Supreme Court of the United States, 2012

Justice Kagan argues that the Confrontation Clause requires defendants to cross-examine forensic analysts who generate reports used as evidence, regardless of whether an expert cites them as a basis for opinion.

Justice Sotomayor dissents from the Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari, arguing that a certificate of appealability should have been issued and that Fairey’s trial in absentia violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.

The Supreme Court affirmed the Illinois judgment, holding that the expert’s testimony about a DNA match did not violate the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause because the out‑of‑court statements were not offered for their truth and were not testimonial.

A fractured Supreme Court affirmed the Illinois Supreme Court's judgment upholding Sandy Williams's rape conviction, obtained at a bench trial through expert testimony relaying a Cellmark Diagnostics DNA report that was never admitted into evidence.

The Court held that the Quiet Title Act does not bar an Administrative Procedure Act suit challenging the Secretary of the Interior’s decision to take land into trust for an Indian tribe when the plaintiff does not claim an interest in the property.

Justice Breyer concurs, joining the plurality. He questions how the Confrontation Clause applies to crime laboratory reports and technical statements after Crawford. He would have set the case for reargument to resolve the broader question.

The Supreme Court held that pharmaceutical sales representatives ('detailers') who obtain nonbinding commitments from physicians to prescribe their employer's drugs qualify as exempt 'outside salesmen' under the FLSA and the DOL's regulations, affirming the Ninth Circuit.

Justice Sotomayor, dissenting, argues that the Quiet Title Act’s limited waiver of sovereign immunity bars any Administrative Procedure Act suit seeking to divest the United States of title to Indian trust land, and that the majority’s contrary holding conflicts with the text of the QTA and APA §702.

In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the Sixth Circuit's judgment, which had set aside Matthews' two 1981 murder convictions and instructed that habeas relief be granted under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

The Supreme Court held that Indianapolis's refusal to refund lump-sum payers while forgiving installment payers under the Barrett Law did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. The Court found the City had a rational basis for the distinction based on administrative considerations.

Justice Ginsburg concurs in the judgment, arguing that the no-probable-cause requirement from Hartman v. Moore does not apply to retaliatory arrest claims because arresting officers are not wholly immune.

The Supreme Court held that Secret Service agents Reichle and Doyle were entitled to qualified immunity from Howards' First Amendment retaliatory-arrest claim because, at the time of his June 2006 arrest, it was not clearly established that an arrest supported by probable cause could violate the First Amendment.

The Court held that Indianapolis did not violate the Equal Protection Clause by refusing to refund lump-sum payers of sewer assessments while forgiving installment payers' debts. The City's distinction had a rational basis rooted in administrative concerns and cost avoidance.

Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Scalia and Alito, dissents, arguing the City’s tax scheme violated the Equal Protection Clause by charging petitioners 10 to 30 times more than neighbors for sewer hookups despite state law requiring equal apportionment.

The Supreme Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar retrial on capital and first-degree murder charges after a mistrial was declared due to a hung jury, even though the foreperson reported unanimous acquittal votes on those charges.

Justice Sotomayor dissents, arguing the Double Jeopardy Clause barred retrial because the jury announced acquittal on murder counts before deadlock on lesser charges. She contends the trial judge should have honored the acquittal or ensured manifest necessity for mistrial.

The Supreme Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar retrying Blueford on capital and first-degree murder charges where the jury reported unanimity against guilt on those charges before deliberations concluded.

The Court held that the Social Security Act defines 'child' for survivors benefits by reference to state intestacy law, not merely biological relationship. Posthumously conceived children qualify for benefits only if they would be eligible to inherit from the decedent under state law.

Justice Breyer dissents, arguing that postpetition capital gains tax claims incurred during Chapter 12 proceedings qualify as administrative expenses under § 503(b) and as priority claims under § 507.

The Court held that federal income tax liability resulting from postpetition farm sale in Chapter 12 is not “incurred by the estate” under §503(b) because the estate is not a separate taxable entity under the IRC. Consequently, such tax cannot be treated as a priority claim eligible for discharge under §1222(a)(2)(A).

