Supreme Court of the United States, 2003

The Court vacates and remands convictions where the Court of Appeals panel included a non-Article III judge from the Northern Mariana Islands. It holds 28 U.S.C. § 292(a) authorizes only Article III district judges, so the panel's composition lacked statutory authority.

The Court vacated the Ninth Circuit’s affirmance of dismissal and remanded the cases. It held that 7 U.S.C. § 7254 does not clearly exempt California’s milk pricing laws from Commerce Clause scrutiny, and that individual petitioners’ Privileges and Immunities Clause claim is not foreclosed by the absence of facial…

The Court held that the federal statute protecting California's milk-composition and labeling laws did not clearly exempt the State's milk-pricing and pooling laws from Commerce Clause review.

Justice Thomas, writing for a unanimous Court, held that direct evidence of discrimination is not required to obtain a mixed-motive jury instruction under Title VII. A plaintiff must present sufficient evidence, direct or circumstantial, for a reasonable jury to find by a preponderance of the evidence that a protected…

The Court vacated and remanded the Second Circuit's judgment for the Isaacson respondents in light of Syngenta v. Henson, and affirmed the judgment for the Stephenson respondents by an equally divided Court.

The Court denied the petitioner's request for an extension of time to file a certiorari petition following denial of leave to proceed in forma pauperis, stating there are no grounds upon which certiorari would be granted.

Justice Scalia delivered the unanimous opinion of the eight participating Justices. The Court held that “origin of goods” under § 43(a)(1)(A) of the Lanham Act identifies the producer of tangible goods offered for sale, not the author of ideas or communications embodied in those goods.

The Supreme Court held that the Eighth Circuit had jurisdiction to hear the appeal as a collateral order, reaffirmed the constitutional framework permitting involuntary medication only when certain stringent criteria are met, and vacated the appellate judgment because the lower courts approved forced medication solely…

The Court held that §§ 85 and 86 of the National Bank Act provide the exclusive cause of action for usury claims against national banks. Such claims therefore arise under federal law and are removable even when the complaint invokes only state law.

Justice Scalia dissents, arguing the Court's holding violates the well-pleaded-complaint rule by allowing removal of state-law usury claims against national banks based solely on their invalidity under federal law rather than federal question jurisdiction on the face of the complaint.

The Court vacated and remanded the Florida Supreme Court's judgment, holding that it erred in failing to determine whether the common pocketknife exception encompassed Bunkley's knife at the time his conviction became final. The decision rested on Fiore v.

Justice Scalia, dissenting, joined Justice Kennedy's dissent and argued that Congress may use prophylactic legislation under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment only to remedy constitutional violations by the particular State regulated, not violations by other States collectively.

Justice Kennedy dissents, arguing the FMLA's abrogation of state sovereign immunity is invalid under §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment because Congress failed to identify a pattern of unconstitutional state conduct warranting such a remedy.

Justice Thomas, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg, held that the facial challenge to the National Park Service's exclusion of concession contracts from the Contract Disputes Act was unripe.

Justice Ginsburg delivered the unanimous opinion holding that ERISA does not require disability plan administrators to give special weight to treating physicians’ opinions or provide a distinct justification for crediting reliable contrary evidence.

Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion argues that the case satisfies Article III standing and is ripe for judicial review because the Park Service’s regulation excluding CDA protections causes immediate concrete economic injury to prospective bidders and existing concessionaires.

The Court vacated and remanded, holding that under Fiore v. White, the Florida Supreme Court must determine if the 'common pocketknife' exception covered Bunkley's knife at the time his conviction became final.

Justice Souter concurred in the judgment, rejecting Martinez’s Fifth Amendment claim for damages based on compelled statements without use at trial, as the core protection is exclusionary. He noted a substantive due process claim might survive for outrageous conduct, warranting remand.

In his dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist argues that the Court improperly expanded Fiore v. White by requiring the Florida Supreme Court to revisit the adequacy of the evidence and the “common pocketknife” exception, and that the petition for certiorari should be denied.

