Supreme Court of the United States

United States v. Navajo Nation

April 6, 2009556 U.S. 287

Summary

The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Scalia, again rejected the Navajo Nation's Indian Tucker Act suit seeking $600 million for the Secretary of the Interior's handling of the 1987 amendments to coal Lease 8580. The Court held that none of the statutes the Federal Circuit relied upon — 25 U.S.C. § 635(a), 25 U.S.C. § 638, and SMCRA § 1300(e) — applies to the lease or creates money-mandating fiduciary duties, and that the Government's 'comprehensive control' over tribal coal cannot ground liability without a specific rights-creating or duty-imposing statutory or regulatory prescription. Because the Tribe identified no applicable trust-creating source of law, the Court did not reach whether any trust duty would be money-mandating, reversed the Federal Circuit, and remanded with instructions to affirm the Court of Federal Claims' dismissal. Justice Souter, joined by Justice Stevens, concurred, agreeing that Navajo I precedent controls even though he still regrets that his dissent in that case did not prevail.

Holding

  • Scope of the Navajo I mandate. The Navajo I mandate did not completely foreclose consideration of statutes unanalyzed there, but Navajo I's reasoning — particularly its insistence that courts train on specific rights-creating or duty-imposing statutory or regulatory prescriptions — left no room for the result the Federal Circuit reached on the sources of law it relied upon.
  • Applicability of 25 U.S.C. § 635(a). Section 635(a) does not apply to Lease 8580 and cannot be invoked as a source of money-mandating rights or duties, because the lease's indefinite term mirroring the IMLA persuasively shows it was negotiated and approved under the IMLA, not the Rehabilitation Act.
  • Money-mandating character of 25 U.S.C. § 638. Section 638 does not impose a money-mandating duty on the Secretary to follow the Tribe's recommendations as to royalty rates under coal leases executed under another Act, and such a reading cannot be enforced through the Indian Tucker Act.
  • Applicability of SMCRA § 1300(e). SMCRA § 1300(e) is categorically inapplicable because Lease 8580 was issued in 1964, some 13 years before SMCRA's enactment, and the provision is limited to leases 'issued' after that date; a lease is not 'issued' whenever it is amended.
  • Liability premised on comprehensive control and common-law trust principles. The Federal Government's liability cannot be premised on control alone; trust principles, including those premised on control, may inform the damages inference only after a plaintiff identifies a specific rights-creating or duty-imposing prescription bearing the hallmarks of a conventional fiduciary relationship, and because the Tribe identified no applicable trust-creating statute or regulation, the Court did not reach whether any trust duty was money-mandating.

Docket 07-1410

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