Supreme Court of the United States, 2009

Justice Alito dissents from the majority’s vacatur and remand, arguing that the Gant test adopted from Thornton creates uncertainty about the scope of vehicle searches after an arrest on a warrant.

The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's judgment, holding that Shell Oil was not liable as an arranger under CERCLA because arranger liability requires intentional steps to dispose of a hazardous substance, not merely knowledge that spills might occur during a sale.

Justice Ginsburg dissenting argues the Court should affirm lower courts holding Shell liable as an arranger under CERCLA because Shell controlled delivery arrangements that inevitably spilled hazardous substances.

Justice Stevens, writing for eight Justices, held that Shell was not liable as an arranger under CERCLA because arranger liability requires intentional steps to dispose of a hazardous substance, and Shell's knowledge of incidental spills during delivery did not establish that intent.

Justice Thomas, writing for a unanimous Court, held that a district court’s remand after declining supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims is not a remand for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and therefore is not insulated from appellate review by 28 U.S.C. §§1447(c) and (d).

The Circuit Justice denied the applicants' renewed request to stay the mandate of the court of appeals while they sought certiorari. Although the Court's request for the Solicitor General's views increased the likelihood that certiorari might be granted, it did not establish entitlement to a stay because the…

Justice Ginsburg, acting as Circuit Justice, denied a stay of the Second Circuit's mandate regarding the Xerox Corporation Pension Plan. She found the applicants failed to demonstrate irreparable harm or that the criteria for a stay were met, despite the Court's invitation to the Solicitor General.

Justice Breyer dissents, arguing that the mandatory minimum enhancement under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) applies only to intentional firearm discharges, not accidental ones. He relies on Bailey v. United States and the rule of lenity, noting that mandatory minimums amplify the harm of erroneous inclusion.

The Court held that the firearm-discharge enhancement in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) applies whenever a firearm is discharged during the relevant violent or drug-trafficking crime, even if the discharge is accidental.

Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court held that statements deliberately elicited in violation of the Sixth Amendment may be used to impeach a defendant’s inconsistent trial testimony.

Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Alito, held that 18 U.S.C. §924(c)(1)(A)(iii) requires no separate proof of intent to discharge a firearm: its ten-year mandatory minimum applies to accidental as well as intentional discharges during the specified crimes.

Justice Stevens dissents, arguing that 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) should be read to require intentional discharge for enhanced sentencing. He contends the statutory structure, legislative history, and the common-law presumption of mens rea support this reading.

Chief Justice Roberts delivered the Court’s opinion holding that the traditional four-factor stay standard, rather than the heightened injunction standard in 8 U. S. C. § 1252(f)(2), governs requests to stay removal pending judicial review.

Justice Breyer’s opinion for the Court held that the Federal Circuit’s mandatory presumption of prejudice from deficient veterans-benefits notices conflicts with the statutory requirement to take due account of prejudicial error.

The Court, in an opinion by Justice Souter, held that 18 U.S.C. § 3501 modified rather than eliminated the McNabb-Mallory rule excluding confessions obtained during unreasonable delays in presentment.

The Court held that the Navajo Nation could not recover damages under the Indian Tucker Act for the Secretary of the Interior’s alleged breach of trust in approving amendments to its coal lease.

Justice Thomas, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Alito, held that a collective-bargaining agreement clearly and unmistakably requiring arbitration of ADEA claims is enforceable under federal law. The NLRA authorizes bargaining over such provisions, and the ADEA does not prohibit them.

Chief Justice Roberts concurs in the judgment in § 18 U.S.C. § 3599 entitles indigent habeas petitioners to appointed counsel for state clemency proceedings. He argues that the phrase subsequent stage of available judicial proceedings does not include state judicial proceedings post habeas because they are new rather…

Justice Breyer agrees the EPA may cost-benefit but not required and must respect reasonableness; Justice Stevens dissents, arguing Clean Water Act 316(b) forbids cost-benefit analysis. Neither opinion sets the court’s binding disposition.

