Supreme Court of the United States, 2009

Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Thomas, concurred in vacating and remanding the case while questioning the Third Circuit's difficulty accepting Pennsylvania's procedural-bar ruling.

The Supreme Court held that a state procedural rule is not automatically "inadequate" under the adequate state ground doctrine—and therefore not unenforceable on federal habeas review—merely because the rule is discretionary rather than mandatory; a discretionary rule can be "firmly established and regularly followed"…

The Supreme Court held that the National Railroad Adjustment Board (NRAB) panel erred in dismissing employees' claims for lack of jurisdiction due to insufficient proof of conferencing.

The Supreme Court held that disclosure orders adverse to the attorney-client privilege do not qualify for immediate appeal under the collateral order doctrine of 28 U.S.C. § 1291, affirming the Eleventh Circuit's dismissal of Mohawk's interlocutory appeal from an order compelling disclosure on implied-waiver grounds.

Justice Stevens dissents, arguing the Court should not overturn the trial judge's fact-intensive decision that the warrantless entry lacked an emergency-aid basis. He notes the trial judge heard testimony and found no objectively reasonable belief that Fisher needed immediate aid, criticizing the Court for…

The Supreme Court held that the Seventh Circuit erred in disposing of the petitioner's unresolved sentencing claims without explanation. The Court vacated the judgment and remanded for the District Court to consider those claims or explain why unnecessary.

The Circuit Justice denied the Commonwealth’s request to stay the mandate because the Commonwealth had not shown a reasonable likelihood that certiorari would be granted or that the judgment would be reversed, and the remaining stay factors did not overcome the presumption favoring release after habeas relief.

The Court granted the habeas petition in part by transferring the case to the District Court for an evidentiary hearing on actual innocence. Justice Stevens concurred to emphasize the substantial risk of executing an innocent man and argued that AEDPA does not preclude relief in original habeas petitions.

The Court addressed whether rejecting employment test results based on their disparate racial impacts constitutes prohibited race discrimination under Title VII’s disparate-treatment provision.

The Supreme Court held that the City of New Haven violated Title VII's disparate-treatment prohibition when it discarded the results of its 2003 firefighter promotion examinations because white candidates had outperformed minority candidates.

The Court held that a seaman may pursue punitive damages under general maritime law for an employer's willful or wanton failure to pay maintenance and cure. It reasoned that punitive damages were historically available in maritime actions, that maintenance and cure is a distinct common-law remedy, and that the Jones…

The Court held that forensic certificates identifying seized substances as cocaine are testimonial affidavits and that admitting them without live testimony or a prior opportunity for cross-examination violated the Sixth Amendment.

The Court held that school officials violated the Fourth Amendment by requiring a 13-year-old student to expose her breasts and pelvic area during a search for common pain-relief pills because the suspicion did not justify that degree of intrusion.

The Supreme Court held that the Arizona Superintendent of Public Instruction has standing to challenge the district court orders because he is a named defendant adjudged in violation of the Equal Educational Opportunities Act (EEOA) and the injunction runs against him.

Justice Alito, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia and Kennedy, dissents from the majority's decision to allow punitive damages for willful refusal of maintenance and cure under general maritime law. He argues that under Miles v.

Justice Kennedy's dissent argues that routine forensic analysts are not conventional witnesses against a defendant under the Confrontation Clause and that scientific-test certificates historically could be admitted without the analyst's live testimony.

Justice Breyer dissents, arguing the majority misapplies Rule 60(b)(5) standards and incorrectly criticizes the lower courts for focusing on funding resources. He contends the lower courts fairly considered changed circumstances and that the record supports their refusal to dissolve the judgment.

The Court held that punitive damages remain available under general maritime law for a seaman’s employer’s willful failure to pay maintenance and cure. It rejected the argument that Miles v. Apex Marine Corp.

Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment but criticized the Court’s failure to explicitly accord Chevron deference to the agency’s interpretation of the Clean Water Act. He argued the Court effectively applied Chevron deference under a new name and called for overruling United States v. Mead Corp.

