Supreme Court of the United States, 2012

The Court held that IIRIRA's provision requiring certain criminal aliens to seek admission upon reentry does not apply retroactively to those convicted before its enactment, preserving their ability to travel briefly under prior law. Justice Ginsburg wrote the opinion, reversing the Second Circuit.

Justice Breyer, dissenting, argues that federal sentencing judges lack statutory authority to order a federal sentence to run consecutively to an anticipated state sentence not yet imposed.

Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Thomas and Alito, dissents, arguing that 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(13)(C)(v) should be applied only to reentry events occurring after the statute’s 1996 effective date and therefore does not apply retroactively to Vartelas, who committed the underlying crime before that date.

The Court held that IIRIRA's admission requirement for lawful permanent residents with certain convictions does not apply retroactively to convictions occurring before the Act's enactment.

The Court held that the two‑year limitations period under § 16(b) begins when the profit is realized, not when the insider files a § 16(a) statement, and may be subject only to ordinary equitable tolling. It vacated the Ninth Circuit’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings.

The Court held that the political question doctrine does not bar judicial review of a citizen’s statutory right to have Israel listed as his place of birth on a passport. The Court vacated and remanded for the lower courts to consider the constitutionality of the statute in the first instance.

Justice Breyer, dissenting, argued that the political question doctrine bars judicial resolution of the passport birthplace designation dispute under § 214(d). He emphasized foreign affairs prudential considerations, judicial inability to assess policy implications, weak individual interests, and the existence of…

Justice Alito concurs in the judgment, agreeing that the narrow question of whether Congress may prescribe the contents of a passport does not present a political question. He affirms that both Congress and the President have authority over passport contents, and that the issue is justiciable.

Justice Sotomayor concurred in part and in the judgment, agreeing this case is not a political question but calling for a more demanding analysis of Baker factors; Justice Breyer dissented, arguing foreign policy concerns should bar adjudication, and Justice Alito concurred in the judgment on narrower grounds.

The Court held that the political question doctrine does not bar judicial review of a citizen's claim to have 'Israel' recorded as his place of birth on a passport under a statute permitting it.

A unanimous Court, in an opinion by Justice Scalia, held that recipients of an EPA administrative compliance order issued under Clean Water Act §309 may bring a civil action under the Administrative Procedure Act to challenge the order: the order is 'final agency action' under 5 U.S.C.

Justice Alito concurred in the judgment, agreeing that property owners may challenge EPA jurisdictional determinations under the Administrative Procedure Act. He argued this provides only modest relief given the unclear reach of the Clean Water Act and severe penalties, urging Congress to clarify the Act.

Justice Scalia dissents, arguing the Court creates a new judicially invented right to effective plea bargaining that conflicts with Strickland and Fretwell. He contends prejudice requires showing the trial was fundamentally unfair, not merely that a plea opportunity was lost.

The Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel extends to a defendant's rejection of a plea offer, and that Strickland prejudice is established where the defendant shows a reasonable probability that but for counsel's ineffective advice the plea would have been presented to and…

The Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel extends to the consideration of plea offers that lapse or are rejected, and that defense counsel has a general duty to communicate formal prosecution plea offers to the accused.

Justice Scalia dissents, arguing the Sixth Amendment guarantees fairness of conviction, not plea bargaining processes. He contends the majority's new prejudice test requires speculation and exceeds judicial authority, suggesting legislative regulation instead.

Justice Alito dissents, arguing that the majority misapplies ineffective‑assistance law and the AEDPA, and that respondent received a fair trial with no showing of prejudice. He maintains that the Sixth Amendment does not guarantee a right to a plea bargain and that the remedy of re‑offering the plea is unwarranted.

The Court held that under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, an employee is “newly awarded compensation” when they first become disabled and statutorily entitled to benefits, regardless of when a formal compensation order issues.

Justice Ginsburg dissents, arguing the FMLA self-care provision validly enforces the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee against gender discrimination. She contends pregnancy discrimination is sex discrimination, distinguishing Geduldig v.

The Court held that when state law requires an ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim to be raised in an initial-review collateral proceeding, the procedural default may be excused if counsel was absent or ineffective there and the underlying trial-counsel claim is substantial.

The Supreme Court held that under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, an employee is 'newly awarded compensation' when they first become disabled and become statutorily entitled to benefits, regardless of whether a formal compensation order issues.