Justice Stevens dissents, joining Justice Souter's opinion, arguing that the majority disregards established precedent (Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.) which holds collective bargaining agreements cannot waive employees' statutory rights to judicial forums for antidiscrimination claims.

Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, held that no certificate of appealability is required to appeal an order denying federally appointed counsel and that 18 U.S.C. §3599 authorizes federally funded representation in state clemency proceedings.

Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment, agreeing that no certificate of appealability was required to appeal the issue presented and that 18 U.S.C. § 3599 entitles eligible state postconviction litigants to federally funded counsel for available state clemency proceedings.

Justice Ginsburg, writing for a unanimous Court, held that a state trial court’s good-faith erroneous denial of a peremptory challenge does not violate federal due process when the defendant receives a fair trial before qualified, unbiased jurors.

The Court, in an opinion by Justice Scalia, affirmed the Fifth Circuit and held that an unpreserved claim that the Government breached a plea agreement is subject to the ordinary four-prong plain-error test under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b).

The Court held that the state court reasonably rejected Mirzayance’s ineffective-assistance claim and that the claim also failed under de novo review. Counsel reasonably recommended withdrawing an insanity defense with almost no prospect of success, and Mirzayance failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability that…

The Court overruled Kansas' exception to the Special Master's report, holding that expert witness attendance fees in original jurisdiction cases are limited by 28 U.S.C. §1821(b). The Court reasoned that even if it has discretion to set fees, a uniform rule applying to all federal cases is appropriate.

Justice Ginsburg’s opinion for the Court held that delays caused by appointed defense counsel ordinarily count against the defendant, not the State, in assessing a Sixth Amendment speedy-trial claim.

Justice Breyer, dissenting and joining Justice Souter, argues that the plurality’s bright‑line 50 % minority‑population gateway rule under §2 of the Voting Rights Act is ill‑suited to the statute’s purposes and proposes a more nuanced numerical test that better reflects voting realities.

The Court affirmed the judgment invalidating North Carolina's division of Pender County under the state constitution. Justice Kennedy's plurality opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, concluded that § 2 of the Voting Rights Act does not require creating or preserving crossover districts: absent…

The Court, in an opinion by Justice Ginsburg, held that a federal court considering a petition to compel arbitration under FAA § 4 must look through the petition to determine whether it would have jurisdiction over the parties’ underlying substantive controversy without the arbitration agreement.

The Supreme Court affirmed the Vermont Supreme Court's judgment holding Wyeth liable for inadequate warnings on Phenergan's label, rejecting both of Wyeth's implied preemption defenses.

Justice Scalia concurred, agreeing with the Court that the statute is ambiguous regarding coerced assistance and that a remand to the agency is appropriate to clarify its interpretation.

The Court held that the agency and the Court of Appeals improperly treated prior precedent as requiring the persecutor bar to apply categorically to coerced assistance in persecution.

The Court held that the environmental organizations lacked standing to challenge the Forest Service regulations after settlement of the Burnt Ridge dispute because they had not established another concrete application threatening imminent injury to an identified member.

Justice Thomas dissents, arguing the INA's persecutor bar unambiguously bars aliens who assisted in persecution regardless of coercion, contrary to the majority's remand to the BIA. He would affirm the Court of Appeals' judgment based on Fedorenko and the statutory text.

Justice Stevens concludes that the persecutor bar is a pure question of statutory construction for the courts, not the agency, and should not automatically disqualify an alien who acted involuntarily. He would decide the threshold legal question and remand for the agency to determine application.

Justice Souter concurs with the Court that the Ten Commandments monument is government speech and that the city need not meet Summum’s formalities. He cautions that the government‑speech doctrine is newly developed and should be applied narrowly, proposing a reasonable‑observer test to determine when expression is…

The Court held that a plaintiff cannot maintain a Sherman Act § 2 price-squeeze claim when the defendant has no antitrust duty to deal at wholesale and its retail pricing does not satisfy the requirements for predatory pricing.

Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg, concurs with the Court’s judgment that Pleasant Grove City’s refusal to permit Summum’s permanent monument is permissible as government speech.