Supreme Court of the United States, 2003

Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for a unanimous Court, held that police had probable cause to arrest Pringle for cocaine possession. Considering together the accessible cocaine, rolled-up cash, circumstances of the automobile encounter, and occupants’ failure to identify an owner, a reasonable officer could infer…

Through three majority opinions, the Court largely upheld the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act. Stevens and O'Connor, joined by Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, upheld Title I's soft-money restrictions and most challenged Title II provisions, including electioneering-communication disclosure requirements and restrictions…

Justice Thomas, writing separately, would invalidate most of BCRA Titles I and II and §§311 and 504 because they impose insufficiently tailored restrictions on core political speech, association, independent expenditures, corporate speech, and anonymous speech.

Chief Justice Rehnquist dissents regarding Title I (soft money bans) and Title V §504 (broadcast disclosure) of BCRA, arguing Title I exceeds regulatory scope absent corruption risk and §504 lacks government interest for request disclosure. He is joined by Justice Scalia and Justice Kennedy.

Justice Scalia concurred with respect to BCRA Titles III and IV, and dissented with respect to Titles I, II, and V. He argued that campaign finance restrictions violate the First Amendment because money is speech, pooling funds is protected association, and corporations have free speech rights.

Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment in part, agreeing to uphold BCRA §323(e), §202, and §213, but dissented in part regarding Titles I and II. He argued the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act violates the First Amendment by expanding the anticorruption interest beyond quid pro quo corruption to mere influence.

Justice Stevens dissents regarding §305 of the BCRA, arguing the plaintiffs have standing despite the temporal distance of the injury and that the provision serves a valid informational purpose without violating the First Amendment. Justice Ginsburg and Justice Breyer join this opinion.

Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Kennedy, dissents, arguing that Maryland’s sovereign ownership of the Potomac River permits it to limit Virginia riparian landowners’ water withdrawals and that the Virginia‑Maryland Compact and the Black‑Jenkins Award do not grant Virginia unrestricted rights.

The Court held that Virginia has sovereign rights to withdraw water from the Potomac River and construct improvements appurtenant to the Virginia shore free from Maryland regulation, based on the 1785 Compact and the Black-Jenkins Award.

Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Stevens, dissents, arguing Maryland holds clear title to the Potomac River under prior adjudications and grants. He contends the 1785 Compact and 1877 Award grant Virginia only limited riparian access rights, not sovereignty, and that Maryland retains regulatory police power.

The Supreme Court held that the 1785 Virginia‑Maryland Compact and the 1877 Black‑Jenkins Award give Virginia, its subdivisions and its citizens the sovereign right to withdraw water from the Potomac River and to construct improvements appurtenant to the Virginia shore without regulation by Maryland, and it voided…

Justice Souter wrote for a unanimous Court reversing the Ninth Circuit. Officers executing a warrant to search for cocaine reasonably waited 15 to 20 seconds after knocking and announcing before forcing entry because they could then reasonably suspect imminent destruction of evidence.

Justice Thomas delivered the unanimous opinion of the seven participating Justices. The Court held that a neutral policy against rehiring employees terminated for workplace misconduct supplies a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason under the McDonnell Douglas framework.

The Court denied certiorari in this appeal. Justice Stevens and Justice Breyer wrote separately respecting the denial, arguing that the Vienna Convention and binding International Court of Justice interpretations prevent procedural default of Article 36 claims in state courts.

Justice Stevens dissented from the denial of certiorari, arguing that Breard’s procedural default rule violates Vienna Convention obligations and should not bar Article 36 claims. He contended the Court’s reasoning was unfaithful to the Supremacy Clause.

Justice Breyer, dissenting, would defer consideration of the petition because the relationship between the Vienna Convention, domestic procedural-default rules, and International Court of Justice interpretations had not received sufficient briefing or analysis.

Justice Scalia delivered the unanimous opinion holding that the Social Security Administration may deny disability benefits to a claimant capable of performing her previous work without determining whether that work exists in significant numbers in the national economy.