The Court held that federal income tax liability from a postpetition farm sale in Chapter 12 bankruptcy is not “incurred by the estate” under 11 U.S.C. § 503(b) because the estate is not a separate taxable entity under the Internal Revenue Code.

Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment, agreeing that Colony controls but criticizing the plurality’s reasoning on Brand X and administrative deference as creating uncertainty. He argued the Court should abandon Brand X and that agency interpretation cannot override a prior Court construction of ambiguity.

The Supreme Court held that 26 U.S.C. § 6501(e)(1)(A)'s extended 6-year statute of limitations does not apply when a taxpayer overstates basis in property. The Court relied on its earlier decision in Colony, Inc. v.

The Court held that IRC §6501(e)(1)(A) does not extend the statute of limitations to six years when a taxpayer overstates the basis of property sold, following Colony, Inc. v. Commissioner. The Court rejected the Government’s argument that a later Treasury Regulation could override Colony under Chevron and Brand X.

Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, dissents from the Court’s affirmation that the Colony decision forecloses the Treasury Department’s interpretation of §6501(e)(1)(A) to include overstatement of basis as an omission.

The Supreme Court held that the term 'individual' as used in the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 encompasses only natural persons, so the Act does not impose liability against organizations, and it affirmed the dismissal of TVPA claims against the Palestinian Authority and the Palestine Liberation Organization.

The Court held that the Torture Victim Protection Act's authorization of suit against an 'individual' extends liability only to natural persons, not organizations. The opinion relied on the ordinary meaning of 'individual' and statutory context, affirming the lower court's dismissal of the suit against the Palestinian…

The Supreme Court unanimously held that a private individual temporarily retained by the government to carry out its work — here a private attorney hired to conduct an internal affairs interview — is entitled to seek qualified immunity under 42 U.S.C.

The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, holding that a private individual temporarily retained by the government to carry out its work is entitled to seek qualified immunity from suit under §1983.

The Court held that a generic drug manufacturer may bring a counterclaim under the Hatch-Waxman Amendments to correct a brand manufacturer's inaccurate use code listing in the FDA's Orange Book.

Justice Sotomayor concurred in the judgment and the Court’s judgment, agreeing that the counterclaim provision should be read to allow generic manufacturers to force correction of inaccurate use codes.

Justice Ginsburg concurs with the majority that a private attorney retained by a municipality to investigate a personnel matter is eligible for qualified immunity in a §1983 suit, and she holds that the Ninth Circuit’s denial of that immunity must be reversed.

Justice Sotomayor concurs in the judgment, agreeing that private counsel retained by a government entity can claim qualified immunity under § 1983 when they work closely with government employees, though she notes not all private government workers automatically qualify.

Justice Kagan, writing for a unanimous Court, held that a generic drug manufacturer sued for patent infringement may use the statutory counterclaim in 21 U.S.C. §355(j)(5)(C)(ii)(I) to require correction of an overbroad patent use code.

Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, dissents, arguing that visual strip searches of individuals arrested for minor offenses and placed in a jail’s general population are unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment absent a specific suspicion of contraband, and that the majority’s rule lacks…

The Supreme Court held that a witness who testifies before a grand jury — including a law enforcement investigator alleged to be the sole 'complaining witness' — enjoys the same absolute immunity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as a trial witness, so no damages claim may be predicated on the testimony.

The Supreme Court affirmed the Third Circuit's reversal of summary judgment for Albert Florence, holding that the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments do not bar the Burlington County and Essex County jails from conducting suspicionless visual strip searches of every arrestee admitted to the general population, including…

Justice Alito joins the Court’s opinion but emphasizes the limits of its holding, noting it does not establish that strip searches are always reasonable for arrestees not yet reviewed by a judicial officer, who may be held separately.

The Supreme Court held that a federal district court has discretion to order a federal sentence consecutive to an anticipated state sentence not yet imposed, because the multiple-sentences provision of the Sentencing Reform Act regulates rather than exhausts traditional judicial discretion and the Bureau of Prisons'…