Justice Scalia, concurring in part, agrees that Martinez’s Fifth Amendment claim under §1983 fails because the claim does not allege a violation of a protected constitutional right, and he notes that the Ninth Circuit’s substantive‑due‑process holding provides an independent basis for reversal.

Justice Stevens, concurring in part and dissenting in part, argues that the police interrogation of Martinez violated the Due Process Clause and the Fifth Amendment even if the statements were not later used at trial, and concludes that qualified immunity should not apply to such brutal conduct.

The Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist joined by Justices O'Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, held that Congress validly abrogated state sovereign immunity for damages actions under the FMLA's family-care provision.

The Court reversed and remanded, rejecting Martinez's § 1983 self-incrimination claim without a majority rationale and leaving substantive due process for consideration on remand.

Justice Kennedy concurred in part and dissented in part regarding whether failure to provide Miranda warnings alone constitutes a completed constitutional violation under § 1983, agreeing it does not without more.

Justice Ginsburg concurred in part and dissented in part in this case, arguing that the Self-Incrimination Clause applies at the time police use severe compulsion to extract a statement, irrespective of whether the statement was later used in a criminal proceeding.

Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment, finding that petitioner lacked Article III standing because it failed to allege a specific injury traceable to the National Park Service's position that the Contract Disputes Act does not apply to concession contracts.

Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for a unanimous Court, held that the Sixth Circuit improperly reviewed Vincent’s double jeopardy claim de novo rather than applying the deferential requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Justice Souter, writing for a unanimous Court, held that the Fair Labor Standards Act does not bar removal of an action from state to federal court. The provision allowing an action to be “maintained” in either forum is not an express exception to removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).

The Court affirmed the First Circuit's judgment setting aside a preliminary injunction against Maine's prescription-drug rebate program. Stevens wrote for a seven-Justice majority in rejecting the dormant Commerce Clause challenges: the program neither regulated out-of-state transaction prices nor discriminated…

The Court held that Indian tribes are not 'persons' under § 1983 qualified to sue to vindicate sovereign immunity from state criminal processes. It vacated the Ninth Circuit's judgment and remanded to consider whether federal common law provides jurisdiction for declaratory or injunctive relief.

In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that the city's 27-day delay in providing a hearing to recover towing and impoundment fees did not violate procedural due process. Applying the Mathews v.

Justice Stevens, concurring in the judgment, affirms that a Native American tribe is a “person” who may sue under 42 U.S.C. §1983, but finds the tribe’s complaint fails to state a claim because it rests on sovereign immunity rather than a deprivation of constitutional rights.

The Court held that a Native American Tribe does not qualify as a 'person' entitled to sue under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to vindicate sovereign immunity rights. The Court remanded for consideration of whether federal jurisdiction existed under other federal laws.

Justice O'Connor agrees with the plurality that States may not impose on Medicaid beneficiaries the burdens of prior authorization in the absence of a countervailing Medicaid purpose.

Justice Thomas, concurring in the judgment, agrees petitioner was not entitled to a preliminary injunction. He argues the Medicaid Act grants States discretion for prior authorization, the Secretary's role precludes obstacle pre-emption, and negative Commerce Clause lacks constitutional basis.

Justice Breyer concurring in part and in the judgment, argues that the District Court erred in enjoining the Maine Rx Program because it applied an incorrect standard for federal preemption that required only a modest showing of harm rather than a serious compromise to federal interests.

Justice Stevens announced the judgment and delivered the opinion joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer in part. The Court held that the District Court abused its discretion in entering a preliminary injunction because the petitioner had not carried its burden of showing a probability of success on the…

The Court reversed the Illinois Supreme Court, holding that the Attorney General's fraud claim—based on false, intentionally misleading statements about how donations would be used—survives a motion to dismiss despite the high percentage of funds retained by the fundraiser; the First Amendment does not protect such…

Justice Ginsburg, writing for a unanimous Court, held that the First Amendment permits States to pursue properly tailored fraud actions against charitable fundraisers who intentionally mislead donors about how contributions will be used.

In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that police arrested Kaupp when they awakened him at approximately 3 a.m., handcuffed him, and transported him involuntarily for questioning.