The Court held that the IDEA Amendments of 1997 do not categorically bar reimbursement for private special-education costs when a public school fails to provide a FAPE and the private placement is appropriate, even if the child never previously received public special-education services.

Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Stevens and Souter, dissented from the Court's conclusion that mining tailings could be treated as fill material eligible for a permit under the Corps' permitting program.

The Supreme Court held that the Army Corps of Engineers, not the EPA, has authority to permit the discharge of mining slurry as fill material under §404 of the Clean Water Act. The Court further held that the Corps acted in accordance with law because EPA new source performance standards do not apply to discharges…

Justice Breyer concurs in the judgment, explaining that the EPA's classification of mine tailings as fill under § 404 is reasonable within a statutory zone, supported by safeguards such as EPA veto power and judicial review. He states this view aligns with the majority opinion and joins it.

The Court held that the Army Corps of Engineers, not the EPA, has authority to permit the discharge of mining slurry into a lake because it qualifies as "fill material" under § 404 of the Clean Water Act.

The Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause precludes retrial on counts where the jury hung if acquittals on related counts necessarily decided an issue of ultimate fact in the defendant's favor.

The Supreme Court held that the burden of persuasion never shifts to the employer in an ADEA disparate-treatment claim: a plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that age was the but-for cause of the adverse employment action, and a mixed-motives jury instruction is therefore never proper in an ADEA…

The Supreme Court held that the Bankruptcy Court's 1986 Johns-Manville orders, which enjoined “Policy Claims” defined as claims and allegations “based upon, arising out of or relating to” the Manville insurance policies, bar state-law Direct Actions against Travelers premised on Travelers' own alleged wrongdoing or…

Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Thomas and Alito, dissents, arguing the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar retrial on counts where the jury hung after acquitting on factually related counts, as this violates original meaning and the 'continuing jeopardy' principle. He distinguishes Ashe v.

The Court held that a jury’s failure to reach a verdict on some counts does not diminish the preclusive effect of acquittals on related counts under the Double Jeopardy Clause. Courts must determine what the jury necessarily decided by examining its verdict and the trial record, while treating hung counts as having no…

The dissent would affirm the Court of Appeals' determination that the 1986 bankruptcy injunction barred only claims seeking recovery from Manville's insurance proceeds or estate for Manville's wrongdoing, not claims alleging independent wrongdoing by Travelers.

The Supreme Court held that a plaintiff bringing a disparate-treatment claim under the ADEA must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that age was the but-for cause of the adverse employment action, and that the burden of persuasion never shifts to the employer to show it would have taken the same action…

The Court held that it has jurisdiction to review the CAAF’s decision and that Article I military appellate courts have subject‑matter jurisdiction to entertain writs of coram nobis to correct fundamental errors in final convictions. The judgment of the CAAF was affirmed and the case remanded for further proceedings.

The Court held that the President validly exercised authority under the EWSAA to make the terrorism exception to foreign sovereign immunity inapplicable to Iraq. That action restored Iraq's immunity and eliminated subject-matter jurisdiction over the pending suits, regardless of when the underlying conduct occurred.

The Court overruled the rule barring police-initiated questioning after a defendant requested counsel at arraignment, concluding that the rule’s practical costs outweighed its benefits and that existing Miranda and Edwards protections were sufficient.

The Court held that New York violated the Supremacy Clause by denying its courts jurisdiction over damages actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against correction officers while permitting those courts to hear analogous federal claims.

Justice Alito dissents from the Court's grant of certiorari and vacatur in light of Arizona v. Gant. He argues the Gant test creates uncertainties regarding vehicle searches incident to arrest, illustrated here by petitioner's arrest for threatening his wife and subsequent car search finding a gun and drugs.

Justice Alito dissents from the majority’s vacatur and remand, arguing that the Gant test adopted from Thornton creates uncertainty about the scope of vehicle searches after an arrest on a warrant.

The Supreme Court granted certiorari and vacated the judgment, remanding the case to the Fourth Circuit for further consideration in light of Arizona v. Gant. Justice Alito dissented, arguing the new Gant test created uncertainties that this case illustrated, and he would grant certiorari to clarify the rule.