Supreme Court of the United States, 2003

Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Stevens, Justice Souter, and Justice Ginsburg, dissents. He argues that Ewing’s 25-years-to-life sentence for stealing three golf clubs violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment because it is grossly disproportionate to the crime.

Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer, dissents from the Court’s affirmation that California’s three‑strikes sentence for Gary Ewing is not grossly disproportionate under the Eighth Amendment.

Justice Ginsburg dissents, arguing that Alaska’s Sex Offender Registration Act, when applied retroactively, is punitive in effect and therefore violates the Ex Post Facto Clause; she would affirm the Court of Appeals’ judgment striking down the statute.

Justice Stevens dissents from the disposition of the Alaska case, arguing the Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act constitutes punishment and its retroactive application violates the Ex Post Facto Clause.

Justice Souter concurred only in the judgment, agreeing that Alaska's Sex Offender Registration Act does not amount to an ex post facto law, but for different reasons than the majority.

The Court held that Alaska's sex offender registration and notification law is a civil, nonpunitive regulatory scheme whose retroactive application does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. Justice Kennedy's opinion was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas.

The Court affirmed Ewing's sentence of 25 years to life for felony grand theft under California's three strikes law. Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy, applied a narrow proportionality principle and concluded that the sentence was not grossly disproportionate…

The Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, holding that the respondent did not meet the statutory requirements for federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. §2254(d).

The Supreme Court vacated the decision, holding the controversy is not ripe for judicial resolution. The Court determined the NPS regulation §51.3 did not constitute final agency action causing immediate hardship and further factual development on a concrete dispute would better assist resolution.

The Supreme Court granted certiorari and summarily reversed the Ninth Circuit, holding that a thirty‑day delay before a post‑deprivation hearing on a vehicle‑impound fee does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment due‑process clause. The Court applied the Mathews v.

The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, holding that the Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause is not violated until compelled statements are used in a criminal proceeding. Failure to give Miranda warnings does not independently violate constitutional rights actionable under § 1983.

The Court held that state employees may recover money damages in federal court for a State's violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act's family-care provision. Congress clearly expressed its intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity, and the provision was a valid exercise of Congress's enforcement power because…

The Court held that a tribe does not qualify as a 'person' to sue under §1983 to vindicate sovereign immunity rights, as the statute secures private rights rather than sovereign prerogatives. The case was remanded for consideration of whether federal common law provides jurisdiction for the tribe's claims.

The Supreme Court affirmed the First Circuit's judgment vacating the preliminary injunction against Maine's Rx Program. The Court held that petitioner failed to show a probability of success on pre-emption or Commerce Clause claims at this stage.

Justice Kennedy's concurrence endorses affirmance of Ewing's 25-years-to-life sentence, reasoning that proportionality review is narrow, deferential to legislative sentencing judgments, and permits enhanced punishment based on recidivism and public-safety goals.

Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment, agreeing that the sentence did not violate the Eighth Amendment. He argued the Amendment prohibits only certain modes of punishment rather than disproportionate sentences, and that Solem v. Helm’s proportionality principle is unworkable.

Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, held that AEDPA barred federal habeas relief from Andrade's two consecutive terms of 25 years to life for petty theft convictions under California's three strikes law.

Justice Souter, with Justice Stevens and Justice O’Connor, dissents. He argues the Indian Mineral Leasing Act (IMLA) and its regulations create a specific fiduciary duty for the Secretary of the Interior to review and approve mineral leases with care for the Tribe’s interest.

Justice Kennedy concurs, joining the Court's opinion that the evidentiary showing required by the Federal Trademark Dilution Act should be clarified on remand. He writes separately to emphasize that 'capacity' in the dilution definition imports present and potential power, allowing injury to be shown without waiting…

The Supreme Court held that the Federal Trademark Dilution Act requires proof of actual dilution of a famous mark's capacity to identify goods or services, rather than a likelihood of dilution.

Justice Ginsburg delivered the unanimous opinion holding that, when a federal defendant unsuccessfully appeals a conviction but does not petition for certiorari, the one-year limitation period for seeking relief under 28 U. S. C.

Justice Ginsburg, writing for Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Breyer, held that the Navajo Nation could not recover damages under the Indian Tucker Act for the Secretary of the Interior’s conduct concerning amendments to its coal lease.

Justice Stevens's opinion held that the Federal Trademark Dilution Act required proof of actual dilution, rather than merely a likelihood of dilution, but did not require proof of lost sales or profits. For nonidentical marks, consumers' mental association alone did not establish dilution.

The Court held that the Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938 and its implementing regulations do not impose specific fiduciary duties on the Secretary of the Interior that can be enforced through a money damages action under the Indian Tucker Act.

The Court held that petitioners did not commit extortion under the Hobbs Act because they did not obtain property from respondents, reversing the RICO judgment without reaching the issue of private injunctive relief.

The Court held that the defendants' conduct did not constitute extortion under the Hobbs Act because they interfered with and deprived the respondents of control over their property but did not obtain or attempt to obtain property from them.

Justice Stevens dissents, arguing the Court mistakenly narrows the Hobbs Act by holding 'extortion' requires tangible property. He contends federal courts have consistently interpreted 'property' to include intangible business rights, and the majority's departure undermines settled law.

Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Breyer, concurs that the Seventh Circuit’s broad definition of extortion under RICO exceeds congressional intent, emphasizing the need for a narrower reading consistent with the specific statutory response of the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act; Justice Stevens dissents…

Justice Souter delivered the unanimous opinion holding that Washington's use of foster children's Social Security benefits, received as their representative payee, to reimburse itself for current foster-care expenses does not violate 42 U. S. C. § 407(a).

Justice Kennedy wrote for eight Justices that Miller-El was entitled to a certificate of appealability on his Batson claim. The certificate inquiry asks whether reasonable jurists could debate the district court's application of AEDPA, not whether the prisoner has established entitlement to habeas relief.

Justice Breyer delivered the unanimous opinion holding that the Fair Housing Act incorporates traditional agency principles rather than imposing automatic personal liability on corporate officers or owners for employees’ discriminatory acts.

Justice Souter, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Breyer, held that initial assignments of coal industry retirees made after the Coal Act's October 1, 1993, deadline remain valid and reversed both judgments of the Sixth Circuit.

Justice Scalia dissents, arguing that the Commissioner lacks statutory authority to assign retired coal miners to signatory operators after the statutory October 1, 1993 deadline has passed.

Justice Thomas dissents, joining Justice Scalia, to argue that the Commissioner lacks authority to assign coal miners after the statutory deadline of October 1, 1993. Thomas contends that 'shall' creates a mandatory command and absent congressional instruction to the contrary, the power expires when the deadline…

Justice Thomas, writing for a unanimous Court, held that 23 U. S. C. §409 validly exercises Congress’ Commerce Clause authority by protecting information compiled or collected for federal highway-safety purposes.

The Court held that Pennsylvania could seek the death penalty at Sattazahn's retrial because the first capital-sentencing jury had deadlocked without acquitting him of the greater offense and the mandatory life sentence therefore did not terminate jeopardy.