Supreme Court of the United States, 2012

Justice Sotomayor, as Circuit Justice, denied an application for an injunction pending appellate review filed by closely held for-profit corporations challenging the ACA contraception mandate under the Free Exercise Clause and RFRA.

The Court held that federal employees may seek judicial review of a Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) 'mixed case' dismissal in federal district court, rather than the Federal Circuit, regardless of whether the MSPB dismissed the case on procedural grounds or on the merits. The decision interprets 5 U.S.C.

The Supreme Court held that temporary, recurring government-induced flooding can constitute a compensable taking under the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause, rejecting a categorical rule that only permanent or inevitably recurring flooding creates liability.

Justice Sotomayor dissents from the Supreme Court’s denial of the petition for certiorari, arguing that the Kentucky Supreme Court erred in applying an overly restrictive standard to mitigation evidence and that the petition should be granted, the judgment vacated, and the case remanded for proper reconsideration.

Justice Sotomayor dissents from the Court's failure to grant certiorari and vacate the judgment of the Kentucky Supreme Court. She argues that the Kentucky Supreme Court erred in its Strickland prejudice analysis by requiring mitigation evidence to explain the crime before considering it as relevant to sentencing.

Justice Breyer, dissenting with Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor, argues the Court should grant certiorari to consider whether Idaho’s modification of the insanity defense, which limits it to negating intent rather than allowing a defense for those unable to appreciate wrongfulness, violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s…

Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor, dissented from the Court’s denial of a petition for certiorari, arguing that Idaho’s statutory limitation of the insanity defense – permitting conviction when a defendant can form intent but cannot appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct – may violate the…

The Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that the Oklahoma Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction because its decision was not based on independent state grounds and, under the Federal Arbitration Act, challenges to the validity of non‑competition agreements in contracts containing arbitration clauses must be decided…

Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Ginsburg, wrote a statement respecting the Supreme Court's grant of a stay of execution. She noted that the Fifth Circuit denied Haynes' certificate of appealability based on procedural default, disregarding the district court's alternative ruling that his claim also lacked merit…

The Court granted Haynes' application for a stay of execution pending disposition of his petition for writ of certiorari. Justice Sotomayor supported the stay to allow Haynes to pursue his ineffective assistance claim if the Court rejects the Fifth Circuit's reliance on procedural default based on Martinez v. Ryan.

Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Thomas and Alito, dissents from the Court’s order granting a stay of execution to Anthony Haynes. He argues that Martinez v. Ryan does not excuse Haynes’s procedural default and that the district court already adjudicated the merits of his ineffective‑assistance claim, rendering a…

Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Thomas and Alito, dissented from the Court’s order granting a stay of execution to Anthony Haynes, arguing that Martinez v. Ryan does not apply to Texas post‑conviction review and that Haynes’ ineffective‑assistance claim lacks merit, making a stay unwarranted.

The Court holds that where a statute provides its own self-executing remedial scheme, the Little Tucker Act cannot provide the sovereign immunity waiver necessary to authorize damages claims against the United States under that statute.

The Supreme Court held that a plaintiff who obtains a permanent injunction that materially alters the defendant’s behavior is a "prevailing party" for purposes of an attorney’s‑fees award under 42 U.S.C. §1988.

The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s injunction against West Virginia’s 2011 congressional redistricting plan, holding that the plan complies with the “one person, one vote” requirement of Article I, §2.

The Supreme Court granted a stay of the Maryland Court of Appeals judgment overturning King’s conviction, pending resolution of the petition for a writ of certiorari. The Court found a reasonable probability that certiorari will be granted, a fair prospect of reversal, and that denial of the stay would cause…

Chief Justice Roberts concurred in the denial of certiorari, expressing skepticism about the Third Circuit's Administrative Procedure Act reasoning regarding the FCC's fleeting indecency policy, but noting the issue was moot as the FCC had since abandoned the fleeting expletive exception entirely.

Chief Justice Roberts concurred in the denial of certiorari, reasoning that although the Third Circuit vacated the FCC order as arbitrary, any disagreement over the FCC's policy regarding fleeting indecency has been mooted by the agency's subsequent abandonment of the fleeting expletive exception.

Justice Ginsburg concludes that the minimum coverage provision is a proper exercise of Congress' taxing power, agreeing with The Chief Justice. She argues that alternatively, the provision is valid under the Commerce Clause because the uninsured are active participants in the health-care market.

