Supreme Court of the United States
United States v. Santos
June 2, 2008553 U.S. 507
Summary
A fractured Supreme Court affirmed the vacatur of Santos's and Diaz's federal money-laundering convictions, holding that 'proceeds' in 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1) means 'profits' rather than gross receipts. Justice Scalia's plurality opinion found the undefined statutory term genuinely ambiguous between its two long-accepted ordinary meanings and invoked the rule of lenity, rejecting the Government's arguments from statutory purpose, the 'merger problem,' and ease of prosecution. Because Justice Stevens supplied the necessary fifth vote on the narrower ground that no legislative history addresses 'proceeds' for stand-alone gambling operations, the Court's holding under Marks is limited to cases lacking such contrary history. Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment on that narrower ground, while Justice Breyer and Justice Alito (joined by The Chief Justice and Justice Kennedy) dissented, contending that 'proceeds' means gross receipts and that the merger concern should be resolved outside the word 'proceeds.'
Holding
- Whether 'proceeds' in 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1) means 'receipts' or 'profits.'. The term 'proceeds' is genuinely ambiguous: it carries two long-accepted ordinary meanings ('receipts' and 'profits'), has acquired no settled technical meaning in the federal criminal code, and every appearance of the word within the money-laundering statute remains coherent under either definition.
- Whether the rule of lenity requires the 'profits' definition notwithstanding the Government's scope-and-enforcement objections.. Yes—the rule of lenity dictates adoption of the 'profits' definition, which is always more defendant-friendly; the Government's appeals to statutory purpose and to ease of prosecution cannot overcome it.
- The scope of the holding under Marks and its application to respondents' convictions.. Because Justice Stevens's concurrence supplied the necessary fifth vote on a narrower ground, the Court's holding is limited to the proposition that 'proceeds' means 'profits' when there is no legislative history to the contrary; Stevens's speculations about cases with contrary legislative history are dicta forming no part of the holding. On that ground, neither Santos's payments to lottery winners and employees nor Diaz's receipt of payments as an employee involved the lottery's profits—the Government did not try to prove, and respondents did not admit, laundering of criminal profits—so the money-laundering convictions fall and the judgment below is affirmed.
Docket 06-1005
Cited authorities
- 2225 U.N.T.S. 209
- Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-2314
- Ind. Code § 35-45-15-5
- N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 30-51-2
- Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 1315.51
- Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-10-1902
- Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-246.3
- 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956