Supreme Court of the United States, 2008

Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Souter, dissents, arguing that the Navy’s failure to complete a NEPA environmental impact statement before conducting sonar training defeats the statute’s purpose and that the district court’s injunction and mitigation measures were proper.

The Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's judgment and vacated the challenged portions of a preliminary injunction restricting Navy sonar training. It held that preliminary relief requires likely, not merely possible, irreparable injury, and that the equities and public interest in realistic military training…

Justice Breyer, concurring in part and dissenting in part, argues that the district court’s injunction imposing two mitigation measures lacks a sufficient factual basis and should be vacated, but he agrees that the Court of Appeals’ modified conditions are appropriate pending the Navy’s EIS.

Justice Breyer dissents from the denial of certiorari, arguing the Court should consider whether admitting a victim impact film with a powerful emotional effect violates the Due Process Clause in a death penalty proceeding.

Justice Thomas concurs in the Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari, holding that Georgia’s statutory proportionality review of death sentences is not constitutionally required and that the Georgia Supreme Court applied the established proportionality standards without error.

Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Breyer, respects the denial of certiorari in this bankruptcy case. They express concern over the circuit split regarding the interpretation of § 365(c)(1) concerning assumption of executory contracts but agree to deny certiorari here because resolving the issue would require…

The Supreme Court per curiam denied the petitioner's applications for a stay of execution and for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that no congressional or state legislative action is likely to give domestic effect to the International Court of Justice judgment and that the petition lacks a viable claim of unlawful…

Justice Scalia's majority opinion held that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to possess firearms unconnected with militia service, including using a handgun for self-defense in the home.

The Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s judgment requiring further proceedings before FERC, but on alternative grounds. Part III of Justice Scalia’s opinion, joined by Justices Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, and Ginsburg, required FERC to clarify whether the contracts imposed excessive burdens on consumers over time and…

Justice Stevens dissenting, rejects the majority's adoption of a Mobile-Sierra doctrine that presumes contract rates are just and reasonable unless they seriously harm the public interest.

The Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings, holding that the Mobile‑Sierra presumption applies to wholesale‑electricity contracts regardless of whether FERC initially reviewed the rate without the presumption and that the same “serious harm to the public interest” standard…

Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Souter, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer, dissents. He argues the Second Amendment protects a collective right tied to militia service, not an individual right to self-defense.

The Court held that forfeiture by wrongdoing permits admission of otherwise unconfronted testimonial statements only when the defendant acted with the purpose of preventing the witness from testifying; causing the witness's unavailability through wrongdoing alone is insufficient.

Justice Alito dissents, arguing that the Eighth Amendment does not categorically prohibit the death penalty for child rape. He contends the Court misidentified the national consensus because legislative inaction resulted from prior dicta, not evolving standards of decency.

The Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the death penalty for the rape of a child where the crime did not result in death. The Court found a national consensus against such punishment and determined in its independent judgment that the penalty is disproportionate to nonhomicide crimes.

Chief Justice Roberts dissents, arguing that Article III standing requires a personal stake in the outcome of litigation. He contends that assignees for collection only, who must remit all proceeds to the assignor, lack such a stake under precedents like Lujan and Vermont Agency.

Justice Breyer's opinion held that assignees holding legal title to claims for money owed have Article III standing even when contractually obligated to remit all litigation proceeds to their assignors.

The Court, in an opinion by Justice Breyer, held that an ERISA plan administrator that both evaluates claims and pays benefits operates under a conflict of interest. Courts must weigh that conflict as one circumstance in abuse-of-discretion review, without changing the standard of review or adopting special…

The Court, in an opinion by Justice Thomas, held that 11 U.S.C. § 1146(a)'s stamp-tax exemption applies only to transfers made pursuant to an already confirmed Chapter 11 plan. Because Piccadilly transferred its assets before confirmation, the Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit's judgment and remanded.

The Court unanimously held that federal statutory habeas jurisdiction extends to American citizens detained overseas by American forces subject to an American chain of command, including forces participating in a multinational coalition.

