Filarsky v. Delia

Summary

The Supreme Court unanimously held that a private individual temporarily retained by the government to carry out its work — here a private attorney hired to conduct an internal affairs interview — is entitled to seek qualified immunity under 42 U.S.C. §1983, reversing the Ninth Circuit's denial of immunity to Filarsky solely because he was not a permanent, full-time city employee. The Court reasoned that the common law of 1871 protected those carrying out government responsibilities without distinguishing full-time public servants from private individuals engaged in public service, that common-law immunity principles are incorporated into §1983 absent clear legislative intent, and that the recognized rationales for immunity (avoiding unwarranted timidity, attracting talent, avoiding the distraction of suits, and preserving the ability to anticipate liability) apply equally regardless of employment status, with Wyatt v. Cole and Richardson v. McKnight confined to purely private ends and unusually structured private firms. The underlying Fourth Amendment question about the ordered production of building materials was not decided. Justice Ginsburg, concurring, agreed with the reversal but stressed that Filarsky remains subject to the clearly-established-law standard on remand and disputed the lower courts' statement that no threat of termination accompanied the order; Justice Sotomayor, concurring, cautioned that not every private individual working for the government automatically qualifies for immunity, which must be assessed under the usual test case by case.