Smith v. Doe

Summary

The Court held that Alaska's sex offender registration and notification law is a civil, nonpunitive regulatory scheme whose retroactive application does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. Justice Kennedy's opinion was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas. The legislature intended public protection rather than punishment, and the law's effects did not supply the clearest proof necessary to override that intent. Justice Thomas also concurred separately, arguing that the inquiry should concern statutory obligations rather than implementation choices such as Internet dissemination. Justice Souter concurred only in the judgment, finding the evidence of punitive and civil character roughly balanced and relying on the presumption of constitutionality. Justice Stevens dissented, reasoning that severe liberty restrictions imposed exclusively and automatically upon convicted offenders constitute punishment. Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Breyer, dissented because the law's burdens, public shaming, and failure to account for rehabilitation made it punitive in effect. The Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and remanded.