Justice Souter, dissenting, agrees reducing majority-minority districts isn't inherently retrogressive but argues the Court improperly redefined nonretrogression under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act by accepting unquantifiable influence instead of decisive electoral power.

Kennedy dissents, arguing the California statute reviving expired limitations periods for child sexual abuse does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. He contends that reviving prosecution does not alter the criminal quality of the offense or make it greater than at commission, falling outside Calder v.

The Supreme Court held that the District Court applied too narrow a standard in evaluating Georgia's 2001 Senate redistricting plan under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act. The Court ruled that retrogression analysis must consider the statewide plan as a whole, including 'influence districts' where minorities may not elect…

Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Souter (in part), concurred in the Court’s dismissal of the writ of certiorari, finding that the California Supreme Court’s decision was not a final judgment, that neither party had Article III standing, and that the case presented premature and novel First Amendment…

The Court dismissed certiorari as improvidently granted in a per curiam order without explaining its reasons or deciding the First Amendment questions. Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg and, as to Part III, Justice Souter, concurred.

The Court held that the District Court erred in its § 5 retrogression analysis by focusing too narrowly on specific districts rather than the statewide plan as a whole. The Court clarified that § 5 permits States to create influence districts even if it reduces the ability to elect candidates of choice in some…

Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court held that Wiggins received ineffective assistance at capital sentencing because counsel unreasonably stopped investigating his background despite records indicating serious childhood deprivation and abuse.

Justice Breyer dissents from the Court's order dismissing the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. He argues the Court has jurisdiction because Nike has standing and the state judgment is final on the federal issue, and he would address the merits to prevent chilling protected speech.

Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, held that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause protects adults' private, consensual sexual intimacy against criminal prohibition. The Court invalidated the Texas statute, overruled Bowers v. Hardwick, and reversed and remanded.

Justice Kennedy dissents, arguing that the Court abandoned strict scrutiny in evaluating the University of Michigan Law School's race‑aware admissions, thereby undermining established precedent.

Chief Justice Rehnquist dissents, arguing that class arbitration cannot be imposed where contracts are silent, as courts not arbitrators decide arbitrability and state law interpretation conflicts with the Federal Arbitration Act. The plurality opinion vacates the judgment and remands to the arbitrator.

Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, dissents, arguing the University of Michigan Law School’s admissions program violates the Equal Protection Clause because it is not narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling interest.

Justice Thomas agrees with the majority that race classifications in admissions that do not serve critical mass are unconstitutional and that such discrimination will be illegal in 25 years.

Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Breyer, concurs with the Court’s judgment upholding the University of Michigan Law School’s admissions policy, emphasizing that race‑conscious programs must have a logical, temporally limited end point and referencing international conventions supporting temporary affirmative…

The Court vacated the South Carolina Supreme Court's judgment and remanded. Justice Breyer's plurality, joined by Justices Scalia, Souter, and Ginsburg, reasoned that whether these broadly worded arbitration agreements prohibited class arbitration was a question of contract interpretation for the arbitrator, not the…

Justice O'Connor's opinion, joined by Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, held that the educational benefits of student-body diversity constitute a compelling interest and that Michigan Law School's individualized, holistic consideration of race was narrowly tailored to that interest.

Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion held that Hamacher had standing to pursue prospective relief and could represent the certified class challenging Michigan's undergraduate admissions policies.

Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, concurring in part and dissenting in part, attacked the University of Michigan Law School’s “critical mass” justification as a sham for racial proportionate admissions.

Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment because he believed the challenged regulations should be sustained on different grounds from those offered by the majority. He proposed asking whether a prisoner's lawful sentence took away a right enjoyed by free persons rather than whether the right survives incarceration.

Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, concurs with the Court’s judgment, reaffirming that prisoners retain constitutional protections such as due process and free speech, and that the Court’s decision aligns with established precedents.

Justice Thomas, writing for a unanimous Court, held that direct evidence of discrimination is not required to obtain a mixed-motive jury instruction under Title VII. A plaintiff must present sufficient evidence, direct or circumstantial, for a reasonable jury to find by a preponderance of the evidence that a protected…