Supreme Court of the United States
Barion Perry v. New Hampshire
January 11, 2012181 L. Ed. 2d 694
Summary
The Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause does not require a preliminary judicial inquiry into the reliability of an eyewitness identification made under suggestive circumstances that were not arranged by law enforcement; absent improper police conduct, reliability is tested through counsel, cross-examination, protective rules of evidence, eyewitness-specific jury instructions, and proof beyond a reasonable doubt, with credibility left to the jury. The Court reasoned that its eyewitness-identification precedents uniformly involved police-arranged suggestiveness, that the reliability screen presupposes improper state action because its aims are deterring rigged lineups, showups, and photo arrays and preserving reliable evidence tainted by police suggestion, and that the general fallibility of eyewitness evidence does not alone make its admission fundamentally unfair. The judgment of the New Hampshire Supreme Court was affirmed. Justice Thomas concurred, agreeing with the result but stating he would not extend the Stovall line, which he views as wrongly grounded in substantive due process; Justice Sotomayor dissented, contending the majority grafts a mens rea requirement onto the two-step inquiry and would have assessed the identification under the ordinary totality-of-the-circumstances reliability test regardless of police arrangement.
Holding
- Whether the Due Process Clause requires a preliminary judicial inquiry into the reliability of an eyewitness identification made under suggestive circumstances not arranged by law enforcement.. No. The Due Process Clause does not require a preliminary judicial inquiry into the reliability of an eyewitness identification when the identification was not procured under unnecessarily suggestive circumstances arranged by law enforcement. Where no improper law enforcement activity is involved, it suffices to test reliability through the rights and opportunities generally designed for that purpose—notably counsel at postindictment lineups, vigorous cross-examination, protective rules of evidence, and jury instructions on the fallibility of eyewitness identification and the reasonable-doubt standard—with the jury ultimately determining the identification's worth.
Docket No. 10-8974
Cited authorities
- CA10
- CA11