Supreme Court of the United States
Rehberg v. Paulk
April 2, 2012566 U.S. 356
Summary
The Supreme Court held that a witness who testifies before a grand jury — including a law enforcement investigator alleged to be the sole 'complaining witness' — enjoys the same absolute immunity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as a trial witness, so no damages claim may be predicated on the testimony. Applying Briscoe's rationale and stressing grand jury secrecy, the Court further held that this immunity cannot be circumvented by recasting the claim as a conspiracy to present false testimony or as an attack on the initiation or maintenance of the prosecution. It rejected the argument that Malley and Kalina carve out a complaining-witness exception, explaining that the historic complaining-witness function was procuring an arrest and initiating a prosecution, not testifying. The Eleventh Circuit's judgment was affirmed.
Holding
- Whether a grand jury witness, including one alleged to be the sole 'complaining witness,' is entitled to the same immunity in a § 1983 action as a trial witness.. Yes. A grand jury witness has absolute immunity from any § 1983 claim based on the witness' testimony — the same immunity Briscoe accords trial witnesses — and no distinction is drawn between law enforcement and lay witnesses.
- Whether absolute immunity for grand jury testimony can be circumvented by alleging a conspiracy to present false testimony or by using evidence of the testimony to support other § 1983 claims concerning the initiation or maintenance of a prosecution.. No. The rule may not be circumvented by claiming that a grand jury witness conspired to present false testimony or by using evidence of the witness' testimony to support any other § 1983 claim concerning the initiation or maintenance of a prosecution.
- Whether a law enforcement officer who testifies before a grand jury is comparable to a common-law 'complaining witness' and thus outside absolute immunity under Malley and Kalina.. No. By testifying before a grand jury, a law enforcement officer does not perform the function of a complaining witness: testifying was not the distinctive function of a complaining witness, whose distinctive function was procuring an arrest and initiating a prosecution — decisions now made almost always by the prosecutor.
Docket 10-788
Cited authorities
- Rule 7(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
- CA11
- CA11
- CA11
- 42 U.S.C. § 1983
- 42 U.S.C. § 1983
- 17 Stat. 13
- 42 U.S.C. § 1983
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- Liviz Sr. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College
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