plans for Texas' 2012 elections, holding that the District Court erred by failing to give deference to the State's recently enacted plan when drawing interim maps.

The Supreme Court vacated and remanded the District Court’s interim redistricting plans for Texas, holding that when a state plan lacks preclearance but is necessary for interim elections, the court must defer to the state’s policy judgments unless they face a reasonable probability of failing preclearance or…

The Court affirmed the Tenth Circuit, holding that Section 514 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act does not violate the Copyright Clause or First Amendment by restoring copyright protection to foreign works that had entered the U.S. public domain.

The Supreme Court held that an Alabama death-row prisoner who missed the State's 42-day deadline for appealing the denial of his Rule 32 postconviction petition demonstrated 'cause' excusing that procedural default, because his attorneys of record had abandoned him without notice: the two departing pro bono New York…

Justice Scalia dissents, arguing Maples did not suffer attorney abandonment because the firm and local counsel remained involved in the case and rejecting the due process claim regarding clerk notice.

Justice Alito concurs in the judgment, agreeing that the petitioner was effectively deprived of legal representation due to abandonment by his attorneys. He attributes this to a unique combination of eight unfortunate events rather than systemic flaws in Alabama's representation system.

Justice Ginsburg’s opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Sotomayor, upheld §514 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, which restored copyright protection to certain foreign works previously in the United States public domain.

The Supreme Court held that the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) does not grant state courts exclusive jurisdiction over private suits. Federal courts retain federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because the TCPA’s permissive reference to state courts does not expressly oust federal jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court held that federal and state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over private suits brought under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA). The Court reasoned that the TCPA’s grant of jurisdiction to state courts is permissive, not exclusive, and does not divest federal courts of their general…

Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Alito, dissenting opinion. He argues the statute restoring copyright to foreign works that were in the public domain exceeds the Copyright Clause's authority and inhibits the dissemination of millions of works without providing any new incentive for their creation.

The Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause does not require a preliminary judicial inquiry into the reliability of an eyewitness identification made under suggestive circumstances that were not arranged by law enforcement; absent improper police conduct, reliability is tested through counsel…

Justice Sotomayor dissents, arguing that the majority’s new limitation requiring police‑arranged suggestive circumstances to trigger the due‑process exclusion of eyewitness identifications contradicts established precedent.

The Court held that the Due Process Clause does not require a trial court to conduct a preliminary reliability assessment of an eyewitness identification unless suggestive circumstances were arranged by law enforcement.

A unanimous Court held that the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment bar employment discrimination suits brought on behalf of ministers against their churches, recognizing a 'ministerial exception' grounded in the Religion Clauses themselves rather than in a generalized freedom of…

Justice Thomas concurs, emphasizing that the Religion Clauses require deference to religious organizations' good-faith understanding of who qualifies as a minister. He argues secular courts should not second-guess theological determinations to avoid burdening religious autonomy.

Justice Sotomayor dissents from the majority's decision to limit due process protection for eyewitness identifications to only those arising from police-arranged suggestive circumstances.

The Court held that the Due Process Clause does not require a preliminary judicial reliability assessment for eyewitness identification unless the suggestive circumstances were arranged by law enforcement.

Justice Alito, joined by Justice Kagan, concurs with the Court’s judgment that the ministerial exception bars the employee’s Title VII claim, emphasizing that the exception is grounded in the employee’s functional religious role rather than formal ordination or title.

The Court held that a federal prisoner cannot imply an Eighth Amendment damages remedy against employees of a privately operated federal prison when state tort law provides alternative remedies offering roughly similar deterrence and compensation.

The Supreme Court held that no Eighth Amendment-based Bivens damages action may be implied against employees of a privately operated federal prison where the alleged misconduct—inadequate medical care and related mistreatment—is of a kind that typically falls within traditional state tort law, because state tort law…

The Supreme Court held that a Bivens action does not lie against employees of a privately operated federal prison for Eighth Amendment violations because state tort law provides an adequate alternative remedy. The Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision recognizing such a claim.

The Court held that the Credit Repair Organizations Act (CROA) is silent on whether its claims may be arbitrated, so under the Federal Arbitration Act the arbitration agreement must be enforced.

Justice Ginsburg dissents, arguing that the Credit Repair Organizations Act’s nonwaivable “right to sue” guarantees a consumer’s right to bring a lawsuit in court, not to submit to arbitration, and would affirm the Ninth Circuit’s judgment rejecting arbitration.

The Court held that a certificate of appealability’s failure to identify a constitutional issue does not eliminate appellate subject-matter jurisdiction, although the identification requirement remains mandatory.

Justice Ginsburg, dissenting, argues Pollard should have a federal Bivens remedy for Eighth Amendment violations in a privately operated federal prison, distinguishing Malesko on deterrence grounds. She would affirm the Ninth Circuit's judgment.

The Court held that the State violated Smith’s due-process rights by withholding police notes that materially contradicted the sole eyewitness’s trial identification. Because that eyewitness was the only evidence linking Smith to the murders, the undisclosed statements created a reasonable probability sufficient to…

The Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, holding that the Credit Repair Organizations Act does not preclude enforcement of arbitration agreements under the Federal Arbitration Act. The majority found the CROA's disclosure of a "right to sue" does not create a non-waivable right to a judicial forum.

Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Kagan, concurred in the judgment. She agreed that Congress did not evince clear intent to disallow arbitration for Credit Repair Organizations Act claims, but she found this interpretation was no more compelling than the majority's view of statutory language.

The Court held that the certificate-of-appealability requirement that the certificate identify the constitutional issue supporting issuance is mandatory but nonjurisdictional, so the Court of Appeals could adjudicate the appeal despite the defective certificate.

Justice Scalia dissents from the Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari in Maxwell v. Roe. He contends that the Ninth Circuit misapplied the deferential standards of 28 U.S.C. §2254(d) and erroneously found a Fourteenth Amendment due‑process violation, and therefore the Court should have granted certiorari and reversed…