A plurality of the Supreme Court held that the FMLA's self-care provision, 29 U.S.C. §2612(a)(1)(D), does not validly abrogate the States' sovereign immunity from damages suits under §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, because at enactment Congress had no evidence of sex-based discrimination or stereotyping in state…

Justice Ginsburg, concurring in part and dissenting in part, argues that 'newly awarded compensation' under the LHWCA occurs when an employer voluntarily pays benefits or a formal order directs payment, rather than when an employee becomes statutorily entitled to compensation as the majority concluded.

The Court held that state-law design-defect and failure-to-warn claims concerning locomotive equipment are preempted by the Locomotive Inspection Act (LIA) under the field preemption analysis in Napier.

Justice Kagan concurs in full with the Court’s holding that the Locomotive Inspection Act preempts the petitioners’ state‑law tort claims for both defective‑design and failure‑to‑warn, reasoning that the agency’s delegated authority under the Act covers both the design of locomotive equipment and the conditions of its…

Justice Sotomayor concurred that the Locomotive Inspection Act (LIA) preempts state-law defective design claims but dissented from the Court's holding that it preempts failure-to-warn claims.

The Court held that the Locomotive Inspection Act preempts state-law tort claims for defective design and failure to warn regarding locomotive equipment containing asbestos. Under Napier, the LIA occupies the field of regulating locomotive equipment broadly.

Court vacated and remanded after CMS approved state Medicaid rate reductions, suggesting APA review may be more appropriate than Supremacy Clause actions post-agency approval, without deciding the underlying cause of action question.

Justice Roberts, dissenting, argues that the Supremacy Clause does not create a private cause of action to enforce Medicaid reimbursement criteria because Congress did not intend such a remedy, and that the majority’s remand is unnecessary.

Justice Kagan, concurring in part and dissenting in part, agreed officers were entitled to qualified immunity for searching for firearms due to gang ties and weapon possession, but dissented as to immunity for searching for gang membership evidence, arguing the warrant lacked probable cause linking gang items to the…

Justice Sotomayor, dissenting, argues that the police warrant was overly broad under the Fourth Amendment and that the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity for seeking gang-related evidence and all firearms when the underlying crime was not gang-related.

The Supreme Court held that police officers who obtained a magistrate-issued warrant authorizing a search of a suspect's former foster mother's home for all firearms and gang-related materials were entitled to qualified immunity under 42 U.S.C. §1983, even assuming the warrant was overbroad.

The Supreme Court reversed the Montana Supreme Court’s summary judgment granting the State title to riverbeds, holding that navigability for title must be assessed segment‑by‑segment at the time of statehood using the Daniel Ball test, and that overland portage and present‑day recreational use are insufficient to…

The Court held that convictions under 26 U.S.C. §§ 7206(1) and (2) qualify as aggravated felonies under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i) when the government loss exceeds $10,000. The Court found these offenses necessarily entail deceit under the categorical approach, and affirmed the Ninth Circuit.

The Court held that tax crimes under 26 U.S.C. §§ 7206(1) and (2) involving fraud or deceit with losses exceeding $10,000 qualify as aggravated felonies for deportation. This outcome follows from applying a categorical approach to the statute's elements rather than specific facts.

Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Breyer and Kagan, dissents from the Court’s holding that a conviction under 26 U.S.C. §7206 constitutes an aggravated felony for deportation purposes. She argues that only the tax‑evasion clause (ii) of 8 U.S.C.

The Supreme Court held that the Federal Arbitration Act preempts West Virginia’s public‑policy rule refusing to enforce predispute arbitration agreements for personal‑injury or wrongful‑death claims against nursing homes.

The Court held that the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act’s registration requirements do not apply to pre-Act offenders until the Attorney General specifies that they do. The Court concluded the statutory text grants the Attorney General authority to specify applicability, resolving uncertainties.

The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, holding that officers did not violate the Fourth Amendment when entering a home without a warrant under exigent circumstances. The Court found that officers were entitled to qualified immunity because they could reasonably believe there was an imminent threat of violence…

The Supreme Court granted certiorari, reversed the Ninth Circuit, and remanded for entry of judgment in favor of the police officers. It held that the officers’ warrantless entry was justified by an objectively reasonable belief of imminent danger and that they are entitled to qualified immunity.