Supreme Court of the United States, 2003

Justice Scalia, with Justice Thomas, concurs in the judgment, concluding that while high expenses alone do not constitute fraud under the First Amendment, the present case rests on misrepresentations beyond mere fund allocation.

Justice Thomas, joined by three Justices, dissents from the majority's interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1). He would require express consent to the magistrate judge’s authority and to be given before proceedings commence.

Justice Breyer concurred in part on jurisdiction but dissented from the Court's disposition on the merits regarding mandatory detention without bail. He would interpret the statute to allow bail where deportability is contested and raise constitutional doubts, citing due process concerns.

Justice Souter, joined by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg, dissents from the Court’s holding that the government may detain a lawful permanent resident under 8 U.S.C. §1226(c) without an individualized hearing.

Justice O’Connor concurred in part and in the judgment, agreeing with the majority that the respondent’s due process challenge should fail on the merits. However, she would have held that 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) bars habeas review of detention decisions under § 1226(c).

Justice Kennedy concurred, stressing that due process requires individualized procedures to validate immigration charges before detaining a lawful permanent resident. He joined the Court’s opinion fully, noting the Government bears the burden to justify detention beyond statutory categorization.

Justice Souter, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Ginsburg, and Breyer, held that consent to a full-time magistrate judge's exercise of civil jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

The Court held that 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) does not bar habeas review of a constitutional challenge to the statutory framework authorizing detention without bail. On the merits, it upheld mandatory detention under § 1226(c) for the limited period necessary to complete removal proceedings for a criminal alien who, for…

The Supreme Court held that consent to a magistrate judge's full jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) may be implied from a party's conduct, provided the party was aware of the right to refuse and voluntarily appeared. This reversed the Fifth Circuit's rule requiring express consent.

Justice Kennedy delivered the unanimous opinion holding that failure to raise ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal does not bar a defendant from raising that claim in a later, appropriate proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, even when new appellate counsel could have raised it using the trial record.

The Court held that Nevada is not required by the Full Faith and Credit Clause to give effect to California’s statutory immunity for its tax‑collection agency, and therefore affirmed the Nevada Supreme Court’s judgment.

The Supreme Court held that the common-law agency test governs whether shareholder-directors of a professional corporation qualify as 'employees' under the ADA's coverage threshold.

Justice Breyer, joined by Justice O’Connor, concurs in part and dissents in part, arguing that FSIA §1603(b)(2) should be read to include indirect ownership of a subsidiary through a foreign‑state‑owned parent corporation, contrary to the majority’s holding of a direct‑ownership requirement.

The Court held that the FSIA's majority-ownership provision requires a foreign state itself to own a majority of a corporation's shares; indirect ownership through corporate parents does not suffice.

The Court, in an opinion by Justice Stevens joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas, held that common-law control principles govern whether physician-shareholders and directors of a professional corporation count as employees toward the ADA's 15-employee threshold.

Justice Ginsburg, dissenting, argues that the physician‑shareholders of Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates function as common‑law employees for purposes of the ADA and would affirm the Court of Appeals’ judgment.

The Court reversed the South Carolina Supreme Court's determination that 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) is unconstitutional as applied to suits against a State's political subdivisions. Justice Scalia held the tolling provision is a valid exercise of Congress's power under the Necessary and Proper Clause to ensure the fair and…

Justice Scalia, writing for a unanimous Court, held that 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d), which tolls state limitations periods for supplemental claims pending in federal court and for 30 days after dismissal, is a valid exercise of Congress's Necessary and Proper Clause authority and applies to claims against a State's political…

Justice Scalia agrees that cross burning undertaken with intent to intimidate may be prohibited and that the judgment should be vacated and remanded for authoritative construction of the prima-facie-evidence provision.

Justice O'Connor, writing for a five-Justice majority in Parts I–III, held that the First Amendment permits prohibiting cross burning undertaken with intent to intimidate: such intimidation constitutes a true threat, and its particularly virulent character permits its separate prohibition under R. A. V.

Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, and Breyer, held that the $145 million punitive damages award accompanying $1 million in compensatory damages violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.

Justice Souter concurs in part and dissents in part. He agrees the Virginia statute is content-based under R. A. V. but finds the prima facie evidence provision skews juries and suppresses ideas. He would invalidate the statute entirely.

Justice Thomas dissenting argues that cross burning is conduct, not expression, and that Virginia's statute constitutionally prohibits intimidating conduct. He supports the inference of intent from the act itself given the historical association of cross burning with violence.

Justice Ginsburg dissenting argues the Court lacks warrant to reform state law governing punitive damages awards under substantive due process. She emphasizes that prior cases recognized state flexibility and that the trial record supported the reprehensibility of State Farm's corporate schemes.

Justice Scalia delivered the opinion for a unanimous participating Court, holding that arbitration should be compelled because it was uncertain whether the agreements’ remedial limitations prohibited RICO treble damages.

Justice Scalia, writing for a unanimous Court, held that Kentucky’s two any-willing-provider statutes regulate insurance and therefore are saved from ERISA preemption. The Court abandoned reliance on the McCarran-Ferguson factors in its saving-clause analysis and adopted two requirements: the state law must be…

The Court affirmed the injunction against Mississippi's unprecleared state-court congressional redistricting plan and upheld the District Court's use of single-member districts. It concluded that the Justice Department's reasonable request for additional information restarted the preclearance review period and that…

Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment and joined Parts III-B and IV of the Court's opinion. He explained that precedent requires federal courts to vacate constitutional rulings on redistricting plans lacking preclearance under §5 of the Voting Rights Act.

The Court affirmed the injunction against Mississippi's state-court congressional redistricting plan because the plan had not obtained the preclearance required before a covered voting change could be enforced.

Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment, reasoning that 2 U.S.C. § 2c impliedly repealed § 2a(c) and pre-empted state laws authorizing at-large elections based on irreconcilable conflict and legislative history. He did not join Parts III-B or IV of the plurality opinion.

Justice O'Connor concurs in the judgment on preclearance grounds but dissents from the plurality's interpretation of the apportionment statutes. She agrees that 2 U.S.C. § 2c does not impliedly repeal 2 U.S.C.

Justice Thomas dissenting with Justice Stevens would have reversed the decision on dischargeability of a debt in a settlement agreement. The dissent concluded that a general release severed the causal nexus between the underlying fraud and the settlement debt, transforming it into a purely contractual obligation not…

Justice Scalia dissents from the Court’s judgment that Washington’s IOLTA program does not require compensation because petitioners suffered no net loss. He argues precedents compel entitlement to the fair market value of interest generated by client funds.

Justice O’Connor concurred in the judgment, agreeing that the post-AEDPA version of 28 U.S.C. § 2254 applies because Garceau filed his habeas application after AEDPA’s effective date. She argued the Court’s reasoning was broader than necessary and that § 2254 is triggered only when a prisoner files an application.

Justice Souter dissents, arguing that the pre‑AEDPA version of 28 U.S.C. §2254 should govern Garceau’s habeas petition because the district court first evaluated the merits of the case before the AEDPA effective date.

Justice Kennedy, acting as Circuit Justice, denies applicant Kenyeres’s request for a stay of removal pending judicial review of his deportation order. While acknowledging a circuit split regarding the evidentiary standard for stays under 8 U.S.C.

Justice Souter, writing for a unanimous Court, held that local governments are persons subject to qui tam liability under the False Claims Act. The statutory term included municipal corporations when Congress enacted the Act in 1863.