The dissent argues the Individual Mandate exceeds Congress's Commerce Clause power by regulating inactivity, and the penalty is not a tax. It finds the Medicaid Expansion coercive and exceeds the Spending Power. The authors conclude the whole Act should be invalid as the unconstitutional provisions are inseverable.

The Supreme Court held that federal law preempts three provisions of Arizona's S.B. 1070: §3 (state penalties for violating federal alien-registration requirements) is field-preempted because Congress has occupied alien registration; §5(C) (criminalizing unauthorized work by aliens) is conflict-preempted as an…

Justice Alito denied the petitions for writ of certiorari concerning the Mount Soledad Veterans Memorial cross. The Court noted the case remains in an interlocutory posture and no final judgment has been entered, leaving the merits unresolved.

Justice Alito concurred in part and dissented in part. He agreed that §2(B) was not preempted, as it added nothing to existing authority, and that §3 was preempted under Hines. However, he dissented on §5(C) and §6, finding no clear and manifest congressional intent to displace traditional state police powers over…

The Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits mandatory life imprisonment without parole for offenders who were under 18 when they committed homicide. Although the Court did not categorically bar life without parole in every juvenile homicide case, it required individualized sentencing that considers youth and…

The Supreme Court granted certiorari, reversed the Montana Supreme Court, and held that Montana’s prohibition on corporate political expenditures violates the First Amendment under the Citizens United precedent. The Court’s per curiam opinion affirms that the corporate speech protection applies to state law as well.

The Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits mandatory life-without-parole sentences for juvenile homicide offenders because such schemes prevent consideration of the defendant's youth and attendant circumstances. The decision reversed the judgments below and remanded for further proceedings.

Justice Scalia, concurring in part and dissenting in part, rejects the Court's conclusion that federal immigration law preempts Arizona's enforcement provisions in S.B. 1070. He concludes states possess inherent sovereign power to exclude persons from their territory and argues the provisions do not conflict with…

The Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits sentencing schemes that mandate life without parole for offenders who were under 18 when they committed homicide. Although the Court did not categorically bar life without parole for juvenile homicide offenders, it required individualized sentencing that considers…

The Court held that the union’s post-notice special assessment for political activities could not be collected from nonmembers without a fresh notice and their affirmative consent, and that the union’s refund offer did not moot the case.

Justice Scalia dissents, arguing that the Fair Sentencing Act’s reduced mandatory minimums should not apply to defendants whose conduct occurred before the Act but were sentenced after its effective date. He maintains that 1 U.S.C.

Justice Breyer dissents, arguing the Sixth Amendment permits judges to determine sentencing facts related to criminal fines, historically judges set fines, and extending Apprendi undermines sentencing uniformity.

Justice Sotomayor concurred in the judgment, agreeing that the union failed to provide a required Hudson notice and opt-out opportunity before collecting a special assessment for political activities from objecting nonmembers.

The Supreme Court held that the FCC's broadcast-indecency standards were unconstitutionally vague as applied to Fox's broadcasts of isolated expletives at the 2002 and 2003 Billboard Music Awards and to ABC's NYPD Blue episode showing roughly seven seconds of nudity, because the Commission failed to give either…

The Supreme Court held that the rule of Apprendi v. New Jersey applies to criminal fines, requiring that any fact increasing the maximum authorized fine be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.

Justice Breyer, dissenting with Justice Kagan, argues that the union’s fee collection system complies with Hudson because it relies on prior-year audited expenses, and he opposes the majority’s opt-in requirement for special assessments due to administrative burdens.

The Supreme Court held that the Fair Sentencing Act's new, lower crack-cocaine mandatory minimums (an 18-to-1 crack-to-powder ratio) apply to offenders who committed crack offenses before the Act's August 3, 2010 effective date but were sentenced after that date.

The Court holds that the Sixth Amendment rule from Apprendi, requiring that any fact increasing the maximum penalty be found by a jury, applies to criminal fines. It reversed the First Circuit’s decision that Apprendi does not govern fines.

The Supreme Court affirmed the Illinois judgment, holding that the expert’s testimony about a DNA match did not violate the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause because the out‑of‑court statements were not offered for their truth and were not testimonial.

Justice Sotomayor dissents from the Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari, arguing that a certificate of appealability should have been issued and that Fairey’s trial in absentia violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.