Justice Stevens concurred in part and dissented in part, agreeing that the Court has jurisdiction but contending that outright dismissal under Rule 19 was too inflexible. He proposed reversing and remanding for further proceedings before a different judge or a stay pending Sandiganbayan decisions.

The Court held that under Rule 19(b) the district court must give weight to the foreign sovereign immunity of absent required parties before proceeding with the litigation. The Court of Appeals erred by evaluating the merits of the Republic of Philippines' claims, which infringed on its immunity, and reversed the…

Justice Kennedy's opinion held that the interpleader action must be dismissed under Rule 19(b) because proceeding without the immune Republic of the Philippines and its Presidential Commission on Good Governance would prejudice their nonfrivolous claims to the disputed assets.

Justice Ginsburg delivered the unanimous opinion rejecting an expansive doctrine of nonparty preclusion based on virtual representation. Federal-question judgments instead have preclusive effect against nonparties under established exceptions, not an open-ended balancing of relationships and interests.

Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion held that the Suspension Clause protects the noncitizen petitioners detained at Guantanamo Bay, that the Detainee Treatment Act’s review procedures are not an adequate and effective substitute for habeas corpus, and that § 7 of the Military Commissions Act therefore…

Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion for the Court held that class-of-one equal protection claims are unavailable in the public employment context and affirmed the Court of Appeals. Employment decisions characteristically involve subjective, individualized judgments, and requiring rational-basis review of allegedly…

Justice Alito delivered the unanimous opinion of the Court. The Court held that liability under 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2) requires proof that the defendant intended a false record or statement to be material to the Government’s decision to pay or approve a false claim; merely obtaining payment from government-derived…

Justice Breyer dissents, arguing that the merger problem is a sentencing issue better resolved by the Sentencing Commission than by interpreting 'proceeds' as 'profits,' while expressing concern over unfairness in money laundering penalties for underlying crimes.

The Court unanimously held that transportation money laundering under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)(B)(i) does not require an attempt to make illicit funds appear legitimate, but does require knowledge that concealing or disguising a listed attribute of the funds is a purpose of the transportation.

The plurality held that 'proceeds' in the money laundering statute means 'profits' rather than 'receipts,' applying the rule of lenity to resolve statutory ambiguity. This interpretation avoids a merger problem where ordinary business expenses of an illegal activity would constitute money laundering.

The Court affirmed the judgment sustaining collateral relief from Santos’s and Diaz’s money-laundering convictions. Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion, joined by Justices Souter and Ginsburg and, except for Part IV, Justice Thomas, concluded that the undefined term “proceeds” was ambiguous and that the rule of lenity…

Justice Alito’s opinion for the Court held that the ADEA’s federal-sector prohibition of discrimination based on age authorizes claims of retaliation for complaining about age discrimination.

The Court, in an opinion by Justice Breyer, held that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 encompasses retaliation claims, including retaliation for complaining about racial discrimination against another employee.

Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court held that 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(3)(B), prohibiting specified pandering and solicitation of child pornography, is neither substantially overbroad nor impermissibly vague, and reversed the Eleventh Circuit.

The Court affirmed the rejection of a facial constitutional challenge to Indiana’s voter photo-identification law. Justice Stevens’s plurality, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy, concluded that the record did not establish burdens sufficient to invalidate the statute in all its applications, given…

Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment that Indiana’s voter-identification law does not violate the Constitution. He argued that under Burdick v. Takushi, only severe burdens on voting rights justify strict scrutiny, while ordinary burdens receive deferential review.

Justice Souter dissents from the Court’s judgment sustaining Indiana’s voter photo ID law, arguing it burdens the right to vote disproportionately on poor, elderly, and disabled citizens without sufficient state interest.

The Supreme Court vacated the Illinois Appellate Court's decision, holding that state courts erred in using an "operational function" test to justify apportionment without first determining if the taxpayer and the sold asset formed a unitary business.

The Court unanimously held that an asset's operational function is not an independent constitutional ground for apportioning income outside the unitary business principle. Illinois therefore could not uphold its tax on Mead's gain from selling Lexis merely by finding an operational purpose without determining whether…